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The relationship of civil society to the state is rarely antagonistic and at most times 
supportive. The political regime and civil society are taken to be interdependent social structures 
that interact through hegemonic, supportive and socially constructed dimensions. Given this 
interdependency, when does civil society challenge authority or do its efforts rise to the level of a 
people’s power revolution? When does it act to dismantle the political regime or seek to 
reconstruct it? This project attempts to shed light on how civil society mobilizes a people’s power 
capable of challenging political authority through the story of its ongoing struggles to pursue 
social objectives in Zimbabwe in the 1990s.  
Since 1980, the Zimbabwe African National Union (Zanu) controlled the only post-colonial 
government Zimbabwe has known. Drawing from its revolutionary credentials it set out to finish 
the interrupted war for Zimbabwean Independence. This objective resonated with civil society 
less and less over time as groups began to see Zanu’s promises as hollow and its corruption and 
patronage systems as the primary obstacle in accomplishing their objectives. This development is 
explored through a grassroots empowerment movement, the Organisation of Rural Associations 
for Progress, the widespread protests in 1997 catalyzed by the Zimbabwean Congress of Trade 
Unions and the efforts to rebuild the constitutional order spearheaded by the National 
Constitutional Assembly.   
The story points to at least three civil society strategies to locate power within the people 
and counter political power: 1) constructing political alternatives within the existing regime, 2) 
mass withdrawal of support for the authority of the regime and 3) reconstruction of the social 
contract. Nevertheless, civil society did not succeed to dismantle the political regime, hampered 
by the continuing capacity of the state to exert hegemonic control, remove the pillars of its 
support and exploit polarized values within civil society.  
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Despite the terrible destruction of social and economic fabric of the country by the 
political struggles of the 2000s, the ongoing development of democratic values and the 
diminishing importance of the interrupted revolution can provide a glimmer of hope for the future 
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PRELUDE: THE FILABUSI CAMPFIRE 
Or how I learned that people’s power makes a difference 
By the light of a campfire in the village of Filabusi, Zimbabwe in 1997 villagers gathered 
for a discussion on the possibility of creating the country's first community foundation from their 
contributions to a traditional savings practice called qoqelela. Women of all ages sat on the 
ground with their legs straight out in front of themselves, as is the custom; interspersed among 
them where a few men, but many stood in the back where their faces were only illuminated 
occasionally when the flames of the fire burned more brightly.  
I sat in a small space cleared for the guests, staff and mobilizers with the Organisation of 
Rural Associations for Progress (ORAP). Our objective was to discuss the creation of the 
country’s first community foundation from the contributions that villagers in this community and 
50,000 other ORAP members across the region had made to assist in their own development.  
After a process of research and inquiry that had taken years and involved members from many 
villages, different models, such as microcredit organizations, had been discarded in favor of 
building a philanthropic foundation that would be owned by its original donors and would seek to 
increase financing by partnering with local and international organizations. A community 
foundation is an organization that raises and distributes resources, usually in the form of grants, 
for the benefit of a particular community. 
With the reality finally coming to fruition, however, some challenging political issues had 
come to the fore. The most important one was who would be supported, whether it would be all 
communities in the region of western Zimbabwe (the three provinces—Midlands and 
Matabeleland South and North—in which ORAP worked) or only the communities of ORAP 
associations that were original contributors. Some ORAP staff members were worried the 
contributors would expect the foundation to support only those groups that had given the initial 
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start-up funding. They argued that grants to non-contributing communities could fan new 
jealousies and anger as those who did nothing to build the new foundation would jump on as free 
riders once it started distributing grants.  We set out to answer this question by visiting many of 
the contributors in meetings such as this one in Filabusi. As an advisor to the process (I worked 
with an organization that was partnered with ORAP), my role was to learn and help shape the 
foundation to meet the expectation of the contributors. 
In the electric atmosphere of accustomed politeness, one of the ORAP staff members 
carefully reviewed the qoqelela initiative, recalling the years of discussing how ORAP members 
could mobilize their savings to fund their own initiatives. Through the qoqelela initiative, village 
mobilizers had collected five Zimbabwe dollars apiece from contributing members. Each dollar 
was to be used to fund projects at various levels of organization. The first dollar was for the family 
units, the smallest level of ORAP organization. The next three dollars funded other levels of 
organization, but the fifth and final dollar, was the subject of creating the shared greater dream 
launched the process for building for the future. Heads nodded in understanding. Each person in 
the crowd had experience with raising and using the funding on these levels particularly in their 
family units.  
Then, the ORAP speaker reviewed how the lessons and work led to shaping a 
community financing institution called a “community foundation.” When it was clear that this 
narrative conformed to the general understanding, we began to discuss some of the issues that 
were being raised in the final efforts to establish this new organization. The ORAP speaker 
emphasized the investment of the contributors and their dreams to progress in their own areas. It 
would be understandable, she emphasized, if contributors were counting on this money to come 
back to them to help invest in their projects. Was this the case, did they want the new foundation 
to commit to funding only the projects of the groups who have contributed to it? That is, did they 
want the money they had given to start the foundation to come back to them in the future in the 
form of grants?  
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The question was important because ORAP had already evoked the ire of some of its 
members who had contributed money and not received receipts or financial reports.  But it was 
also important to shape the mission and programs of the future foundation. Was it to be an ORAP 
program, that is, meant to support only ORAP linked associations or was it to take on a larger 
vision and mission for community development in the region? 
A pause followed in which the profiles of audience members danced as shadows in the 
firelight across their neighbors. I wondered if people had understood the question. In a way, it 
seemed like it had an obvious answer. Of course, the contributors expect to be the main 
beneficiaries of the foundation. Staff at ORAP had been telling me this for weeks, arguing that the 
foundation would need to have a narrow mission. Perhaps it could grow in time, but the 
foundation needed to be accountable to those who invested in it as its first priority.  
Finally, an elderly woman pressed her skirts around her outstretched legs and rose in the 
flickering light. Solemnly and in a confident voice she said, no, of course we do not expect this 
money to come back to us.  Our dream is that it will help everyone, that it will build a better future.  
This future may be something that those of us here will never know.  Only our grandchildren and 
their grandchildren will live to see it. 
One could see and hear the murmurs of assent around her. As though a dam had 
opened, several others rose to build on the idea of how important it was to open the dream to 
everyone. Some spoke of the lack of resources for everyone’s development and others argued 
that it would make no sense for ORAP communities to progress at the expense of their 
neighbors. Most would have agreed, at the least, that the twenty years of waiting for the fruits of 
governmental promises for development and prosperity had yielded little progress.  What brought 
them together, however, was not resistance but the dream of building on the traditions, ideas, 
energy and resources they already possessed without waiting for the government.  Their need to 
believe they could take development into their own hands, ran counter to an air of resignation that 
hung over a country in which the practice of waiting for government patronage and its social 
programs to lift up its citizens was commonplace. How did the passion for autonomous 
 4 
development and the firm commitment to social solidarity fit with a political sphere that seemed to 
rule largely from clientelist structures and closing off the access to resources for the benefit of a 
few?  
My work brought me often to Zimbabwe in the 1990s. I traveled extensively around the 
Bulawayo region to meet with members of village associations and other organizations engaged 
largely in community development.  One thing that struck me again and again was how 
knowledgeable and politically savvy many people were.  Despite the fact that print media and 
television were scarce in the rural areas—but hardly absent—most people found time to listen to 
the radio or to analyze political and economic affairs with their friends and neighbors. As an 
upshot, they were very aware of and concerned about the political context in which they found 
themselves. They tended to be intimate with current events and history and curious about diverse 
sides of issues. 
Political debate covered not just local issues but international politics and events such as 
the US invasion of Somalia. Zimbabweans struggled with why the world was willing to let 
Rwandans die and rot in their own rivers and watched with hope the demise of the racial regime 
of Apartheid in South Africa. Talk of Zimbabwean politics itself was guarded. Nevertheless, I 
regularly heard murmurs about how the “old man” (Robert Mugabe) could not live forever. 
Frustration with the high cost of school fees and a common interest in addressing the region’s 
endemic water shortages were hot political issues.   
I compared the Zimbabweans I met to my expectations about political interest in the 
United States where political discussion, in my experience, seemed to be limited to those who do 
it for a living or families with an interest and culture of political services. I was curious and 
wondered what to make of the much higher general level of political consciousness. Why did 
Zimbabweans (and this seemed to hold true in Botswana where I also lived but less true in 
Mozambique) care so much? Why did Americans care so little? I was left with a conclusion that 
Zimbabwean society was deeply political. Fanon’s undifferentiated and apolitical masses were 
hard to find in Zimbabwe in the 1990s. Whatever catastrophe was on the horizon could not be 
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attributed to the political ignorance of the people. Which is not to say that citizens were in the 
political driver’s seat. Robert Mugabe and those around him seemed to be on a train speeding to 
the end of its tracks. They could neither disembark nor turn themselves around. By 1997, it was 
clear that historical change was on the horizon in Zimbabwe. 
What was uncomfortable was the contradiction between what appeared to be a strong 
understanding of political power and a sense of powerlessness to change it that pervaded the 
society around me.  It seemed that every discussion on political conditions ended with a 
disclaimer, “well, the old man is old now,” “we can only hope,” “The problem is, who will replace 
him,” or a standard Zimbabwean expression of polite resignation when considering a change in 
the political climate, “maybe.”  
The feeling of hopelessness in the shadow of power politics may be a constant for us all. 
We have all felt and fought against it. Nothing heals this dismay of citizens when we realize that 
we are incapable of moving our leaders or our institutions from destructive paths. But we do 
console ourselves by acting where we can, by doing what we can—keeping the government at 
bay. What I saw was a government that was very present in all aspects of life. The widely 
repeated warning to be careful of criticizing the government of Zimbabwe because the CIO 
(Central Intelligence Organization) had spies in every bar and restaurant, for example, illustrates 
just how much people believed the Zimbabwean government was breathing down their necks. 
Citizens discerned few degrees of separation between themselves and their national leaders. 
National leaders exercised direct control to a degree that politicians are rarely visible in the United 
States.  
Perhaps the zenith of the idea of civil society has come and gone.  Those who wanted to 
hitch their hat on civil society as the next big hope for “democratization,” believe very strongly that 
all social and political progress must point that way. Robert Putnam and Vaclav Havel, among 
others, gave shape to an idea of an energetic civil society that pervaded 1990s Zimbabwe. In this 
form, civil society alters the course of bad policy, puts pressure on the government to respond 
and acts on behalf of the voiceless. To the south of Zimbabwe, in South Africa, civil society was 
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crowned as an important factor in the demise of Apartheid. And, to differing extents, something 
called civil society was embedded in the many democracy movements of the 1990s in Africa.  
The fervor over civil society by 1990 was primarily caused by the fall of totalitarian 
governments in Eastern Europe1.  Civil society showed its strength in Africa by being an 
organizational space in which people demanded the demise of Apartheid and acted to change 
regimes in Zambia and other single party states.  Could civil society emerge as a balancing 
power to unjust, undemocratic governments? The answer was apparently yes. It seemed that 
political change was emerging from a new people’s power in Mozambique, Zambia, Botswana, 
Malawi and across Southern Africa,. As such, the support for civil society organizations, 
specifically NGOs, was becoming a staple for international donors.  The post-colonial 
relationships with the international community established on a donor/recipient relationship 
worked on their own logic. United Nations Agencies, the international financial institutions and 
Western AID programs became more attentive to NGOs, as an alternative way to reach African 
populations. Having fostered the creation of one-party states during the Cold War, many African 
governments, Zimbabwe was no exception, had severely limited all political competition. The idea 
of civil society, thus, not only promised to strengthen citizen organization and voice—leading to 
greater democracy—it provided a means to take alternative paths for development and policy that 
would not directly compete with government power.  
The international financial institutions sought to reshape African political economies 
through structural adjustment programs in the 1980s and 1990s with little or no concern for the 
impacts on the rural poor. Civil society organizations picked up the slack and tried to address the 
negative impacts of retrenchment and weakening of social services. The price tag of providing 
pitifully small resources for civil society organizations to address social needs was nowhere near 
the scale of development funds being demanded by African governments.  Support was justified 
                                                      
1 Chris Hamm traces the origins of the meaning of civil society in Eastern Europe to an antidote 
for totalitarianism.  Seen as a replacement of socialism, he argues it is a weak utopian concept 
that is no longer taken seriously in the region. Hamm, C. (2004) In the Church of Civil Society. in 
M. Glasius, D. Lewis and H. Seckinelgin (eds) Exploring civil society : political and cultural 
contexts. New York: Routledge, pp. x, 213. 
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not by the potential economic gains or even the assistance to poor communities but because of 
the supposed linkage between civil society and good governance, which was seen as a real 
solution to the mismanagement of government and economy. Read this way, the West may have 
channeled support to civil society, not so much to balance the power of African governments but 
to keep them in power by supplying an escape valve for citizen expectations. While this financial 
support may have distorted internal social processes by stimulating a cottage industry of NGOs, it 
was only successful to the extent that it met a homegrown demand for association, characterized 
by a fundamental human drive to make life better. 
Sitting around the Filabusi campfire, I began to think of civil society as the place in which 
people bring and form their sense of justice in the context of their aspirations and dreams. I do 
not think this is merely an idealistic process but a practical one in which people gain the capacity 
to judge political positions. The staff at ORAP had one understanding in which justice could only 
be served by limiting the benefits of a new institution to one that would privilege some over 
others. Happily ORAP staff tested their own ideas of justice by asking people what they wanted 
and creating the conditions in which people could actively participate in an ethical discourse. 
What if a state as a political institution of the people could be formed in the same way? This is not 
such a theoretical question as that is exactly the aspiration that would later become so powerful in 
the work of the National Constitutional Assembly to convene a national dialogue around 
constitution making.  
The Zimbabwean discourse of the time seemed to be caught in a vortex of despair. But 
this was not the same as political apathy. I began to think that expressions of resignation should 
not be taken as sign that Zimbabweans had given up, but rather that they were part of a process 
of coming to understand what was at stake in the political sphere and how to address it.  It was 
common to shake your head and say something along the lines of “Maybe the old man should go, 
but who will replace him? Zimbabwe has nobody else who can take his place.”   
Underlying these words for me is the challenge of understanding why not just anybody 
can lead a polity, because not just anybody has the credibility as well as the raw power and skills 
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to direct the Leviathan. The content of the political message (the real objectives of the 
government and not just manipulating propaganda) and how it is heard against the diverse 
dreams of people and groups is continually judged and changing as part of the political process. 
The problem deserves to be understood on its own ground. The persistence of the political cult of 
personality as it plays out in Robert Mugabe is not merely because of a cultural predilection to 
personal leadership, it is related to how power is constructed.   
I hoped my Zimbabwean friends could find a way out of the vice of political power. 
Whether or not Mugabe had the powers they ascribed to him seemed to be irrelevant because 
they acted as if he and his government had those powers.  In the largely Ndebele region of the 
country where I worked, the persistent shortage of water and the perceived neglect or hostility of 
the government to local development was the reality. The recent history of repression in the late 
1980s (the Gukurahundi, in which thousands of largely Ndebele Zimbabweans lost their lives and 
homes) cemented a fear and pragmatism about public complaint and forced resentment under 
the surface.  How much of this changed strategy and how much affected the objectives 
themselves? Civil society hardly came to halt; it even seemed to thrive as a haven for the 
irrepressible desire to better material conditions. My Zimbabwean colleagues and friends did not 
outwardly oppose the government but, instead, pursued social and economic goals within the 
framework of possibilities, such as building schools and providing seed resources for community 
projects.  
Still, government was always there. ORAP, for example, might build a school but the 
government would provide the teachers, it might fund a livestock project, but the government 
created the conditions around which livestock farming was possible. It is no wonder then that the 
strategy of ignoring the government only works for so long. I observed that, under a veneer of 
respect for authority and what seemed like profound patience, Zimbabweans were not really 
waiting but actively constructing a citizenship and society that would, eventually, come to oppose 
the government they had.  
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The Filabusians clarity over a future that should benefit everyone was echoed 
everywhere I went. Zimbabweans were crafting and creating a politics of involvement, discussion 
and action. I think of the elderly woman declaring that her contribution (and dream) had to benefit 
everyone including the generations to come, as a critique of the politics of patronage that would 
be echoed over and over again in the post-1997 efforts to bring about political change. It seemed 
to me that a clear political stance, a national democratic vision, if you like, was emerging from the 
experience of these communities to build for the future and to act on their aspirations.   
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CHAPTER ONE: OVERVIEW AND APPROACH 
In pursuing social objectives, citizens are political animals and civil society is a sphere of political 
power. While some challenge the legitimacy of a political regime, the relationship of civil society 
to the state is rarely antagonistic and at most times supportive. When does people’s power 
challenge authority? When does it act to dismantle the government or to seek to reconstruct it? 
While economic and material deprivation certainly motivates citizen anger, is it useful to think of 
people’s power as social construction in the realm of political authority? This project seeks to 
bring to light how civil society in its struggles for justice and emancipation constructs a people’s 
power capable of challenging political authority. Not all attempts to dismantle a political regime 
are successful. We can learn much about the limits of people’s power through a case in which the 
political regime was able to fend it off. Zimbabwe is taken to be such an instructive case.  
 
The front door clearly marked with the well-known name of a Zimbabwean human rights 
organization was open and welcoming. Despite a climate in 2002 in which human rights 
defenders were being openly persecuted, there were no signs of increased security here. The 
calm, empty reception called attention to busier days when the well-worn furniture had seen much 
more traffic.   
The receptionist was pleasant despite the fact that we had not made an appointment 
ahead of time. She ducked momentarily into the director’s office and returned to invite us in. Even 
though he did not know us and was immersed in a climate of uncertainty and fear around human 
rights work in which it was rational to react with caution, the director greeted us warmly and 
proceeded to talk to us for hours about the challenges of human rights in his country, continuing 
with the interview well after his receptionist left for the evening.  
In very sad detail, he described the breakdown in the rule of law over the last two years, 
how the courts, which had a reputation for independence, were now bowing to political pressure 
and the ruling party was persecuting, hounding or firing independent judges. It had become very 
unlikely to get a just ruling in the country, he said.  He was clearly miserable and feeling a little 
lost.  “I will tell you, it’s no secret.  I am also thinking of leaving the country.” He paused when he 
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said this and then asked a simple rhetorical question that stuck with me.  “What is a human rights 
lawyer if there is no rule of law? I am nothing here.”  
This project began as an intuition that the answer to a similar question, “what is civil 
society without formal political power?” was a defendable, “it is still a realm of people’s power.” I 
had worked for years in a variety of countries where people consciously identified themselves as 
part of civil society in their pursuit of a broad range of social goals. They even spoke of power and 
empowerment as things that fundamentally belonged to the people. Where government was 
weak, impunity common and the barriers to formal political participation exceedingly high civil 
society seemed a rallying call for many. Granted I was working in the 1990s and 2000s, after the 
fall of the Berlin Wall and the first waves of democratization in Africa. At the time, the term “civil 
society” was in common use by those out of political power; a glimmer of hope that governance 
could be built from within. But beyond this consonance of practical political strategy and the 
interests of foreign aid (coupled at the same time with the dismal failures of structural adjustment 
in which many governments became less capable of bettering the plight of their citizens), there 
was something motivating and powerful about the use of civil society that attracted not only the 
disaffected but some of the best minds. I have heard the idea that civil society in these countries 
is a haven for the government in waiting. It seemed to me that it is much more than this; that it is 
a source of political power accessible even when all other formal avenues are shut down. 
Whether the aspiration to change the nature of political power is stated in a social mission or 
submerged in the motivating subtext that brings groups together, the social objectives of civil 
society organizations provide a shared set of ideas not only about how the world would be better 
but also about how we believe it is possible to change it. The question is not only then the one the 
Bulawayo lawyer posed, (restated: how can civil society act on social objectives (human rights) 
without government (providing the courts and infrastructure needed for the rule of law), but how 
can government actually accomplish political objectives without the support of civil society 
(legitimizing and acting on these objectives)? 
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Civil society groups struggle to bring about small and large changes on the way to 
accomplishing their objectives. How does this struggle affect the political sphere?  How do their 
accomplishments add up?  
In working largely with organizations in the Global South that are seeking such broad 
outcomes as an end to poverty, the defense and expansion of human rights or the protection of 
the environment on which we depend, I felt that civil society had deep claims to the political 
sphere that were not captured on lower levels of analysis—evaluating the impacts of NGO 
advocacy efforts, for example—but were part and parcel of the structural relationship that 
interlinks civil society and the political regime.  
Despite enormous volumes of literature produced on the subject of civil society, in my 
own experience the attempts to tie it down are unsatisfactory. As Chris Hamm argues the belief in 
civil society has become a secular religion for a better life that has grown in importance as the 
expectations for a socialist alternative have diminished.  
…the emphasis on NGOs and the ‘third sector’ that was supposed to be an autonomous 
force beyond the spheres of the state and market was both a simplification and a 
distortion of the two principle classical strands of civil society theorizing—that which 
refuses the state versus society dichotomy (Ferguson, for example) and that which 
identifies civil society with the atomistic world of the market (for example, Marx) (Hamm, 
2004).  
Michael Walzer in locating attempts to search for the good life in the state or the state as 
controlled by a cooperative economy, the market or nationalism comes to the possibility of a 
corrective in the idea that, “the good life can only be lived in civil society, the realm of 
fragmentation and struggle but also of concrete and authentic solidarities where we fulfill E.M. 
Forster’s injunction, “only connect’ and become sociable or communal men and women” (Walzer, 
2003, p 313).  
This vision of civil society, not as an afterthought but as a place of realization does not 
forgo the need for the state, the market, capitalism or national identities but it raises the profile of 
civil society as an imperfect place in which the search for a better future is paramount.  
Ideally civil society is a setting of settings: all are included, none is preferred. The 
argument is a liberal version of the four answers [political society, the cooperative 
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economy, the marketplace and nationalism] accepting them all, insisting that each leave 
room for the others, therefore not finally accepting any of them” (Walzer, 2003, p 313).  
In my own experience, those who consciously engage with the concept of civil society are 
quite convinced that civil society provides a position from which the good life can be pursued. 
This could be a new form of misplaced faith or a reflection of impatience over the slow pace of 
political reform but social activists do not seem to care. They use their associations intentionally 
to change the political, economic and social systems that repress them and are often pragmatic 
about ideological positions on capitalism, socialism and nationalism. The political perspective 
they embrace is only occasionally one in which the state is in the center—much can be 
accomplished by acting on the social fabric to change opinions, organize direct action and find 
ways to meet the goals of a community with as little support or interference from government as 
possible. Political advocacy, as a specific attempt to change government action, emerges as a 
strategic necessity but behind it are always the social missions around which groups organize in 
the first place. Thus Amnesty International members act for the release of political prisoners in 
order to attain the freedom of the prisoners of conscience and not to gain political power as an 
end in itself.   
Political literature that tries to situate civil society within political developments tends to be 
frustrated by the moments in which civil society organizations show little conscious interest in 
directly changing or supporting formal political institutions and then plays catch up to explain the 
forces at work when civil society erupts to put major pressure on a political regime. I have 
wondered how civil society would be an effective political force if it is sometimes political and 
sometimes not. I began to think that part of the problem of understanding the dynamics at work in 
modern civil societies was the tendency to equate all political action with a state-orientation.  The 
separation into political and social spheres of activity allows us to mark off the world of political 
action but politics is more than the art of rule, as Walzer notes, the state is expected to pursue a 
vision of social order and social good.  
Civil society associations use their governments to mobilize, educate, engage and 
integrate. They want to right wrongs and alter repressive practice as well as develop the 
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underdeveloped. These political programs are translated into formal politics when politicians 
produce policy and act. Of course, not all social objectives emerge victorious in elections (or coup 
d’états for that matter) and at any point there are contradictory ideas of “the good” coexisting 
within civil society.   
Politics, formal and informal, is a part of the social universe. While government shapes 
civil society, civil society must also shape government. Of course, this view is not particularly 
astounding. Civil society for some observers, like Robert Putnam, is a necessary element for 
democratization because it pressures and shapes responsive governance. “Government 
institutions receive inputs from their social environment and produce outputs to respond to that 
environment” (Putnam, 1993, p 9). On the other hand, it is problematic for Marxists because it 
undermines the emergence of a working class capture of power.   
Neither of these attitudes on civil society focuses on the processes that come from 
association. People learn and come to understand what is fair and what is not fair, often re-
evaluating their understanding of injustice as they see how their actions affect others. The 
emergence of a society that is no longer willing to tolerate a specific ideology or political regime 
still seems like a somewhat magical process because civil society harbors alternate and 
conflicting ideas of justice.   
Why did it take over fifty years to dismantle apartheid in South Africa or a hundred years 
to address state-sanctioned racism after the end of the American Civil War? When repressive 
political policies seem so clear in historical hindsight, it is easy to forget that they were once 
considered sufficiently legitimate, not merely through the force of conquest and the imposition of 
material power but because, uncomfortably, society had not yet come to a critical turning point in 
its process of self-understanding and, thus, sanctioned the continuation of practices that unjustly 
squelched the ability and capacity of its members.   
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People’s Power 
Since the 1986 Philippines People Power revolution, we have seen the emergence of 
people’s power2 revolutions, in which people have tossed off dictatorial regimes in favor of 
something approximating greater democracy.  Perhaps, the recurring resort to people’s power in 
the Philippines and the 2011 Arab Spring are among the best known. Such revolutions seem to 
be characterized by dispersed leadership, the emphasis on democracy and the diverse identities 
of the people who take to the streets with a clear message against the prevailing political regime. 
We measure their success by the ending of repressive regimes. While people power revolutions 
seem to push in the direction of greater democracy and political openness, aligning them with 
emancipatory aspirations, the broad base of citizen solidarity encompasses many perspectives 
on what makes a good society. In a people-power moment socialists and capitalists rub shoulders 
as do groups normally divided by religious, ethnic, gender, age, occupational, etc. affiliations.   
What makes people’s power a phenomenon of the modern age may be that experience, 
values and objectives are shared over greater distances and without the lag of time that could 
stand in the way of simultaneous solidarity in the past.  In such a way, texting on cell phones was 
a contributor to organizational capacity in the People’s Power revolution of the Philippines (see, 
for example,Rheingold, 2003) and the internet is currently enabling hitherto unknown forms of 
virtual association. On the other hand, the many peasant uprisings of the feudal era were 
localized occurrences and the revolutionary movements of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, while spread over larger distances, required ideological positions around which to 
mobilize, share and disseminate broad social objectives. It is also true that never in history was 
the thin gruel of international norms as thick as it is today, when the belief in universal human 
                                                      
2 The term “people’s power” or “people power” came into popular use after the People’s Power 
Revolution in the Philippines in 1986. A 1989 article on People Power and Development by Alan 
During argues that community action was a growing and important force, “U.S. policymakers 
need to recognize that grassroots groups have become national political actors in a growing 
number of countries. In the search for a Third World policy relevant to an increasingly multipolar 
world, U.S. policymakers must now recognize that com- munity movements have become too 
powerful to ignore any longer” During, A. (1989) 'People Power and Development', Foreign 
Policy, 76(Autumn)..  
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rights, disconnected to a particular polity, bolsters expectations of good governance and a 
system, albeit weak, of monitoring and punishing human rights abusers.   
There is no denying that technological innovations such as the cell phone and the 
Internet have sped up change and awareness of injustice.  But faster communications with a 
larger set of people explains how the politically unacceptable is exposed more quickly but not 
how it became politically unacceptable in the first place. An undeniable increase in the density of 
internationalized norms in the UN and regional systems has also facilitated political change, by 
making more available the language and the concepts available to express our outrage over the 
politically unacceptable. But these international norms, basic human rights and the acceptable 
action of states did not magically become local norms just because UN declarations have been 
translated into many languages. Each right is a struggle against repression that must get its 
content from the efforts to overcome actual experienced repression. We do not fight for a 
theoretical good but for unrealized aspirations that are sufficiently possible because they are 
shared and, thus become a social fact. This solidarity, sharing and dreaming are what I have 
learned to believe is a first fact of civil society. Such ideals are ensconced in the “civil” as 
recognition that our objectives have meaning in a world of inter-subjective meanings. In Africa the 
saying goes, “I am, because you are” and the idea of civil society seems to go further to say, “I 
can because we can.” 
On a macro level, civil society is a part of the structure of the modern polity and, can play 
a number of roles. While it is by necessity amorphous as a space for social aspirations, it is 
clearly delimited by the political rules of the game.  But this is not the same as being absolutely 
defined by those rules, something inferred by those who propose a close relationship between 
economic capitalism and civil society3. In my experience, even in very repressive governments, it 
                                                      
3 As Shils remarks, “the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of Hegel’s idea rejected his notion of the 
pluralism of civil society; it changed his notion of reciprocal autonomy and interdependence of the 
state and society by making the state entirely dependent on the ruling stratum of society and 
placing society completely under the control of the state” Shils, E. (2003) "The Virtue of Civil 
Society". in V. A. Hodgkinson and M. W. Foley (eds) The Civil Society Reader. Lebanon, New 
Hampshire: University Press of New England. 
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is impossible to completely reduce civil society to the realm of political control because it is as 
implicated in the emergence of what is politically possible—by keeping alive social objectives 
even in very small groups--as it is regulated by the control of the state.  
If social interaction happens through thousands of channels and the legitimacy of social 
objectives is reinforced through actual interaction, then political transformation takes place in 
visible spaces where groups and associations conceptualize what stands in the way of meeting 
their social objectives and in the strategies and language they adopt to express claims on justice.  
Transformation is obviously not limited to their advocacy for political change, while this may rise 
in importance depending on the role of the state, but is guided by the formulation of their missions 
and objectives that express what is wrong that needs to be changed.  
In this way, my approach to civil society and political authority goes beyond political 
advocacy or other engagement in formal politics as evidence of political activity.  My task is to 
look for evidence of support and tension between the political regime and civil society in the way 
in which social and political objectives are actualized on the ground of associative life. It also 
departs from prioritizing NGOs or other formal organizations as the universe of civil society, 
arguing instead that civil society has its own eco-system that includes almost all non-
governmental organization around socially legitimated ends.  The type, density and limitations of 
these organizations are important as part of the mediating social fabric that makes particular 
social objectives possible.   Still it is the objectives themselves that emerge as a force to 
legitimate one political direction over another. 
The meeting point between legitimate political authority and civil society is some sort of 
social contract that governs what can rationally be expected. Such an agreement is concretized in 
constitutions and norms by which governments operate. The ruling regimes hold the mantle of 
authority to the extent that they honor the agreement to provide sufficient conditions for 
individuals and groups to accomplish their objectives; security, law and order being necessary but 
insufficient conditions because peace is only meaningful to the extent that one can rationally hope 
to pursue one’s objectives. When these objectives become increasingly impossible to realize, 
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how and why does civil society come to exert a people power’s force against the state?  If civil 
society plays the soft role of legitimating political authority, we should be able to see the social 
contract as an ongoing process and not a moment in the past.     
To find evidence of this legitimizing process, I question how and why social objectives 
may resonate with the political objectives of the state and how and why they move to a sufficient 
mass of dissonance with a political regime’s claims to authority. Because civil society as I 
conceive it here is a structure that enables many streams of consonant and competing objectives, 
I think that the way to understand and embrace it is to tell the story of its journey in this process 
through the eyes of social actors. I have chosen the case of Zimbabwe as a platform to explore 
this story partly because I think its political development can tell us much about possibilities that 
are buried in what we think we already know about politics and partly because the story of civil 
society and the state in Zimbabwe did not come to a clear resolution it can reveal complexities in 
the processes in which state and civil society interact.  
  Why Zimbabwe? 
For me the question of why explore civil society and political authority in the Zimbabwean 
context has two answers. The first is that I have struggled as an outsider although also as a friend 
to colleagues in Zimbabwe to understand the events that led to its unraveling for many years. My 
personal connection, while in no ways equal to the wonderful theorists and observers who have 
personally participated in the events of the last two decades (such as Brian Kagoro or Brian 
Raftopoulos), is something I have drawn on throughout to explore and question.  The second 
reason is that Zimbabwe is an excellent case to see where people’s power pressed for change, 
where it was able to succeed and where it fell short. 
How I became aware that change was underfoot 
In Bulawayo, Zimbabwe in 1997, I chatted with a colleague about the spheres of 
expanding war to the north and west, in Zaire, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and Angola. The 
promise of peace and quiet in the region that had felt so strong and palpable as conflicts were 
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settled in South Africa and Mozambique was evaporating with the stubborn march to war to the 
north.  I wondered out loud if the circles of conflict would continue to grow like those from a rock 
tossed in a pond. I could see a map of conflict emanating out from the Congo in my mind’s eye. 
Such circles could easily reach Zambia, I said, hoping my Zimbabwean friend would not find me 
alarmist.  No, he replied, the conflict is already here and it is the end of Zimbabwe as we know it.   
Zimbabwe looked nothing like its neighbors in 1997. It had enjoyed significant stability 
over its 17 years of independence. While its economic future was not rosy, the economy had 
certainly not collapsed. But my friend told me that its people no longer believed in the 
government; that neither Zanu nor Robert Mugabe could feed the image of a false country any 
more.  I knew then that my friend had many reasons to be disgruntled. Being from the Matabele 
people meant that he acutely felt the brunt of the Mugabe/Zanu government that had heavily 
persecuted them not even a decade in the recent past and, in his perspective, continued to 
neglect their region of the country. But having fought successfully for many years on the national 
level for the rights of disabled people—a battle that entailed significant patience and strength—
my friend also had a great respect for the power of law and enforcement to help secure 
protections for vulnerable people.   
In my job at the time, directing the Synergos Institute’s Southern African programs, I met 
with many supposed Zimbabwe experts both within the country and without. Every one of them 
seemed to be blind to the electric atmosphere of opposition that my friend saw so clearly. Over 
the next three years, as the crisis moved from bad to worse, I thought long and deeply about my 
friend’s clear sight. Somewhat sheepishly, I realized that my own rather mystical materialist idea 
of ripples of trouble expanding outwards from the banks of the Congo had no way of accounting 
for the kind and type of crisis that hit Zimbabwe. While there are similarities to its neighbors—the 
rise of violence; political corruption and the maniacal attempts to keep political power; the 
dismantling of political, social and economic institutions and the dominance of survival 
strategies—the battles and resistance were more openly connected with the particular struggle 
over what the vision for the future of the country should be. 
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It was important to take seriously how and why Zimbabweans were ready to sacrifice the 
order and stability of the Mugabe/Zanu regime for change. The change seemed to come from 
within civil society itself because Mugabe, and his Zanu party, had not changed to my knowledge, 
nor were they doing anything more awful in 1997 than in 1987. Of course, this point is subtle. 
Was it a change in the nature of the political regime that caused a reaction within civil society or a 
change in civil society that made the actions (corruption, patrimonial politics and anti-democratic 
governance) of the regime unbearable?   
For a while, I wondered if the change had been caused by external events. If the end of 
the Cold War and the new political credibility of South Africa and the, not unrelated, bloody 
political battles to the north could explain what predisposed Zimbabweans to reject their political 
leadership and set out on a precipitous and dangerous course.  While, I still think that the 
reduction in relative power is an important part of the story, what I realized was that an attempt to 
maintain its regional power could not completely explain the loss of faith of the citizens and their 
invigorated commitment to deep political change. It was as though people had woken up one day 
and decided it was possible to take things into their own hands.   
There are many for whom the impending train wreck of political crisis is explained by 
democratic deficits and the resulting political mismanagement and corruption—in fact, this is how 
many of the participants in Zimbabwe’s people’s power moment would explain their grievances. 
But when does mismanagement and corruption come to matter? How do people come to a 
breaking point that makes present political realities untenable? It is clear, and I hope will be 
clearer as I go along, that Zimbabweans had already broken with their government by 1997. Civil 
society organizations became overtly political both in expressing the dissatisfaction of the people 
and in promoting awareness of the injustices perpetrated by its political regime. Their activities 
were focused on creating political alternatives and opening up a closed political system. But the 
unwillingness of the government to change—in fact, outright refusal—pushed the country further 
into crisis. How did this conflict between state and civil society entail the dismantling of the 
 21 
political system? My feeling was that the answers to some of these questions were very important 
to moving our understanding of civil society.  
A bundle of potential lessons 
So why should the texture of civil society in Zimbabwe be instructive? The case for a 
people’s power revolution in Zimbabwe might appear weak because the political regime did not 
fall in the 1990s and is still holding on today. Would it be better to choose an unmitigated 
success—such as the Philippines--where a people power’s revolution resulted in the changeover 
of political power? First of all, this is to pre-define success of people’s power as the end of a 
political regime—a win or lose scenario—when the record seems clear that the challenge of re-
constituting political authority does not end with the exit of the previous regime but begins as 
society comes to terms with raw power and continuing injustice. If people’s power is exerted 
through a constructive process, what happens before and after is as important to explore as the 
demonstrations themselves. In that way, a country like the Philippines has lessons to offer in the 
struggles that came after the first people’s power revolution, which eventually led for a need for 
people to take to the streets in a second and a third. Rather than seeing people’s power as a 
moment, Zimbabwe helps us to see it as a continuing process that may or may not succeed at 
any one point.  
Still, the country is a basket case today. Why after more than a decade of crisis is the 
challenge to the political regime unresolved? It is an important illustration that people’s power 
revolutions require the unsettling of the status quo, which in the extreme means that challenging 
the political regime can result in the loss of the basic protections for security and human rights as 
well as the unraveling of the economy. The idea, then, that civil society can dismantle a political 
regime through a socially constructive process would seem to be a story that could be told about 
many places.  
But my final reason for choosing Zimbabwe is that Africa is a place of possibilities in 
which political organization looks like it does in the rest of the world but is also responding to the 
struggle to “move the center” back home, to take Ngugi’s expression (wa Thiong'o, 1993). To the 
 22 
extent that this is true and we should embrace the ongoing development of African polities, they 
can tell us much about the possibilities of political organization because they are less committed 
to a dominant stream of international ideas. These alternatives—such as systems of communal 
welfare—are possible in the richer and more powerful countries but are less visible because of 
the dominant political and economic forms of organization. I really do not want to think of 
Zimbabwe as a particularly African case of state and civil society, nor as an exceptional case in 
the breakdown of the modern state structure. I think that Zimbabwe adequately illustrates the 
political power of civil society in general and hope that telling its story will produce a narrative 
about the interrelations of state and civil society. 
A Critical Approach  
My goal is to explore how civil society exerted people’s power against the political regime 
in Zimbabwe.  What were the limits of its ability to alter the political landscape and why did this 
not result in an end of the regime? In Zimbabwe, how was the government able to oppose 
people’s power effectively enough to ensure its own survival despite (or because of) the resulting 
large-scale destruction of the country’s social and political health? 
These questions are relevant not just to Zimbabwe but also to other countries with similar 
histories and to our understanding of the relationship between civil society and the state. One 
way of approaching them would be to compare a variety of cases of the emergence of people’s 
power, but this could bury the legitimizing processes and over generalize that which makes the 
most sense in the context in which it emerges.   
Instead I wish to engage deeply with the pursuit of social objectives in Zimbabwe by 
questioning what was at stake and how social actors interpreted them in the 1997 to 2001 period. 
I question the political and social objectives within this single case of people power to tell what I 
hope is a plausible story about how political authority was viewed and constructed by social 
activists. Such an inductive approach cannot generalize that all civil society will result in people 
power revolutions or that when it does it will exert this power through a particular form, such as 
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protests and strikes. But if we can see in one country some of the constructive texture between 
civil society and the political regime, it should demonstrate immanent political qualities of civil 
society everywhere.   
This project is critical, emancipatory and social constructivist in orientation. It conceives 
social facts as emerging out of processes that can be measured as the struggle against 
repression and for greater freedom. In asking how civil society comes to see political authority as 
illegitimate, I explore where and how the broad objectives of the political regime resonate with the 
social objectives of citizens. While there is a strong case to be made that shifts in authority 
correlate to material causes—economic hardship, land ownership, the conditions of workers, the 
corruption of politicians, the diffusion of technology, etc.—my interest is how civil society views 
and interprets these material conditions in light of the government’s narrative about what it seeks 
to accomplish.  
Unpacking social objectives 
I take social objectives to be the intentions and aspirations that people express through 
their association. These objectives are sometimes stated in the missions and goals of 
organizations but most are probably never clearly stated. They are called on, however, as 
justification for action. Several social objectives such as, democratization, may implicitly inform 
much social action. I do not seek to define democratization but to show how it is manifests in the 
objectives of civil society.   
I also do not try to show that all civil society organizations conceive of this progress 
toward greater freedom in the same way. A cumulative picture of all of civil society objectives is 
not only extremely difficult but I take it to be unnecessary. Directions and tensions are visible and 
while these do not sum up all of civil society, the extent to which they are embraced and/or 
ignored tells us something about objectives that resonated in society as a whole. While there is 
almost always a counter objective to any social objective, I take it as sufficient to show how 
particular groups conceive of the obstacles they face. I will make use of the idea of resonance, by 
which I mean that objectives are reproduced or held by many people, to suggest movements 
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within society, often that are picked up and communicated by simple statements such as 
“Mugabe must go.” 
In this way, this project sees the emancipatory movements of civil society in the 
resonance or dissonance of objectives, focusing on the conception of people’s power as a 
process in which the dissonance of social and political objectives leads people to share the 
common goal of dismantling the political regime. As such, it will explore how groups within civil 
society have expressed and pursued their objectives, as both communication and action, as a 
process in which political objectives are legitimized and, thus, political authority. According to 
Habermas' insight:  
The revaluation of the particular, the natural, the provincial, of social spaces that are 
small enough to be familiar, of decentralized forms of commerce and despecialized 
activities of segmented pubs, simple interactions and dedifferentialized public spheres--
all this is meant to foster the revitalization of possibilities for expression and 
communication that have been buried alive (Habermas, 1989).  
The constructive processes in which civil society associations are engaged are often 
under the surface.  Thus, civil society remains a partly buried element in the story of Zimbabwean 
demise easily discounted as too weak to stop the government from its destructive policies but not 
understood to be part of dialectical processes of political transition in the direction of a new social 
contract. A focus on the dialogical component of civil society is warranted as a potential 
emancipatory force for that which has been repressed.  As Andrew Linklater points out:  
The recent dialogic turn in social theory points towards a normative approach to 
community which supports greater universality coupled with a deeper commitment to the 
wealth of human difference (Linklater, 1998).  
Subsequently, in order to unearth process leading to the de-legitimization of the political 
regime in Zimbabwe, the project analyzes and considers how the dominant objectives of the 
political regime and the concrete objectives emerging from social groups interact. It will employ 
participant and external observations that illustrate what is considered to be the "dominant" 
political discourse and look for evidence of resonance and dissonance with social objectives.  
Generalities about "dominant" meanings, such as the political regime’s objective for 
ongoing liberation, are taken as starting places to question the overall frame within which the 
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political regime seeks to legitimize itself. These dominant objectives, in this sense, are above the 
surface, repeated in public speeches and formalized in policy documents.  
Since discourse shapes values that lead to structures and behavior (similar to Emanuel 
Adler's description of a structurationist approach to epistemic communities (Adler, 1992)), piecing 
together narratives of the social discourse of civil society requires an interpretive methodology, 
where the researcher places his or her views squarely within the universe of inquiry. In this way, I 
make use of both my own experience working in civil society and, particularly, in Zimbabwe in the 
1980s and 1990s as an additional resource in interpreting textual evidence.  
Both identification of "frames" and "discourses" are used to ferret out social objectives. 
"Frames" can help to interpret what is at stake. "Frames are interpretive schemata that enable 
participants to locate, perceive and label occurrences, selectively punctuating and encoding 
objects, situations and sequences."4 While extensive use is made of text normally to verify a 
particular frame, I think what is important to the story is the understanding of actors that they are 
organizing their objectives into a frame for the purpose of moving forward or staking out a social 
fact. In this way, my approach is to identify where framed objectives link and break with political 
authority, not to prove the truth of the claims but to contribute to the story as social process.  
Similarly discourse looks at discursive fields by drawing from a variety of texts but also 
"the spoken words of social movement participants, leaders, opponents and bystanders…." 
(Johnston, 2002). I have consulted newspaper articles, materials from civil society organizations 
and essays and books that have reported about the period as my main sources. While these 
sources are incomplete, often the unconscious ways in which objectives and meaning are 
reported make stronger arguments for their existence than mission statements and lists of 
organizational objectives. 
                                                      
4 Johnston, H. (2002) Verification and proof in Frame and Discourse Analysis. in B. Klandermans 
and S. Staggenborg (eds) Methods of social movement research. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, pp. xx, 382. p. 63, quoting Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, Framing 
Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment." Annual Review of Sociology 
26:611-39, 2000. 
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I have also renewed my contact with Zimbabwe through a visit in 2010 and informally 
interviewed friends and acquaintances to help understand the social objectives at stake. These 
interviews have helped to point me in directions, but the choice of the direction was, I hope, what 
the available resources dictate guided by but not determined by what either my friends or I expect 
to be there. 
The one exception I have made to being exclusively guided by primary sources is the 
Chapter Three discussion of the political objectives of Robert Mugabe and the Zanu regime. 
Confronted with a mountain of texts, I did not want to make this a study of how Zanu formulated 
and expressed its objectives. Others have taken on this task with some success. As such, I found 
rich analysis of Zanu/Mugabe qua Zimbabwe government aspirations and I have called on these 
sources to help build a simple framework for understanding the overall objectives of the political 
regime. In focusing on political objectives, I do not throw out the idea that the overriding objective 
of a political regime is to study what it takes to stay in power. As Machiavelli said,  
A prince should therefore have no other aim or thought, nor take up any other thing for 
his study but war and its organization and discipline, for that is the only art that is 
necessary to one who commands” (Machiavelli, 1950).  
But I am looking for pointers that are sufficient to show political resonance and 
dissonance and illuminate social processes that lead towards or away from the political authority 
of a regime.  Beyond the political theoretical positioning of civil society, the key goal is to tell a 
plausible story about the flow and dynamic interchange of political values and meanings that are 
posited as essential to civil society. The study looks at particular moments of conflict, process and 
resolutions that lead to the shaping of meaning. In short, my approach is to locate social 
objectives that are reflected back into society and deepened through discourse and action.  
Outline of the Next Chapters 
Overall, this project starts by reviewing civil society as it emerges in political theory. My 
exploration then delves into objective-focused interpretations of events to look for the intersection 
points of the social and political objectives of civil society organizations and individual activists 
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with those of the political regime. As civil society is by nature diverse, I look for points of entry that 
reveal something about the aspirations of associative life to show resonance or dissonance with 
the political regime and to draw lessons about the limits and contours of the political power of civil 
society. 
The second chapter starts by building a theoretical framework around civil society and its 
relationship to the political sphere. I draw on Locke and Hegel to argue that civil society is an 
expanding sphere of civic action characterized by the expression and action for social objectives. 
The power of this relationship can be called upon as a resource for political hegemony but it also 
exerts a pressure for greater democracy that is constructed through the pursuit of social justice 
that is produced and reproduced through social interaction. Civil society, thus, while composed of 
diverse aspirational activity can come to understand a government as repressive and withdraw its 
support when the political regime is seen as the major stumbling block to the accomplishment of 
social objectives.  
A case is then made that the Zimbabwean political regime as embodied in its leader 
Robert Mugabe and the ruling party, Zanu, consistently expressed political objectives in the 
direction of continuing the (interrupted) independence revolution to overthrow white colonial rule 
and to put the country back onto an autonomous, internally driven development. Chapter Three 
explores how these objectives were materialized and employed in the nearly two decades 
proceeding the political crisis. It explores how continuing the revolution justified a particular view 
of independence that increasingly replaced the former colonial masters with Zanu itself and then 
became more and more difficult to square with the internally driven search for a more 
autonomous development.  Continuing the revolution also seemed to undergird several strategies 
in key areas that became frames deployed to explain government policies for protecting against 
internal and external enemies, Africanization and economic development. Given the revolutionary 
stance of the government, it asks how and why Zanu became cut-off from its own civil society, 
which began to disbelieve in Zanu’s objectives or its commitment to them and highlight its 
corruption.  
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The fourth, fifth, and sixth chapters follow the story of civil society and social objectives. 
The contours of the growing dissatisfaction with political authority is told through the stories of 
three organizations—the Organisation of Rural Associations for Progress (ORAP), the Zimbabwe 
Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) and the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA)—that acted 
as pivot points around which civil society associations pursued social objectives. Each of these 
organizations had a mass following and a supportive relationship with a network of other civil 
society organizations and was recognized as a center of alternatives or opposition. In this way, by 
telling the story of their attempts to pursue social objectives in the period leading up to and 
include the crisis, we seek to learn about the limits and possibilities in the relationship between 
civil society and political authority in Zimbabwe.  
In the fourth chapter, we start with ORAP, a peasants’ movement in the western region of 
Zimbabwe that developed a narrow and influential set of democratic objectives that resonated (as 
seen by its large membership) with the desires of villagers to increase their autonomy from the 
state and other development agencies.  Through ORAP and its actions, it can be seen that civil 
society association was developing empowered citizens in spite of the government’s attempts to 
control all resources.  While eschewing any direct involvement with political parties, ORAP was 
born in a difficult political context when residents of the region were largely identified with the 
opposition Zapu. Nevertheless ORAP provided its members with a self-empowerment 
methodology that helped them to create alternatives to government-led development and became 
an important provider of drought relief services.   
Having seen one way in which civil society was carving out a space for greater freedom, 
we then turn to the labor movement in the country in the fifth chapter. The Zimbabwe Congress of 
Trade Unions was able to mobilize broad-based protests against the imposition of new taxes in 
1997 that were intended to raise resources to pay veteran’s reparations. Coming from a history in 
which it was largely seen as ineffective at advocating for labor rights with government (and the 
private sector), the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions was the focal point for this direct assault 
on government.  
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Many of its leaders, and most particularly its Secretary General, Morgan Tsvangirai, 
helped to channel frustration into a massive work stayaway—resulting in the people’s power 
demonstrations of 1997 and 1998, which received support across Zimbabwean civil society. This 
beginning eventually laid the path for the establishment of the Movement for Democratic Change 
(MDC), which lodged the first real competition against Zanu.  Exploring how and why the protests 
became a focal point for eroding a culture of restraint shows the rapidly changing relationship 
between civil society and the political authority of the Zanu regime. The protests, however, did not 
go as far as to topple the Zanu regime, even while there were overt calls for its end. The 
countervailing force of the veterans, whose cause was a significant part of the framing of political 
objectives, uncovers the hegemonic structure of civil society through which Zanu was able to re-
exert its control.  
In Chapter Six, we turn to the efforts that began in 1997 for a participatory process of 
constitution making to replace the faulty and oft-amended Lancaster House Constitution. A 
coalition of groups brought together by the Zimbabwean Council of Churches (ZCC) initiated 
discussions that led to the establishment of the National Constitutional Assembly in 1998. These 
groups, which included the Zimbabwean Congress of Trade Unions, took the important step of 
moving directly onto the political playing field with the aspiration of creating a new constitution for 
Zimbabwe. They had come to the point of agreement that a participatory constitutional culture 
was a critical missing ingredient in improving governance in the country. The plans would be both 
to invest in the civic education of Zimbabweans and to engage its citizens in a process of debate 
and drafting a new constitution. The constitution was a focal point because the ten-year waiting 
period imposed by the Lancaster Agreement had expired and the government had not moved 
seriously to draft a new constitution. As it turned out, Zanu thought it could use the pressure for a 
new constitution to both rebuild social bridges and to meet its own ends in fortifying party 
strength. It was sadly mistaken. The NCA and other groups pushed the “no” vote against its draft 
constitution and when it materialized in a national referendum, the resulting euphoria was 
significant enough to propel a dynamic launch of the Movement for Democratic Change. 
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Through the aspiration and action of these three focal points for social objectives—
ORAP, the ZCTU and the NCA—a picture emerges of a vibrant associative sector that arrives at 
an impasse where the diversity of its goals and aspirations can only be achieved by reforming the 
structure of its government.     
The final chapter comes back to the question of why people’s power in Zimbabwe was 
not sufficient to bring about the fall of the regime—as it has in other places in the world. What 
lessons can we learn from the Zimbabwe example? How far does people’s power go and what 
are its weaknesses that can be and are exploited by its government in the name of political 
survival? Zimbabweans have invented strategies to address the specific repressive practices of 
their government but the closed political administration was able to maintain control of the political 
space as its citizens fled both state-sponsored violence and the widespread economic, political 
and social devastation that followed.  
The key goal will be to tell a plausible story about how and why civil society comes to 
dismantle the political regime. In the end, the challenge is to see “people’s power” and the “social 
contract” as socially constructed processes. Protest, opposition, alternative action and resistance 
build new awareness and help to focus a demand for political change. Actual exercise of our 
freedoms brings us to see the effects of our actions on others as well as to experience the ways 
in which the political sphere is repressive and supportive. 
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CHAPTER TWO: TOWARD A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Civil society is a society that has agreed to submit to political rule in order to attain greater 
freedom. The political regime relies on the power of civil society, exerted through hegemonic, 
democratic and socially constructed dimensions in order to pursue its objectives. Civil society 
while not directly a part of the structure of a political regime provides the political foundation on 
which the political regime sits. It is an open-entry structure, in which people and their communities 
participate to meet and define their own ends (objectives) and in so doing shape political 
possibilities. Political authority is the power given to states through consent or agreement that we 
can call a social contract. Civil society calls on institutions like NGOs, churches, universities and 
others as resources for its social objectives. These institutions act as magnifiers or repressive 
agents for social objectives, much as the state does. As civil society is a structural element of a 
governed society, it can be conceived as a site of power exerted on its partner political regime 
both by seeking change within the system and by withdrawing its support.  
 
On 19 February 2011 at the Harare Labour Center, police swept in to arrest 45 people 
(actually 44 as it seems one of the group was a state informer) who had gathered together to 
watch footage of events that led to the ouster of the leaders of Tunisia and Egypt. Inspector 
James Sabhu, the spokesman for the police said that the activists were watching the video “as a 
way of motivating them to subvert a constitutionally elected government” (Dugger, 2011) (CNN 
Wire Staff, 2011).  The government announced that the activists who included Munyaradzi 
Gwisai, a University of Zimbabwe Law Lecturer and coordinator of the Zimbabwean International 
Socialist Organization would be charged with treason, an offense punishable by death.  
While 39 people were later freed, the government focused its case on six activists 
Antoneta Choto, Tatenda Mombeyarara, Edson Chakuma, Hopewell Gumbo and Welcome 
Zimuto (Bell, 2011). During the trial in March 2012, the prosecutor asked Gwisai if it was not 
strange for Zimbabweans to meet to build solidarity with faraway movements.  “There is nothing 
odd about it,” Gwisai replied. “No less a person than President Mugabe has condemned other 
African leaders for not working in solidarity when one of their colleagues was attacked and killed 
and surely that cannot be bad about the working class in Zimbabwe”(Olende, 2012). 
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The activists had met to learn from the movements in 2011 that started in Tunisia and 
then moved to Egypt, Morocco, Bahrain, Libya, Yemen and Syria. The fervor of people’s power 
revolutions took the world by surprise with journalists and political analysts scrambling to 
understand the people’s demands and to identify the leadership of the movements. People’s 
power in the Arab world seemed to defy the conventional wisdom all too accustomed to the idea 
that political change would come slowly and be mediated through an Islamic religious lens. This 
myopia obscures grassroots struggles in the Arab world, as in other countries, for a more “open 
society,” and recognition of rights to pursue a wide variety of social objectives. But how does civil 
society provide a countervailing force for good governance and accountability unless it actually 
has the power to interpret political malfeasance and bring governments to accountability?  
The accountability mechanism for many analysts is the electoral box. This narrow 
interpretation of civic power holds civil society always hostage to the political regime. Participation 
in elections is an indisputable vote for the legitimacy of the regime—parties, laws, and 
government power—but elections are not the only way that civil society relates to political power. 
As in the case of the Zimbabwean activists, civil society organizations are constantly learning, 
changing both tactics and their understanding of what is at stake. 
In the last 20 years or so, the term “civil society” has been consciously linked to the 
pursuit of good governance. This chapter considers a theoretical construct in which civil society is 
more than a passive force for democratic governance; it is also an active site for the pursuit of the 
good life and, thus, is a political force for action toward the common good that should be 
understood on its own ground.   
Returning to Locke and Hegel we locate civil society within its original emancipatory 
political framework. Consulting with Gramsci, de Tocqueville and Habermas/Cohen we recognize 
three capacities, hegemonic leadership (Gramsci), diffuse democratic traditions (de Tocqueville) 
and social-justice construction (Habermas/Cohen), as dimensions of its relationship to political 
authority. Building on this, the chapter emphasizes a dual vision of civil society, one that is both 
constricted by Gramscian hegemonic ideas of thought leaders that enforce dominant values and 
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still wields a people’s power that emerges from the exercise of freedoms (de Tocqueville) as a 
politically constructive practice leading to a shared understanding of the common good across 
diverse social objectives to which political authority must ultimately answer.  
For the purposes of understanding the structural relationship between civil society and a 
political regime, civil society is defined as an open-entry structure, in which people and their 
communities participate to meet and define their own ends (objectives) and in so doing shape 
political possibilities. The structure is populated by a variety of forms of association, not all of 
which are organized into formal structures.  The formal structures, however, help by providing 
organizational capacities and continuity to social objectives, they also can become repressive to 
the extent that they weed out and direct aspirations that do not conform to their organizing logic.  
Why be Concerned with Civil Society? 
Since Rousseau and Locke theorized a process by which we give up some of our political 
power in order to gain the security of life and property and de Tocqueville linked the strength of 
democracy to associative action, the idea that political authority must emerge from the agreement 
and active assent of the people has had currency.   
In this way, this is a story about how civil society becomes a political power, particularly 
for demanding accountability to some sort of social contract and calling for a new one. The 
importance of the social contract need not be forcefully argued as it has taken a place among 
what is considered necessary elements for the formation of polities although it is often conceived 
as a more theoretical and less practical construct. This story looks at the social contract as a 
living, evolving agreement related to a) how political awareness is developed through associative 
action, b) how people’s power is developed and begins to manifest itself, c) the limits to this 
power and d) the transformation and re-emergence of people’s power in response to both 
success and failure. 
Civil societies are now commonly associated with supposed political goods, exemplifying 
the hopes that democracy, human rights and good governance can be brought about 
through the direct action of citizens. Considerable attention has been given to civil society 
as an important ingredient in democratization (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997).  The 
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idea of civil society has helped us to name social/political forces at work on both the 
economic and political spheres of activity. The first and important step was to differentiate 
a civil society from society in general. Civil society emerges in the quest for political 
organization that will expand freedom. As Locke shows, it is civil because it accepts limits 
on the freedom that comes to us by nature. As the concept unfolds in Hegel, civil society 
is a space between the family and the state where people exercise their freedoms. 
Locke and the necessity of civil society  
John Locke proposed that people commit themselves to the project of government to 
achieve security (general protection, identity, services and rules) that ultimately enable them to 
act for their own legitimate ends. As Locke argues in the Second Treatise on Government,  
The only way whereby any one divests himself of his natural liberty and puts on the 
bonds of civil society, is by agreeing with other men to join and unite into a community for 
their comfortable, safe and peaceable living one amongst another, in a secure enjoyment 
of their properties, and a greater security against any that are not of it (Locke and 
Macpherson, 1980).   
It is the bonds or limits on our actions that characterize the person in civil society. 
Communities must have some respect for the inter-relationship of ends and will feel the necessity 
for laws, rules and the enforcement of them. The first transition for Locke is the movement to a 
social fabric that can support protections and enable greater freedom; the political state embodies 
the rules and enforcement of these protections. To secure rights to enjoy the benefits from action 
in community, people relinquish “natural liberty” to the state with its authority to interpret and 
enforce rules and, thus, gain: 
…a standing rule to live by, common to every one of that society and made by the 
legislative power erected in it; a liberty to follow my own will in all things, where the rule 
proscribes not; and not to be subject to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will 
of another man: as freedom of nature is, to be under no other restraint but the law of 
nature” (Locke and Macpherson, 1980).  
In this way, civil society is characterized by a broad shared awareness of the necessity of 
political authority to secure a more narrow (because activity is limited by the state) but greater 
capacity to actually exercise and develop freedoms. In Locke’s primordial social agreement, civil 
society is a social medium that justifies political authority to secure person and property. Civil 
society can only exist where there is consent to this political authority.  
In practice, it is very difficult to withdraw from a social contract. By so doing, a non-
consenting civil society, to use an oxymoron, will undermine the authority of the very political 
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regime that provides, however imperfectly, the enabling framework for its own actions. When and 
how will a civil society come to the point where benefits of reconstructing political authority 
outweigh the consequences of withdrawing its support? While human rights instruments and 
international pressure provide thin protections (take Somalia, Myanmar or Haiti for example) for a 
“global civil society,” the efforts to dismantle or reform a particular regime from within require 
significant social resources, courage, commitment and clear sight. 
Hegel and the ends of civil society 
While Locke focused on a contract made in the theoretical past, one of the keys to civil 
society for Hegel in the Philosophy of Right is the present constantly developing nature of the 
universal principles that inform political life. This state of development comes about through a 
dialectical process in which the tyranny of survival dictates that the mind is exclusively occupied 
with satisfying its needs—it lacks the security to enjoy the fruits of its own labor beyond the 
immediate present. Doing what one must to survive is an unfreedom because the mind is under 
the compulsion to satisfy basic needs (as opposed to the external unfreedom of physical 
insecurity stressed by Locke). By only satisfying needs, the particular mind, which has not yet 
developed into an individual consciousness—reflects the universal into itself and it becomes a 
“vessel” capable of the development of the idea (the direction of freedom).  
The mind that has thus passed into the realm of civil society will be able to expand its 
area of action through association (complete interdependence). In this free space of activity, 
humans will both better meet the basic needs of survival and enter into an open space of activity 
in which they can pursue their individual happiness, their social objectives.  
In the course of the actual attainment of selfish ends-an attainment conditioned in this 
way by universality—there is formed a system of complete interdependence, wherein the 
livelihood, happiness and legal status of one man is interwoven with the livelihood, 
happiness and rights of all. On this system, individual happiness, &c., depend, and only 
in this connected system are they actualized and secured (Hegel, 1967). 
The important end of civil society is education because it makes understanding possible 
in the process of freeing the mind. It is the direction that one is willing to take because it creates 
the ground for a greater freedom, escaping the unfreedom of necessity. Education is not separate 
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from the individual’s activities undertaken to satisfy wants and needs, in fact this is what 
motivates the person to submit to what would otherwise be a rather tedious and painful process. 
The mind learns how to satisfy its wants and needs in the direction of the ultimate freedom that it 
seeks but that is, at this point, only an idea.  
The disfavor showered on education is due in part to its being this hard struggle; but it is 
through this educational struggle that the subjective will itself attain objectivity within, an 
objectivity in which alone it is for its part capable of being the actuality of the Idea (Hegel, 
1967).  
The mind as particular is only an unrealized essence before it submits to this process. It, 
then, becomes an individual—with a sense of owning its own ends and a capacity for “infinite self-
determination” (Hegel, 1967). Civil society only exists as such in the simultaneous development 
of the political state because people require the principle of universality upon which the state 
rests and shapes society, most particularly law which establishes an objective form of justice in 
which standards are not arbitrarily applied and in which there is some conception, however 
incipient, of rights. One can posit that the greatest civil society would be one in which these 
universal principles were the most accessible, stable and capable of reproduction. On the other 
hand, the more faulty and limited the “state” formed universal, the less capable the particular to 
realize the freedom that is its end.  
What Hegel proposes as a dialectical process of reflection, in which progress in the 
direction of freedom is the end, is a process in which the particular, unformed essence works with 
others to construct a world in which it can become an informed and actualized individual, whether 
or not universal principles are fully accessible.  
Citizens, who accept their submission to the state, will chafe against the tension between 
their awareness of these universal principles and the continuing unfreedom of the particular, and, 
in this way will desire to make the actual state responsive. As the project of expanding individual 
freedoms, in a multitude of forms, is pursued, it will, through the educational process, inevitably 
come to understand the unfree aspects of society as facts of injustice that must be changed. Civil 
society is thus an associative space in which people pursue social objectives that represent their 
desire both to exercise and increase their freedoms. 
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Dimensions of People’s Power & Civil Society 
How do people exercise and expand their freedoms? As a realm of free action, civil 
society organizations enable a broad range of social objectives that express the current 
objectives of groups in society in general: improvement of social services, watchdog of 
government and private sector activities, social innovation, protection of vulnerable populations 
and more.  
In terms of the relationship of civil society with the political sphere, three tendencies have 
been explored for the exercise of civic power: hegemony, wherein powerful social forces within 
civil society control what is politically possible, diffuse pressure for democracy in which the 
exercise of freedom itself is a support to democratic power by both reinforcing its logic and 
reducing the expectations that government will do for the people and the construction of social 
justice in which the social agora constructs the normative interpretations of the political world.  
The interrelation of these three aspects of civil society provides a framework for 
understanding the limits of people’s power.   
Civil society and hegemony 
The Gramscian tradition draws from Antonio Gramsci’s attempts to understand why 
progress in Italy from a capitalist to a socialist society had been impeded. Gramsci theorized civil 
society as a space that exerts hegemonic force over the state by imposing conditions that can 
retard the flow of historical progress.  
In this multiplicity of private associations (which are of two kinds, natural, and contractual 
or voluntary) one or more predominates relatively or absolutely—constituting the 
hegemonic apparatus of one social group over the rest of the population (or civil society); 
the basis for the state in the narrow sense of the governmental-coercive apparatus 
(Gramsci, 1971).  
Gramsci grappled with the question of why the working class had failed to take over the 
state in Italy, despite what seemed to be conditions conducive for a socialist revolution. He 
proposed that the regressive (non-working class) elements of civil society, namely the aristocrats, 
were responsible for impeding progress through the exertion of the hegemonic power of the ideas 
of the elite aristocracy. Even though the aristocracy was a pre-capitalist form of power it retained 
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residual power over the social world. Elite social forces of civil society, in this case the 
aristocracy, mediate and limit what social and political objectives can be pursued. One can 
conceptualize this struggle as a war, as Gramsci says:  
The massive structures of the modern democracies, both as State organizations, and as 
complexes of associations in civil society, constitute for the art of politics as it were the 
“trenches” and the permanent fortifications of the front in the war of position: they render 
merely “partial” the element of movement which before used to be “the whole of war, etc”  
(Gramsci 1971, 243).  
The Gramscian hegemonic view of civil society is primarily vertical; power flows from the 
elite, which has enormous influence over the minds of citizens and wields this influence as a 
truncheon to discipline those who would think otherwise. For Gramsci, this hegemonic power 
leads civil society to resist political objectives. It can only be a moral, progressive force when the 
workers regain control over the state and production.  
The state and civil society are locked in a “war of position.” We can extrapolate a 
hegemonic theory of civil society in which social leaders monopolize social norms. In this way of 
thinking, actual civil society is dominated by the imposition of the values of its social leaders—
social objectives are limited and channeled by the narrow control of the hearts and minds of the 
people to serve the interests of the social elite.   
Neo-Gramscian analysis emphasizes this hegemonic power over the conceptions of the 
common good held by civil society. The quest for social justice, disciplined by the dominant 
powers, constructs the limits around what political action is possible. The unit of state power is in 
the hands of political elites who are not necessarily the visible state apparatus or leadership but 
are the winning faction in the war of ideas on the turf of civil society. This provides a useful way of 
conceptualizing the political regime as integrated vertically into the fabric of civil society. Its 
objectives for society gain power through the exercise of social hegemony to the extent that they 
reflect the values and objectives of social classes that are able to dominate and lead civil society, 
in fact, any political regime that does not try to align with the social hegemons can hardly be at 
peace.  
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The political party is an important site for the contestation of hegemony because it seeks 
power by presenting and re-presenting social objectives for the benefit of its actual and potential 
supporters.  
Civil society and democracy 
While the struggle for hegemony explains much of social control, it treats the medium of 
control—civil society—as an amorphous mass led by the ideas and objectives of its social elites. 
The Tocquevillian tradition begins to explain civil society not just as a singular, directed force but 
as a diverse realm of activity that undergirds the development of political democracy, simply as a 
place of vibrant activity. As a political observer Alexis de Tocqueville was very interested in 
explaining the nature of American democracy, he wrote:  
Thus the most democratic country on earth is found to be out of all of them the one where 
men have most perfected, in our day, the art of pursuing in common the object of their 
common desires and have applied this new science to the greatest number of objects (de 
Tocqueville 2006, Ch VI).  
This symbiotic relationship between civil society and democracy is an influential insight 
taken up by Robert Putnam in his studies of modern Italian and American democracies (Putnam 
1993 & 2000). In this tradition, civil society strengthens democracy through the pluralist pursuit of 
a wide a variety of ends. Civil society is thus a supportive pillar of democracy. The political state 
accomplishes more by enabling the constant exercise of civic freedom. Through association, civil 
society associations are participants in the political world, whether or not their association is of a 
political nature. As Putnam argues from empirical studies of sports clubs in Italy, regions of more 
accountable democratic governance correlate with the density of civil society organizations and 
not necessarily with their objectives.  
The function of civil society in this tradition is the constant and persistent pressure for 
responsive governance. As the unseen hand of people participating in the marketplace drives 
efficiency and results in the optimum supply and production of economic goods, so the 
participants in civil society create an unseen social hand that results in the inclusion of diverse 
social objectives in governance.  As a companion, to the hegemonic view of civil society, the 
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Tocquevillian tradition shows how the democratic state and civil society are two sides of a coin.  
The correlation between associational density and democracy conforms to the Hegelian insight 
that the division between state and civil society is the expanding sphere of social action.  
A flaw in this logic, however, is to simply assume a necessary causal relationship 
between civil society and democracy. As Simone Chambers points out, analysts in this stream 
tend to equate civil society organizations that already have democratic values with all of civil 
society. This is a circular logic that forces us to turn a blind eye toward organizations that do not 
have “democratic values.”  
I think what we can take from the Tocqueville tradition is that strong democracy looks like 
a vibrant associational sphere and that civil society and democratic traditions are mutually 
supportive. But the question is still important, as Simone Chambers asks, “Under what conditions 
or in what circumstances does strong vigorous associational life promote civility and democracy, 
and when can we expect it to undermine democratic values?” (Chambers, 2002).  The vibrancy of 
associative life provides a measure of the efficacy of the political sphere in expanding the social 
space for people to pursue what they consider to be just objectives and to participate in the 
reproduction of political and social value that may or may not require the particular development 
of political democracy.   
Civil society and justice 
In the Gramscian tradition the tension of hegemonic values with political and social 
objectives is emphasized and in the Tocquevillian tradition the correlation between civil society 
and democracy is drawn from action on diverse and localized objectives. The seminal life-world 
(Cohen and Arato drawing from Habermas) tradition theorizes civil society as a force through 
which the social processes that construct identities, norms and culture are created and recreated.  
In this way, associative action and communication construct the justification for political objectives 
(democratic or not!), and the content that is given to ideas of social justice.  
Cohen and Arato identify associations of civil society as the sites in which communicative 
interaction results in a lifeworld of ethical possibility:  
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It is here, on the institutional level of the lifeworld, that one can root a hermeneutically 
accessible, because socially integrated, concept of civil society. This concept would 
include all of the institutions and associational forms that require communicative 
interaction for their reproduction and that rely primarily on processes of social integration 
for coordinating action with their boundaries (Cohen & Arato 1992, 429).  
The seminal life world departs from the neo-Gramscian and neo-Tocquevillian traditions 
in that it proposes no way to judge the content of the constructive power of civil society. Hence 
the ultimate good is neither the socialist nor the democratic state, per se, but is determined by 
processes that engage people in the construction of ideas of social justice. Civil society provides 
a process engine in which values and meanings required for judgment are reproduced. Central to 
the seminal life-world are justice-producing processes that emerge through communicative 
interaction.  
Justice requires actual communication, as Habermas theorizes, guided by the principle 
that every individual who is potentially affected must be an active participant in determining the 
correctness of a decision: “Every valid norm would meet with the approval of all concerned if they 
could take place in a practical discourse” (Habermas, 1990). Communicative process is 
procedural and must take place in actuality and not behind a veil of ignorance as it does for 
Rawls, “Any content, no matter how fundamental the action norms in question may be, must be 
made subject to real discourse (or advocatory discourses undertaken in their place” (Habermas, 
1990).   
Habermas develops the concept of deliberative politics in which the normative lifeworld (a 
cross-over with civil society) interacts with the political sphere. With the important exclusion of the 
private sector that has invaded the lifeworld in its control over economic production, civil society is 
largely contiguous with the lifeworld. “The results of deliberative politics can be understood as 
communicatively generated power that competes, on the one hand with the social power of actors 
with credible threats and, on the other hand, with the administrative power of officeholders” 
(Habermas, 2007). Through civil society, people produce and reproduce values on the actual 
ground of argumentation and working with others towards common ends; civil society is thus 
critical for constructing the evaluative positions through which just or unjust action has meaning.   
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This actual participation in decisions that will affect us is, of course, practically difficult but 
has been translated into political policies across the world as the necessity of getting the 
participation of citizens and communities in policy decisions. Oddly, the move to “participation” in 
policies that are still determined by policy elites is a hybrid of the hegemonic approach. The 
objectives themselves are rarely what is tested in exercises of participation, albeit driven by the 
practical concerns of policy making and the institutionalized process through which policy 
decisions are supposed to be made by proxies with the authority to represent given by election or 
force. The agencies executing political policy are, thus, limited in the ways they can learn and 
their jealousy over the right to represent limits feedback on the objectives themselves.5   
Towards an operational theory 
Combining these three perspectives into a theoretical framework on civil society, we see 
that civil society is implicated in the reproduction of political authority first off as a moral force that 
is constrained and led by hegemonic values that the political elite attempt to manipulate and 
represent (Gramsci). Second as a space of free activity in which people grow and exercise their 
capacity to accomplish their objectives, whether social, political or economic (democracy as in de 
Tocqueville and Putnam). As the site for communicative interaction, however, it is a constructive 
engine for the values and objectives themselves (Habermas and Cohen).   
In this way, I propose that we can cogently speak of the actual political authority to be 
government legitimized by its normative resonance with the social objectives of its people as well 
as its capacity to hold a practical and physical monopoly over the political sphere. The balance 
between the use of hegemony and participatory policies necessitates clarity and reproduction of 
political objectives that act as a communicative link between the realm of free action and the vast 
and diverse social objectives of the citizenry. While these social objectives are limited by politics, 
the agreement over the justness of these limits is not constructed by the government but by the 
                                                      
5 That the lifeworld constructs evaluative positions and, thus, has a kind of power, doesn’t mean 
that everything is continually up in the air, of course. Norms are established over time and people 
can call on multiple resources reproduced through education and institutions but the compelling 
agreement over normative positions is continually being produced and reproduced. 
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life-world processes of civil society.  There is then the possibility that hegemonic power can be 
increasingly imperfectly connected to the life-world process of its society where political 
objectives can become out of sync with the social world.   
If political authority is always referred to the awareness of its society that changes as 
actual particulars realize themselves then it must also be in a continual state of construction. 
Original state myths, such as Locke’s, provide a constitutional narrative for the present. But each 
new generation, actualized by the current social structure must commit to the state project as 
learned through a process of education that makes use of social communication to construct the 
space for actual people to achieve their objectives. That is, political authority must be continually 
re-constituted through social processes that give it its properties and capacities.  
The three traditions of civil society highlight three 
different logics of relationships between civil society and 
government with specific implications for the legitimization of 
political power.  The diagram illustrates the possible 
relationships between government and civil society as a three-
sided figure in which the extreme logics of control (hegemony), 
support (democratic practice) or mutual construction (social 
justice) are represented by the sides.  
A political regime sustains its ability to control by staying at the forefront of the dominant 
political objectives of its society, which provides for its justification, legitimacy and relevance to 
the society it rules. It utilizes this legitimacy to regulate right action and identify and punish the 
unjust. It has limited power over what political objectives are dominant, although it can through 
patronage and its megaphone promote some ideas over others. 
The state/civil society relationship is also characterized by mutual support.  Political 
authority is reinforced when the political sphere enables diverse social objectives while restricting 
as few as it must and in ways that can be seen as just. These social objectives include some 
degree of direct political participation in the political process itself but the benefits of civil society 
 





are enjoyed as the autonomous production of social goods—from social events to economic 
production.  
Through the supportive dimension, employment of political goods as well as civil 
pressure results in accountability, better policies and the reinforcement of a commitment to 
democratic governance. Most people do not need to be convinced to follow law in general while 
they may protest particular laws. Political rule is as much maintained by government enforcement 
as it is by the internalized acceptance of the rules of the game across the range of civil society 
organizations acting for a variety of social objectives. In this way, civil society is a supportive pillar 
to the state (as much as the state provides the conditions for its action), but this is not to say that 
civil society will support the actual political regime or all aspects of institutionalized power that 
define the political regime.  
The correctness of political and social objectives is constructed through the third 
dimension, the continual life-world processes of civil society. Participation in the lifeworld (in 
which values and meanings are constructed) produces and reproduces the values on which 
particular activities and political policies are judged as legitimate. If there is significant resonance 
between formal political objectives and those that emerge in civil society the political regime and 
its society are sufficiently aligned. On the other hand, if the political regime becomes too 
disconnected from the lifeworld, its actions cannot be seen as just. Civil society responds by no 
longer supporting its legitimacy. The relationship is not one of two warring ideologies or political 
classes, it is one where people’s power manifests as a denial of political authority.  
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Figure 2 – Dimensions of Civil Society and the State 
Elements of Understanding Civil Society 
An operational definition 
It is useful to take an operational concept of civil society that encompasses the control, 
support and constructive dimensions of its relationship with the political sphere. Civil society is 
an open-entry structure, in which people and their communities participate to meet and 
define their own ends (objectives) and in so doing shape political possibilities. By shaping, 
we refer to a) capturing the state in the hegemonic struggle, b) enhancing the participation of 
citizens and c) better incorporating learning and debate into decision-making processes as we 
have discussed above. It is worth re-iterating that civil society in this conception is not at all points 
distinct from the state but is sufficiently separate to recognize the state as the sector of control. 
“The idea of civil society is the idea of a part of society which has a life of its own, which is 












This definition is similar to one proposed by CIVICUS, an organization focused on 
fostering the health of civil societies, civil society is “the arena, outside of the family, the state, 
and the market where people associate to advance common interests”(António Francisco, 2007). 
In CIVICUS’ definition civil society denotes a bustling space, an arena, where common interests 
can incorporate a broad range of objectives and, thus, are necessarily diverse.  UNRISD also 
uses the structural metaphor of the arena, “Civil Society is a complex social arena, with 
individuals and groups organized in various forms of associations and networks in order to 
express their views and fulfill their interests” (Pianta, 2005). 
While civil society may sometimes look like an arena with many sideshows and activities 
all jumbled together, the social objectives of civil society are not contained within such delineated 
space but like products of the marketplace are put to use in the home and government. The 
“common interests” of individuals within civil society, then, refers to some “added value” that 
comes from defining and refining common objectives in association, that is to say that these 
interests get to be “common” in the first place because of their ratification by lifeworld processes 
of coming to define the moral contact of action. 
Civil society’s capacity to build awareness and the will to act against injustice actually 
make it tremendously powerful, while its action is controlled and channeled through the 
hegemony of dominant objectives (of the state and also the market). Cohen and Arato develop 
this perspective, which they see as differing from Hegel’s along the following lines: 
First, it presupposes a more differentiated social structure.  Taking our cue from Gramsci 
and Parsons, we postulate the differentiation of civil society not only from the state but 
also from the economy.  Our concept is neither state-centered as was Hegel’s, however 
ambiguously, nor economy-centered as was Marx’s. Ours is a society-centered model.  
Second, following Tocqueville and the early Habermas, we make the public spheres of 
societal communication and voluntary association the central institutions of civil society.  
Of course, the private, understood as the domain of autonomous individual judgment, is 
also crucial to a modern civil society. Third, we conceive the institutionalization of civil 
society as a process that always (as in Hegel) involves a stabilization of societal 
institutions on the basis of rights (“abstract right”), but also one that has the immanent 
possibility of becoming more democratic and whose norms call for democratization” 
(Cohen, 1992). 
Thought of in this way, civil society is a central actor in the dynamic process of 
reproducing a base of values and, thus, in enabling legitimate political objectives.  Civil society 
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supports a government’s power to enforce shared norms and create the conditions for action on 
diverse objectives. In this way, the state interacts with civil society to enforce its own hegemonic 
power, but it does so because it is aware that this power has its genesis from within civil society. 
Political authority 
As a term used throughout this study to connote the quality of legitimacy of a political 
regime that gives it the rational expectation people will follow its rule in most everything, I 
recognize that political authority is in the eye of the beholder.  As Hannah Arendt concludes,  
…the moment we begin to talk and think about authority, after all one of the central 
concepts of political thought, it is as though we were caught in a maze of abstractions, 
metaphors, and figures of speech in which everything can be taken and mistaken for 
something else, because we have no reality, either in history or everyday experience to 
which we can unanimously appeal (Arendt, 1950). 
Political authority is the power given to states through the acknowledgement of their 
legitimacy and the justification of their right to exercise power. In developing the political liberal 
concept of legitimacy, John Rawls links origins of legitimacy to a constitution that imparts the 
authority as tradition, religion or charisma have in the past.  
Let us say, then, that the exercise of political power is legitimate only when it is exercised 
in fundamental cases in accordance with a constitution, the essentials of which all 
reasonable citizens as free and equal might reasonably be expected to endorse (Rawls, 
1993).  
Given the lack of a working constitution, the demonstrated reluctance to adhere to it or a 
constitution that is far from reasonable or relevant to the polity, there would be precious little 
legitimacy to salvage. All these conditions applied to Zimbabwe in 1997. But they also applied in 
1987. Clearly, the crux is not just the existence of a constitution but also of a constitutional culture 
that all arrive at through a constructive/education process. Political authority not only 
encompasses the right of punishment and management of society but also includes within itself 
authority for transformation, where politics seeks not just to reproduce society, as it is today, but 
also to take it in some direction.   
In terms of legitimacy, as long as the government enables diverse groups to act towards 
their own ends as if they can have some hope of achieving them, associations and groups accept 
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the legitimacy of government to discipline social order and to act for some degree of social 
transformation. Legitimacy imparts the power to limit civil society but in a way that can be 
understood to be just—guided by explicit laws and open to some process of social review where 
it is unclear. Within the political agenda social order and security for the present are paramount 
but, underneath them, the political vision for the future of the country must also be believable--
there is leadership which is moving in direction in which social injustice and inequity have some 
hope to be addressed. While the fear of chaos is eventually not enough to legitimize political 
authority, it is a powerful motivator in the short and medium term. 
Differentiation of civil society  
The civil society must be more than a set of markets and market-like institutions. What 
does it need to be a civil society? It must possess the institutions which protect it from the 
encroachment of the state and which keep it a civil society. A civil society must have a 
system of competing political parties…. It must possess an independent judiciary, which 
upholds the rule of law and protects the liberty of individuals and institutions. It must 
possess a set of institutions for making known the activities of government; it includes a 
free press reporting freely on the activities of government…. These are the primary 
institutions of civil society because they are the safeguards of the separation of civil 
society from the state” (Shils, 2003). 
Civil society encompasses a number of institutional forms. The common profound 
conflation of civil society with NGOs is not only misguided, it is dangerous. While NGOs can 
support a broad range of social objectives from civil society, their institutionalization means they 
are also driven to survive and will filter out activities and strategies for which they do not have 
sufficient resources or that could result in a loss of capacity. Practically donors assume that they 
can support civil society by strengthening NGOs and many studies have an overwhelming bias 
for measuring civil society as the amount of formalized NGOs and their impact. There is clearly a 
correlation between NGOs and civil society—as NGOs represent the formalization of objectives 
into missions and programs but that does not make the universe of NGOs contiguous with the 
associative sphere of action. 
In order to guarantee that social objectives don't fade away or die with the proponents, 
people create the institutions they need. In this way, the differentiation of civil society leads to 
churches, companies, unions, NGOs or universities and other organizations that share like 
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objectives and become embedded in society. But institutions are areas of contestation 
themselves.  Thus, movements within civil society emerge to challenge the objectives of the 
market, church, etc.  
As Cohen and Arato do above, it has become commonplace to exclude the market from 
civil society. It is normal to think in terms of three “sectors” of activity: 1) government concerned 
with political rule, 2) private sector concerned with economic production and 3) civil society 
concerned with social goods. The placement of the market inside or outside of civil society has 
been highly contentious but there are reasons why we should resist its exclusion. The separation 
is hermeneutically useful because it makes economic production its own social good, one that 
needs to be measured in terms of efficiency and output. But it also misses that corporations, 
however much some may act otherwise, fulfill a social objective (to provide the economic goods 
we need). The market is a resource that cannot be completely alienated from civil society as its 
members engage in the “liberty to follow my own will in all things where the rule proscribes not” 
envisaged by Locke. 
It is one thing, of course to impute causes to civil society groups and another to talk about 
the effects of civil society writ large. The question of whether civil society associations actually 
have the power to meet their objectives is irrelevant from one standpoint—when people act they 
do so as if they can. We should ask instead what do people hope to accomplish as civil society? 
Can we even speak of civil society as a whole?   
Does civil society, composed of diverse and even conflicting objectives, do anything itself 
or speak with a unified voice as we hear implied today in appeals to civil society’s opinion or point 
of view? I don’t think that we can dismiss out-of-hand the intuition that civil society writ large 
exerts, at times, a force with a direction even though it is not a unified power with clear 
leadership. But the problem of tying down agency is certainly central to current common usages 
of the term. One reads in the newspaper statements like “In this context, international civil 
society’s role becomes more relevant to push the stakeholders for a permanent solution to 
Kashmir” or “A co-founder of Médecins Sans Frontières, a humanitarian-aid agency… Mr. 
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Kouchner arrived on a wave of popularity and high-mindedness. He told diplomats to spend more 
time talking to “civil society”, not elites...”6  
The invocation of civil society is generally made in the hopes of balancing the official or 
governmental view on an issue. Today, the use of the term civil society is most common when 
speaking about countries thought to have weak political systems. This may have grown out of the 
diplomatic and foreign assistance trends justified as a push to democracy and accountability. In 
Africa, it has become routine for reporters and policymakers to seek out “representatives” and 
“leaders” to speak on behalf of civil society on important issues. This must be partly wrong. Civil 
society—as a diverse sector of activity for achieving social objectives--has no leader, no 
representatives and no single identity. Nobody can speak for it. But neither does the “market.”  
Thus, we say, “the prices were determined by the market,” without evoking the authority of some 
central agent who decides the prices. As a social structure that both impacts and is enmeshed 
with the state, civil society has an effect but whatever agency it has is a derivative effect of the 
discourse and action that is in constant flux across many organizations. 
Civil Society: an African Concept? 
The contribution of Africans (I am not sure if one can call it the contribution of Africa) 
could be that the weight and constraints of the existing idea- systems tend to rest less 
heavily on them than on Europeans, and the movements that emerge there—in the larger 
political arena, and in the academy—will hopefully reflect this. It may be therefore that 
more coherent insights into options will arise there. But they will only arise if they are not 
placed in the old cul-de-sac of universalism vs. particularism (Wallerstein, 1998). 
Across Africa a strong awareness about civil society has grown in the last decades. 
There are two streams of thought here, both of which question the weakness of African civil 
society, the first by emphasizing that civil society is an imported concept in which organizations 
have been influenced and shaped by external donors and another that tries to grapple with 
internal weaknesses in civil society as an indigenous and African fact of life. The stakes in civil 
                                                      
6 First quote from Daily Times, “World civil society role vital to resolve Kashmir dispute, experts 
say,” 16 Nov 2010, Lahore, Pakistan. Second quote from The Economist, “The Quai Adrift,” 11 
Nov 2010, London. 
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society are high, no less than the possibilities for improving governance and finding an authentic 
African path of development. I suggest that we take civil society as a fact of life that grapples with 
African contradictions and dichotomies in the global context in which it finds itself and treat 
weaknesses as we find them interpreted by those who are part of the processes under way.  
The term civil society swept the African continent and took shape over the last decades. 
For example, when European journalists descended on Nigeria during its unrest and potential 
return to democracy in the 1990s, Obadare says, they brought with them the term civil society re-
popularized in the wake of transformation sweeping Eastern Europe from totalitarian leaning 
communist states. Local actors, even those who were activists in civil society were baffled: 
Reporting underground for the TEMPO, the leading anti-military newspaper in Nigeria in 
the early 1990s, I was asked by a correspondent of a foreign newspaper what I thought 
the consequences of our struggle…would be in terms of energizing ‘civil society.’ I could 
not give the correspondent a coherent answer for it was the first time I had heard about 
civil society” (Obadare, 2004). 
The rapid dissemination and use of the term has been such that it is now quite common 
across the continent and has created a cottage industry of NGOs that consciously operate as 
“agents” of civil society on a broad spectrum of social objectives. The new attention on 
associative action has sparked vigorous debates resulting in a new civic consciousness that 
seeks to look increasingly inward for solutions. Africa’s acceptance and use of the term does not 
mean that civil society was created where there was none before but that the conscious use of 
the term serves a purpose by supporting a realm of possibilities. 
Civil society has also sparked a development industry, where working with a non-
governmental organization can provide a path out of unemployment in a way that is more 
lucrative at times than work with the private sector. NGOs have learned how to speak the lingo 
and meet the conditions to raise funding. And many international funding agencies exhibit a kind 
of blindness to civil society by only relating with creatures of their own making. Reliance on 
foreign funding not only asks questions about the weak foundations of NGOs, it goes to the heart 
of the question about how they act as resources for civil society. As Stephen Ndegwa explains, 
“Local NGOs admit their greatest impediment to their capacity to be long-term contributors to a 
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vibrant civil society is their dependency on external sources of funding for their operations” 
(Ndegwa, 1996). Even in recognizing the negative dependencies of such relationships, the 
linkages to the external world, not just through donors, but through issue networks gives NGOs 
access to global thinking on democracy and development that make them part of a wider culture 
of constructing values and objectives. Not only do they import, Africans, through their NGOs, also 
shape universal ideas of justice in global fora.  So while the term civil society may be a relatively 
new arrival, the social forces it calls on point to the age-old social development of particular and 
universal ideas of the political good in which Africans have a central localized and global role. As 
Wallerstein entreats their role should not be relegated to the cul-de-sac of universalism versus 
particularism.  
Ngugi wa Thiongo argues for returning African culture and knowledge to the center, not 
to replace Western influence but to return it to its rightful place as a resource for Africa, not a 
continuing experience of imperial domination (wa Thiong'o, 1993). The quest for the right answer, 
the correct path, the high culture for the African is hobbled if it must always return to Europe to be 
measured against European scholarship and values. Ngugi’s step to revitalizing African 
processes prescribes cultural processes that locate intrinsic value in labor, commodities, 
knowledge and communities. The culture of civil society as it is actually experienced resists the 
dichotomy of dependence on either government or externally generated value systems by 
acknowledging interdependence and solidarity and consciously struggling to make and achieve 
the good life out of locally valid understanding and objectives. In this hive of activity, we can see 
the contours of indigenous civil society.   
The possession of indigenous civil society capacity correlates for many policymakers to 
broad political objectives for democratization, human rights and development/poverty alleviation. 
For example, the program framework for the UN Democracy Fund established in 2006 after the 
Doha Agreement states it will focus its “activities on supporting the interface between civil society 
and the official institutions of democracy…” (UNDEF, 2007). The preface to the 2006 European 
Union Annual Report on Human Rights states “Human rights policy must be based on interaction 
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between all relevant actors, public institutions and civil society alike” (EU, 2006)—relevant actors 
here apparently refers to foreign interests since public institutions and civil society would seem to 
cover the domestic territory adequately.  
Michael Bratton is one of many advocates for the necessity of developing an 
understanding of civil society as a buttress for democratization in African political systems, where 
greater democracy is the goal and the take on civil society is informed by the de Tocqueville and 
Putnam traditions. In this perspective, a strong civil society forces governmental accountability 
and responsiveness and is necessary to encourage a movement away from authoritarian rule.  
The institutions of civil society have a crucial role to play in the consolidation of 
democracy. At the deepest levels of political culture, civic institutions include the political 
norms and values that underpin the rules of democratic competition (Bratton, 1981). 
But is part of the problem really the nascent state of civil societies? Are civil societies in 
Africa also best characterized as underdeveloped?7 Isn’t it all too convenient for the imperialist 
West to just label everything African as underdeveloped? Even though the term in Africa is a 
recent import, engagement in associative life has no weaker roots than anywhere else. To the 
contrary, community life on its face seems to be much more vital than it is in places like Italy 
(Putnam’s focus) or the United States with their emphasis on individual interests and 
professionalized social services.  
As Sola Akinrinade and Ebenezer Obadare propose, civil society is very much an African 
concept. Association is older than modern governments and the emphasis on "voluntary" 
association may leave out the universe of other identities formed by ethnic or community ties 
(Akinrinade, 2004, Obadare, 2004). “Civil society…is not an alien phenomenon but has a long 
history in Nigeria and became awakened from the late 1980s” (Akinrinade, 2004). As Akinrinrade 
                                                      
7 Bratton argues “…there is prima facie evidence of a nascent civil society in certain African 
countries. But universal ideas require adaptation to take into account distinctiveness of different 
world regions, notably in the level of socioeconomic development and in the cultural attributes of 
different nations and sub-nations. Westerners, projecting aspirations derived from their own 
histories, are prone to overestimate the prospects for democratic change elsewhere in the world.”  
Or perhaps, Westerners start by thinking democracy is only the particular universe of checks, 
balances and relationships they have come to know through their own development. At any rate, I 
think it is reasonable to discard the idea of “nascent” civil society as it is not useful for taking civil 
society on its own ground. 
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proposes, the useful question is how have civil societies developed in African states, not whether 
they exist. Akinrinrade sets out with a conceptualization of civil society that he feels is applicable 
to the African context, “the realm of the society minus the state: in other words, the realm of free 
association organized outside of the purview of the state, and, in the political context, the domain 
of independent opposition to the authoritarian state” (Akinrinade, 2004). This conceptualization 
differs from the one proposed here--Civil society is an open-entry structure, in which people and 
their communities participate to meet their own ends and in so doing shape political actors—in 
two significant ways. First of all, it takes the confusing route of defining civil society as the 
negative image of the state and second, it may undervalue the inter-linkages between the state 
and civil society that make them not completely distinct. If we see civil society as both part of and 
distinct from the state in Africa, perhaps we can better understand the way in which states in 
general must respond and be responsive to civil society. 
In this way, Bratton’s advocacy for the necessity of developing and understanding civil 
society as a buttress for democratization in African political systems can make sense. Civil 
society is necessary for the norms and values that force governmental accountability and 
responsiveness to its people and is a necessary component in understanding what authoritarian 
rule represses.  
The institutions of civil society have a crucial role to play in the consolidation of 
democracy. At the deepest levels of political culture, civic institutions include the political 
norms and values that underpin the rules of democratic competition (Bratton, 1981). 
Is it, thus, fair to conclude, that the very concept of civil society is imposed, deficient or 
inapplicable to the realities of African governments? Of course it isn’t. In thinking about a broad 
concept such as civil society it is sensible to think cross-culturally and across a variety of states 
and geographic areas. Because a significant cross-section of human perspective still tends to be 
overshadowed by the social and economic domination of a few countries, it is worth making a 
conscious effort to bring it to the fore. Beyond remembering that the proverbial West has its own 
agenda with African civil societies, it is important to take African associative life on its own fertile 
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ground. This ground can reveal possibilities and alternatives for the development of politics that 
are of a universal nature and useful to human development. In this way, Roberto Unger argues: 
The large marginalized countries of today’s world – China, India, Russia, Indonesia and 
Brazil – represent fertile terrain for the exploration of these possibilities, although each of 
them now stands inhibited in realizing the potential for divergence. The large involuntary 
or half-conscious institutional experimentalism that may occur in these countries throws 
light upon the hidden opportunities for democratic transformation in the rich democracies 
(Unger 1998, 27). 
Unger’s call for experimentation is just as cogent for the small-marginalized countries. 
Less in the spotlight, the imposition of foreign power may be more direct but is also less 
conditioned by realist power games at the margins. In this way, one might look productively to the 
ways in which civil society is developing in African nations. This project takes a critical theoretical 
perspective that the value of exploring the role of civil society in the Zimbabwean crisis is to learn 
something about the emancipatory potential of civil society.  
Conclusion: When does Civil Society Deny Political Authority? 
As we have seen civil society, rarely challenges political authority. As a space for acting 
on social objectives it nourishes the political authority of the regime through exercise of diverse 
activities. We have taken contradictory views of civil society, as both the site of support for the 
development of hegemonic power and for democratic freedoms, and embrace them both as true. 
Dominant values are accessible to the political elite who can use them to support political 
objectives while they struggle against them when they are incompatible with their objectives. The 
more the hegemony of values is experienced as a lived obstacle to social objectives the more 
untenable it is to maintain the support of civil society for the regime. But these values must be 
socially reproduced. Civil society through its role in deliberative politics acts as a constructive 
realm whereby people become aware of injustice moving in and out of a constant process of 
association and action.   
At most times a political regime and its civil society are locked in a balance of control, 
support and mutual construction. The relationship between a political regime and civil society has 
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considerable play. Even when government represses significant civic action it still provides the 
security, order and rules that enable some degree of civic action.  
It is difficult to predict when tension between civil society and government will erupt into a 
withdrawal of support for the political authority of the regime because the crisis point relies on a 
general awareness of a government’s repressive nature coupled with a decrease in the 
hegemonic power that keeps people disciplined to see the world through one set of lenses. In the 
interim, civil society will shelter dissatisfaction with many facets of government power and, 
paradoxically, even with the fundamental belief in the right of political power. This structure of 
diverse social objectives supports the state’s efforts to maintain nationalist unity—legitimizing 
government--when the state’s actions support the social freedoms necessary to maintain them, 
but when these actions become an impediment to civil society’s diverse objectives, the state itself 
becomes the problem.   
Even with highly imperfect actual freedom, government is rarely challenged by its own 
civil society. But, when public awareness grows to understand its government to be the author of 
unfreedom, it no longer accepts the authority of political leadership and a social struggle ensues 
with the primary goal of deposing the structures and leadership behind political authority. While 
government continues to be organized around the status quo political logic of control, it no longer 
is legitimated by civil society and it resorts to forceful declarations, arbitrary judgment and 
secrecy, creating a tumultuous environment in which it almost inevitably further destroys any 
remnants of trust with its people. Likewise, civil society, in dismantling government’s credibility 
also breaks the contract whereby people can predict sufficient order and stability from the rules 
enforced by government to meet their own objectives in associating. And indeed, this relationship 
grows antagonistic. This point of crisis is, thankfully, rare.  
The crisis in Zimbabwe, which has not yet ended as I consider it now, has been 
construed as one of class and exhausted nationalism (Bond and Manyanya, 2002), the 
egomaniacal power project of Robert Mugabe (Meredith, 2002),the quest for democracy (Kagoro, 
1999) and the seeds of political opposition (Raftopoulos, 2009). While these explanations provide 
 57 
some insight into the events of the Zimbabwean crisis, none explore sufficiently just how civil 
society became a significant force against the political regime. We take up this issue in the next 
chapter to lay the groundwork for understanding the formation and pursuit of a political agenda in 
the country. Within the limits of civil society we have explored, how should we expect its political 
power to be developed and exercised? 
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CHAPTER THREE: HEROES ACRES – THE VISION OF ZANU 
Emerging out of a guerilla-led revolution against colonial rule, the Zimbabwe African National 
Union became the only post-colonial government Zimbabwe has known. Drawing from the 
experience of the guerilla war it has been consistent about its commitment to continuing the war 
for Zimbabwean Independence. This objective, set against the colonial backdrop, has colored the 
way in which it seeks to develop the country. Throughout its history its efforts to finish the 
interrupted revolution for independence have resonated with its civil society but became less and 
less dominant over time as civil society developed in the country. Some specific objectives were 
independence, Africanization, combating the enemy within and without and economic 
development. In fortifying the political class to resist settler and neo-colonial forces it focused on 
establishing Zimbabwe as a single party state and became increasingly closed-off.  
 
At the Bulawayo outdoor public theater in the late 1990s, Amakhosi Theater Productions 
and Academy8, some friends and I went to see the performance of a play called the Helicopter of 
Esigodini.  The story, they told me, was based on true events that happened to a former soldier 
who returned to his village, Esigodini, with big dreams. What was truly remarkable was the way in 
which the actors were able to crystallize the general complicity of continuing dependency through 
the lack of belief in our own capacities.  
In encapsulated form, the soldier had worked in the army as a helicopter mechanic and 
had decided he would return home to start his own helicopter factory by scavenging and building 
new helicopters from spare parts.  His neighbors not only do not support him but seem angry and 
threatened that he would waste valuable time and resources on a dream they believed he could 
never realize.  They tell him an African can never build helicopters as if this should be obvious to 
everyone. As their paranoia escalates, someone tips off the Central Intelligence Agency (CIO), 
which comes to believe that outsiders as a way of subverting Zimbabwe must be bankrolling the 
                                                      
8 Amakhosi under the leadership of playwrite Cont Mhlanga was a cultural gem in the Bulawayo 
township of Makokoba.  Its productions not only acted as a springboard for nurturing local actors, 
playwrites and directors but it tackled many hard political questions. It still exists today although 
much of its funding dried up in the 2000s and Mhlanga, like many others, was persecuted for his 
political views and action. 
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veteran. The helicopter initiative, as a cover for South African espionage, thus, becomes a 
national security issues and CIO officials torture and interrogate the veteran to find the identities 
of his South African backers.  
The play is a satirical indictment of Zimbabwean society.  The actors bring this home at 
the end as they move out of their roles and begin addressing the audience directly, “Why can’t a 
Zimbabwean build a helicopter? Who told you this was true?  It is nobody else’s fault that we 
don’t believe in ourselves.”  
Thinking Political Objectives 
The sense of dependency on others—Rhodesia until Independence, the “Zapu 
dissidents” until the 1987 Unity Accords, South Africa until 1995 and, after 2000, Britain and the 
United States—is drawn from the experience with colonial and settler rule. From its emergence 
as a resistance force, Zimbabwe depended deeply on its unreformed neighbor in South Africa 
(Dzimba, 1998) and an international system in which it continued to be dependent on Europe 
markets and aid on the outside. Zanu also needed to protect its power and revolutionary 
objectives on the inside (Moyo, 1992, Bratton, 1981) particularly from Zapu, which also had 
claims on these objectives and a similar mandate for nation building.  
The unit of analysis here is Zanu, the independence-seeking mouthpiece of a guerilla 
struggle turned political party when it won the country’s first universal franchise elections and 
then, in its consolidation of power, increasingly hard to distinguish from the state. While Zanu is 
not always the same as the state, its profession of contiguity—in its assertion of a one-party 
state—with the Zimbabwean state is a part of the story of how it gained and maintained its power. 
Looking under the hood, however, can rapidly reveal that Zanu’s power has never been absolute. 
Under its rule, Zimbabwe, for example, maintained a remarkably independent judiciary and 
whether it fully accepted it or not Zanu has been, perhaps imperfectly, confined by the 
Zimbabwean constitution and the provisions of the Lancaster settlement that led to its own 
ascension to power.  
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A useful way to frame Zanu’s overarching political objectives is the continuation of the 
revolution leading to Zimbabwean independence it started in the bush. While democracy, 
socialism and black/white reconciliation are also part of the framing of Zanu’s message, they 
have been subordinate to the revolutionary mission strengthened and developed from its leaders 
experiences in guerilla warfare in the pre-independence period. The framing is useful because it 
underlies the interpretation of justice—such as the rights of veterans emerging from the 
independence struggle and the continuing dominance of Zimbabwean resources by the European 
outsider—to the fore.  
The Zanu guerilla fighters understood their goal as a transformative revolutionary 
independence that would end the racist political rule of Rhodesia, characterized by the second-
class, subhuman status of Africans and the impunity of the original and continuing theft of their 
resources by the British settlers.9 Given the inheritance of the settler economy and the disaster of 
rapid transformational approaches (such as Uganda’s nationalization of white and Indian owned 
property and Tanzania’s Ujamaa brand of socialism), the revolution adopted a pragmatic, long-
term perspective. As Robert Mugabe wrote in the Zimbabwe News, the official publication of Zanu 
and ZANLA in 1978,  
Our revolution is an ever progressive dynamic process set in the positive direction of 
achieving both immediate and long- term revolutionary goals. It has a past, a present and 
a future (Mugabe, 1983). 
It was clear in Mugabe's formulation at this early date that continuing the revolution—
past, present and future—would require a transformative process in which the Party would carry 
the burden of inculcating the masses with their own self-interest in becoming a conscious nation 
of collective workers.  He continues,  
With our now having created liberated and semi-liberated areas, our task, as we hound 
and pound the enemy, must be an intensive systemic politicisation programme to 
disorient the masses in liberated and semi-liberated zones away from a social pattern of 
                                                      
9 Terrence Ranger’s study of peasant consciousness leading to and fueling the guerrilla war 
brings him to argue that, “during the war itself peasant aspirations were focused upon the 
recovery of the land lost to the whites and upon exclusion from the communal areas of 
administrative coercion. Ranger, T. O. (1985) Peasant consciousness and guerrilla war in 
Zimbabwe : a comparative study, London/Berkeley, J. Currey; University of California Press. 
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colonialist society and its individualism, and accordingly orientate them towards a new 
social order and self-reliance in the following directions…[defense, production and 
construction, health and hygiene, collectivism, organic unity and the people-army 
relationship]” (Mugabe, 1983). 
The roadmap of the continuing revolution began with the perspective that the masses 
were incapable of effecting their own transformation--hence, it was necessary to "disorient" them; 
it would be the responsibility of the Party to lead them from their undifferentiated state (as 
masses) toward an appropriate, authentic future of collective capacity against the 
colonial/capitalist vision of individual-serving greed. This view of Zimbabweans as masses is 
strongly reminiscent of Fanon’s view of the underdeveloped consciousness of the colonized:  
His consciousness is so vulnerable and so inscrutable that it is ignited by the slightest 
spark. The great undiscriminating thirst for enlightenment of the early days is threatened 
at every moment by a dose of mystification” (Fanon, 2004).  
As a result, the political elites find themselves in a position of needing to politicize the 
masses through work and education to a higher state of political consciousness. “To politicize the 
masses is to make the nation in its totality a reality for every citizen” (Fanon, 2004).  
For Zanu, the space of free action, or civil society, was, thus, something to be realized in 
the future. The party would have to substitute for civil society (since people were unorganized as 
masses and not representative, in the party view, in anything remotely civil) meaning that all 
legitimate activity in the party’s eyes would have to emerge from its own stimulus. This vision of 
the new people could serve to replace or discount the moral standing of freely conceived 
objectives as they actually were, replacing real people with an aspirational form. For example, 
addressing the newly independent nation on Independence Day 1980, Mugabe said, 
As we become a new people we are called to be constructive, progressive and forever 
forward looking, for we cannot afford to be men of yesterday, backward-looking, 
retrogressive and destructive ("Mugabe's Pre-Independence Broadcast", 1980). 
The first Independence Day speech went on to call for reconciliation with the former 
oppressors and emphasized the importance of the unity that would bring all together into one 
country. The policy of reconciliation was important, to avoid an economic breakdown resulting 
from white flight, but also “to trample on racism, tribalism and regionalism and work hard to 
reconstruct and rehabilitate our society as we reinvigorate our economic machinery” (Mugabe, 
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1980). Difference had no place in the political sphere. Progressive independence would require 
national unity through common cause.  And what gave Mugabe/Zanu the authority to move 
forward?  
Only a government that subjects itself to the rule of law has any moral right to demand of 
its citizen’s obedience to the rule of law.  
 
Our Constitution equally circumscribes the powers of government by declaring civil rights 
and freedoms as fundamental. We intend to uphold these fundamental rights and 
freedoms to the full (Mugabe, 1980).  
Mugabe and Zanu clearly sought to qualm the fears of white settlers by accepting the 
broad limitations of government authority in terms of civil rights and respect for freedoms through 
the recognition of the moral authority that springs from the constitution, however imposed this 
was. The constitution and Zanu’s treatment of it was later to become central to civil society’s 
challenges to the social contract (see Chapter Six). Zanu’s positions are often drawn from 
statements and decrees of its leader, Robert Mugabe, to such an extent that both internally and 
externally, his charismatic rule is seen to define the political realm to the exclusion of other actors 
and systems. The government as one man is something that Mugabe himself is more than happy 
to reinforce as this statement about his political opponents from the 2007 Independence 
celebrations illustrates: 
At a time when they should be coming up with ideas that can develop the nation, they are 
busy concentrating on saying Mugabe should go. Ndinopika nambuya vangu Nehand [I 
swear by my ancestors spirits] that will not happen (Meredith, 2007, p 239). 
We can think of Zanu’s projection of itself as largely an equation wherein Zimbabwe the 
state = Zanu the party = Robert Mugabe the Prince. This is problematic, however. Zimbabwe has 
thought of itself as a democracy throughout its short history even as Zanu continually dominated 
elections and declared its purpose to establish a one-party state.10 The 
                                                      
10 The pursuit of a one-party state has been consistently justified within the context of democratic 
Zimbabwe to “minimize internecine factionalism.” But Sachikonye finds the culture of democracy 
to be strong in the country and concludes that, “The existence of a civil society whose institutions 
periodically question the hegemony of the state on specific questions relating to democracy is 
widely perceived to be an insurance against an unmitigated slide into authoritarianism and 
autocracy” Sachikonye, L. M. (1989) 'The Debate on Democracy in Contemporary Zimbabwe', 
Review of African Political Economy, (45/46), 117-25. 
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Zimbabwe=Zanu=Mugabe formulation serves a political purpose, then, in focusing power in a 
particular party and particular man. The focus on Mugabe can also obscure the social processes 
that have resisted this brand of concentrated power from the ground. Because so much in 
Zimbabwe revolved around Mugabe’s proclamations and personality, we do not avoid using his 
framing of events as a stand in for the perspectives of the political regime as a whole, but should 
be aware that even on this concentrated political field the Zanu regime is a differentiated structure 
that is not always in sync with Mugabe. 
In terms of civil society, we can think of Zimbabwe as having roughly three periods of 
political transition:  
• 1980 to 1997, a period of Zanu’s consolidation of a one party state. Civil society 
organizations rarely challenge the government directly and many try to work with it as the 
legitimate political authority.  
• 1997 until the constitutional vote in 2001, in which the demands for political change are 
brought together in people’s power demonstrations and then a renewal of engagement 
with the regime. This leads to the inception a new competing political party, the 
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). 
•  2001 to 2011, in which society is torn apart by violence—from land invasions, the 
reassertion of Zanu’s hegemony and economic decline. The MDC makes political gains 
that finally result in a “unity” government, after an election in 2008 marred by violence 
and controversy.  
Constructing Political Authority 
The roots and causes of the Zimbabwean crisis has been the subject of a fair amount of 
literature over the last decades.  Most analysts take for granted the idea that the fundamental 
objective of ZANU, as it would be for any political party, was to maximize its own power and 
thereby ensure its survival. Institutional (and personal political) survival serves as the central 
rational motivation of political life.  But beyond power in service of ambition or the survival of the 
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state is the question “what for.” Within Zanu’s continuing revolution for independence discussed 
above a fair range of causes for the social crises that exploded in the 2000s have been explored.  
In the next section we will review how some of these causes played out against social objectives 
and particularly how they led towards or away from the construction of political authority: 
Addressing inequity: Bratton 
In 1981, Michael Bratton sounded a note of guarded optimism about the potential 
transformation of Zimbabwe into a viable state with transformative goals. He saw the 
establishment of Zanu’s authority over the state bureaucratic infrastructure as necessary to 
address the inherited social inequity. But by 1997, he was preoccupied by the lack of checks and 
balances as a major obstacle to democratic governance. 
In 1980, as Zanu looked forward, it needed to consolidate its control over the 
administration of government and respond to expectations, which meant very rapidly acting to 
redress basic social inequities in the country with a focus on the most underserved and 
marginalized. “…Is it possible to use the power of the state in a capitalist society to create an 
egalitarian and democratic pattern of development?” (Bratton, 1981, p. 475). With 90 percent of 
assets owned by either white settler or outside interests, the government’s revolutionary 
transformational goals were constrained by the need to accommodate settler interests driven by 
the Lancaster House settlement and the protection of the inherited economic order.  
Zanu’s objectives, Bratton suggests, in taking the reins of power were transformed from 
revolutionary—in the sense of seeking large-scale and rapid economic transformation—to 
nationalistic.  We needn’t see this as a dichotomy because the national consolidation he has in 
mind is the control of domestic forces through state administration, a necessary condition if the 
regime is to have any hope of progress on its transformative agenda. As he says,  
The new Government probably does not wish to tackle entrenched economic interests 
from a position of organisational weakness; reform and reorganisation of administrative 
and military institutions are first required. It is unlikely that the difficult task of restructuring 
economic production can be achieved in the absence of a well-disciplined and 
participatory administrative machinery (Bratton, 1981, p. 454). 
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Zanu needed actual power in order to pursue its transformative agenda.  It, thus, had to 
balance or accommodate its policies to the existing social and economic interests, which meant a 
far more conciliatory approach to the white settler population than happened in many other 
African countries. Its transformative objectives necessitated a pragmatic, political stance. As 
Bratton puts it “The Z.A.N.U. (P.F.) leadership set itself the dual task of winning political 
independence and restructuring the economy along egalitarian lines” (Bratton, 1981, p. 448). 
Zanu’s pragmatism tempers its revolutionary objectives. It must both redistribute 
resources and guarantee continuity in ownership and production. These considerations find 
expression in Growth with Equity, the name of the first development plan, which embraces both 
settler capitalism and the question of redistributing economic benefits that had been concentrated 
under colonial administration. “The Government is still searching for the political and economic 
consensus that will provide both growth and equity, and both stability and change. The 
emergence of a development strategy is a process, not an event” (Bratton, 1981, p. 473).  
By 1997, Bratton would still see Zimbabwe as an emerging democracy but showing the 
danger signs of Zanu’s unchecked hold on power. The potential for democratic transformation in 
Zimbabwe was retarded by neo-patrimonial habits and institutional weakness (lack of built-in 
checks and balances that make it possible for individuals to manipulate the system for their own 
advantage).  
The multiparty systems in Botswana, Senegal and Zimbabwe are all imperfectly 
democratic in these respects, and when unchecked, their leaders show marked 
tendencies to lapse into neopatrimonial habits. African multiparty systems can be thought 
of as hybrid regimes in which the formal rules of electoral democracy vie with informal 
personal ties of "big men” to define and shape the actual practice of politics (Bratton and 
Van de Walle, 1997, p. 82). 
Civil society is for Bratton an institutional check on antidemocratic power because of its 
interest in defending the democratic order. But it is a plural civil society, “composed of a high 
density of voluntary associations and a wide diversity of communications media” (Bratton and 
Van de Walle, 1997) that is correlated with the incidence of democratic transition. Thus, civil 
society is too weak for Bratton in Zimbabwe (as in much of Africa) to support democratic 
transitions, lacking both diversity and density. But this diversity and density of the visible civil 
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society organizations, most particularly formally registered and recognized NGOs is derivative of 
the democratic openness of a government, whether the government has created the financial, 
legal and secure conditions for formal citizen action. Taking the existence of a robust sector of 
sanctioned organizations to be indicative of democratic support and pressure in a society may 
miss the more interesting question of how and why civil society started to develop these sorts of 
institutions in the first place. Civil society and the Zanu-led government shared the cause of 
addressing social inequity and while the authority over both meaning and program is deeply 
invested in the government, civil society organizations grow out of activists and civic groups to 
address a diversity of issues.  
Uneven development & exhausted nationalism: Bond & Manyanya 
For many, the advancement of African socialism was to be the antidote for inherited 
inequity in Zimbabwe. Providing a class-based analysis, Patrick Bond and Masimba Manyanya 
hold the Zimbabwean government up against its socialist promises.  Writing in Zimbabwe’s 
Plunge in 2002, they posit that Zimbabwe’s post-1997 crisis can largely be explained by the 
economic and political constraints on its historical development.  
Zanu’s capitulation to the neoliberal Washington agenda in 1990 was a final nail in the 
coffin of its socialist aspirations and evidence of its internal corruption while its own nationalist 
objectives were torn apart by the contradictions between self-serving politics and the good of the 
country, as Bond and Manyanya say “exhausted nationalism” and no longer able to mobilize the 
majority of its citizens. Bond and Manyana are centrally concerned with the interests of labor and 
do not mention civil society by name. They go as far as to cite the conflicts over aspirations for 
values of human rights and democracy as nebulous and the distraction of an emerging middle 
class. The "multi-class" composition of the opposition dilutes the clear interests of labor.  
In sum a cross-class alliance composed of organized labour, the constrained petit-
bourgeoisie, church-based critics, students, some sympathetic business liberals and 
various other activists emerged around issues of accountability and abuse of public 
funds, fueling a growing sentiment that after two decades in power, Zanu could quite 
possibly be voted down in the 2000 parliamentary election (Bond and Manyanya, 2002, 
p. 74).  
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They do not entertain that such a broad social alliance also suggests something beyond 
the monstrous idea that Big Business and Big Labor would get into bed together against the 
better interests of labor. The emergence of the MDC is problematic for Bond and Manyana 
because it is not accompanied with a clear national ideology, i.e. socialism. Worse, it the MDC 
does the bidding of the capitalist white landlords who see the political opening as an opportunity 
for cementing a neoliberal economic future, in sync with the Washington Consensus, for the 
country. As a result, the MDC, born out of the labor movement, incorporates business and middle 
class objectives against meeting workers’ interest, that is, national, interests. 
The problem is competition over class interests: the elite, political class was bankrupt in 
its promises and the middle class had already dug in to a role in protecting its privileged access to 
resources on the backs of the poor and marginalized. As they quote Mugabe from a 1989 remark,  
There exists among the membership of…Zanu a minority, but very powerful bourgeois 
group which champions the cause of international finance and national private capital, 
whose interests thus stand opposed to the development and growth of a socialist and 
egalitarian society in Zimbabwe (Bond and Manyanya, 2002). 
The actual motivation of primitive accumulation—in terms of capturing assets through 
government intervention not economic production—provides a stark contrast to the government 
proclamations on development and equity and contributes to the perceived contradictions that 
morally bankrupted its official policy.  
As Party privilege was a fact of life of the post-independence years, it was at the very 
least tolerated or suffered by Zimbabwean citizens. But this raises the question of what changed 
to make the contradictions inherent in Zanu's policies morally intolerable to a broad swath of civil 
society (students, church groups, business, labor, et al) in the late 1990s. Zanu's monopolization 
of power suggests not just that it used violence and intimidation to destroy its opponents but that 
its revolutionary/nationalist mission (as Bond and Manyana see it an objective of socialism in 
which the land would be re-distributed) was significantly resonant within civil society. On the 
political playing field its opponents did not elucidate a compelling alternative vision because 
Zanu’s transformative goals were not the problem; it was the go-it-alone way in which Zanu 
pursued them.  Zapu and Zum (Zimbabwe Unity Movement), as opposition parties, while they 
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survived, largely agreed with Zanu’s central vision—the quest for African socialism and resistance 
to internal or external control—while stressing their intentions to promote a multi-party 
Zimbabwe.11 The persistence of claims on multi-partyism, despite Zanu’s efforts to squelch them, 
shows Zanu's monopolization of the state never completely resonated either within the party itself 
(political opposition increasingly emerged from disaffected party members who either became 
independent or founded parties to challenge the Zanu monopoly) or within civil society.  
Underlying the compelling analysis about the dual effects of abandoned socialist goals 
and exhausted nationalism is the story of broken promises. The political crisis of the 1990s is 
explained by, on the one hand, the fact that the regime was no longer believably on the side of 
the workers who it had thrown under the bus with its economic policy and had mined the pursuit 
of nationalism to the point that its nationalist goals could no longer bring together people either. 
Unity and corruption: Kagoro & Raftopoulos 
Nationalism and the pursuit of unity are recurrent streams within the framing of political 
objectives reported by analysts. The pursuit of unity plays out in Zanu's message over time as a 
strategic necessity to accomplish its goals. Zimbabwe is at war with a tricky enemy--the entire 
framework of Western hegemony--that is able to infiltrate, steal and control. Internally, any 
contenders to political power (Republican Front, Zapu and Zum) were a threat to its ability to set 
the agenda. For its defense, Zanu maintained a social army—party members—with priority 
access to resources. Not only did Zanu become interchangeable with government but also, as the 
guardian of the revolution, it privileged distribution of resources to those associated with it. As 
Brian Kagoro has recently written: 
                                                      
11 Dissatisfaction with the one-party intentions of Zanu created much of the support for other 
parties in Zimbabwe but at least until the rise of the MDC, opposition parties did not succeed in 
disseminating an alternative political platform. In the case of Zapu, it could mobilize the same 
revolutionary credentials as Zapu. Sachikonye points out that Zum managed to get 30 percent of 
the vote in 1989 largely from not being Zanu, “There does appear to exist a constituency for ZUM. 
It challenges the hegemony of the united ZANU party. It condemns the one-party concept as 
undemocratic and as a protective shield for corrupt elements within the political leadership….Yet 
there is nothing in ZUM's platform that makes it more radical or socialist than the party it seeks to 
discredit. The ideological position of ZUM is ambiguous and amorphous” Ibid. 
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Zanuism as a political culture became a pervasive feature in all spheres of Zimbabwean 
life. Civic, economic and social spaces became captive to the hegemonic politics of 
absolutised perceptions and positions. Perceptions and positions, which made difference 
and innovation an intolerable and very often risky enterprise. Herein lay the foundations 
of the despotism that now plagues Zimbabwe. A despotism that seeks to homogenise 
national opinion, conduct, perception and thus turning Zimbabwe into a nation of 
accomplice and patronage governance. The social forces that advocate this system claim 
the liberation struggle as their private sector. The criterion of admission into this sector is, 
first the tribe, then the region and last but not least ‘war veterancy' (Kagoro, 2010, p. 99) . 
One way or the other, resources had to be repatriated from the enemy.  
…keep in mind that in the Gramscian sense, the Zimbabwean crisis has also resulted in 
the reconstruction of the post-colonial state in order both to provide the modality for and 
to consolidate the accumulation drive of, the ruling party elite in the country (Raftopoulos, 
2004, p. 160).  
The monopolization of, at least, media resources was consistent with the transformational 
struggle in which Zanu continued to engage “to develop an intellectual and cultural strategy” 
(Raftopoulos, 2004, p. 161). Personal enrichment of party members is, thus, a strategy for 
maintaining the unity of the political elite in the Gramscian sense to keep the upper hand in the 
continuing war of liberation.  As a means to an end, personal accumulation makes perfect sense 
to the party faithful although it comes with a risk of undermining Zanu’s moral authority of Zanu.  
As Kagoro observes,  
The major emphasis on national unity bereft of freedom and justice only served the 
purpose of covering up the contradictions in the society. When used in this sense unity 
became a self-serving ideology, concealing the inequities of power in the post-colonial 
society (Kagoro, 2010, p. 109).  
The necessity of unity helped Zanu to turn a blind eye to its internal corruption even while 
those outside its privilege would come to understand the elite political class’s ever growing stock 
of expensive cars, farms, lucrative contracts and veterans’ payments as raw primitive 
accumulation and the pursuit of power.  Power and wealth are required not as ends in themselves 
but in order to do something, in this case to transform a Zimbabwean polity into an African state.  
This theme of constructing a society is picked up by Brian Raftopoulos:  
As the crisis unfolded, various social forces called on repertoires from both the past and 
present to construct their version of events. The ruling party drew on a combination of 
revived nationalism that privileged its role in the liberation of the country, prioritized the 
centrality of the fight for land, and demonized all those outside the selective ‘patriotic 
history’ it espoused. It also represented its stance as part of a longer history of pan-
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Africanist and anti-imperialist struggles on the African continent and globally 
(Raftopoulos, 2009, p. 202). 
Since Independence, the government of Zimbabwe was consistent in its message of 
unity as one-party rule. The 1990 elections that pitted the upstart Zimbabwe Unity Movement 
(ZUM) party against the Zanu political machine was a case in point.  Even a nationalist hero such 
as Edgar Tekere, who had broken off from Zanu to found ZUM, did not have sufficient power to 
overcome his rivals on the political stage.12 As Christine Sylvester points out, the frame of unity, 
despite its contradictions, worked for the ruling party (Sylvester, 1990). Zanu claimed political 
divisions were a luxury the country could not afford. As Mugabe told a group of school children in 
1990, ''We have to have peace, and we necessarily have to decide together as a nation and 
people because if we are divided into groups of tribal factions and regional groups we will have 
quarrelling and fighting amongst ourselves” ("Zimbabwe ZANU chairman reportedly dubs multi-
party system ''unaffordable luxury''", 1990) (Maier, 1990). Many people shared the view; as I 
heard from a number of friends, nobody could replace Robert Mugabe, ostensibly as there was 
little to differentiate Zanu from Mugabe.  This point was usually made as a rhetorical question, 
“Who else, who else in Zimbabwe could take the place of the old man?”   
The idea that the ruling party had lost its way by 1997 is a theme running through 
analyses of the post-1997 crisis. But whether or not Zanu had in fact made mistakes, it had not 
fundamentally changed its objectives. As Zanu’s position had hardened and its justification of its 
own struggle for absolute control of material resources and the political agenda advanced, it had 
increasingly insulated itself from the demands of civil society, it could hardly have been expected 
to turn about face and embrace people’s participation or scrutiny.  
                                                      
12 Based on the results of the 1990 elections in which Mugabe won 78 percent of the vote (about 
42 percent of the electorate because of the low turn out) and ZUM managed to squeak out only 2 
out of 120 contested seats, Mugabe claimed a mandate for the one-party state, Borger, J. 
"Mugabe claims mandate to form one-party state." Financial Times, April 2 1990.   
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Inclusion/exclusion and civil society: Dorman 
Increasingly isolating itself from political debate within civil society was a hallmark of the 
party. There was little distinction between criticism and debate. The experience of persecution 
and the danger of political involvement explain the quiet political voice of civil society 
organizations, but their reticence to stand up to government does not mean that they lacked 
political consciousness.   
Sara Rich Dorman relates in her own experience in Zimbabwe in the 1990s that NGOs 
avoided politics altogether. Arguing that NGOs are characterized by a politics of inclusion in 
which they are largely co-opted by the state she concludes, “The politics of inclusion incorporated 
NGOs firmly with the ZANU (PF) regime. NGOs were vulnerable to co-option because of their 
roots in the liberation war and their commitment to the government’s agenda of development” 
(Dorman, 2001, p. 41). Zanu did not need to suppress all independent voices, bringing them into 
the party fold was sufficient. Others would self-correct or avoid encounters with the government 
altogether. 
The shared “roots in the liberation” meant that civil society was in fact not just forced into 
a quiescent attitude but tacitly supported building from the common experience of combating 
colonial occupation and racism, which explains why social objectives would be sufficiently 
resonant with the political perspectives espoused by Zanu. In this sense, political complacency is 
certainly not absence of political engagement. The growth of the number and type of 
organizations, the self-organization of rural and community groups and the emergence of 
pressure on government for a variety of rights proves that civil society was fulfilling some roles 
that were demanded of it.   
Zanu built its hegemony on the inclusion of independent voices into the political 
machinery, something it effected with NGOs vulnerable to co-option because of their roots in the 
liberation war and their commitment to the government’s agenda of development (Dorman, 2001). 
But as NGOs pursued internal social objectives of civil society that necessitated at least neutral 
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relations with government, one can think of their close linkages with government not so much as 
co-option but as sensible strategy.   
Collaborative strategies with government, however, entailed limited feedback on 
internally generated Zanu policies. Ironically because of his future role as chief interlocutor for 
Zanu when he became Minister of Information in 2000 Jonathan Moyo points out Zanu’s isolation 
from political debate in a quote he takes from a speech given by Mugabe to Zanu’s National 
Consultative Assembly in 1991. The strict discipline of the party was meant to “elucidate” 
decisions without airing any disagreements publicly,  
[our Central Committee] and this National Consultative Assembly are organs in which 
debate of any interest to the party members can take place, with a divergence of views 
being permissible as a feature of our democratic process; but once we have debated and 
concluded the debate on the basis of majority decisions, those decisions become binding 
on us all; to adhere recalcitrantly to your own position and seek to enunciate it out in the 
public is a demonstration of indiscipline verging on revolt (Moyo, 1992, p. 325). 
Each of the perspectives on Zanu discussed here agree that the struggle for power 
(survival) is a central explanatory variable in Zanu actions but in a context in which it seeks a 
transformational revolution over the long term with a national consolidation necessary to achieve 
it. Civil society is a positive force in pushing for democratic openings for all but Bond and 
Manyanya, and even they do not deny its democratic aspirations. Kagoro, Raftopoulos and 
Dorman also begin to explore the civil society role in constituting moral authority. In each of these 
accounts civil society emerges as both complicit in the hegemonic project that is central to Zanu’s 
political strategy and, increasingly, as a site of resistance. In Bratton, Zimbabwean civil society is 
still largely imminent potential (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997), as its strength relies on its 
density and diversity.  
The Promise of Independence 
We will explore the dominance of Zanu’s leadership in relationship to civil society in 
Zimbabwe in the sections that follow, beginning with a discussion of how the struggle for 
independence was embraced and used. This broad struggle developed through a series of 
specific aspirations:  
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• Towards national unity, particularly around symbols of patriotism and an authentic African 
past  
• Against internal dissent that could even potentially stand in the way or question Zanu 
policy and power 
• Against external power, such as the Apartheid government of South Africa that stand-in 
for the enemy settlers, at least until the mid-1990s 
• And for a development strategy, originally socialist that would serve these ends by 
increasing the capacity and ownership of black Zimbabweans.   
To identify these streams of inquiry should not close off other significant implications of 
government objectives and our goal is not to comprehensively explain Zimbabwean history but to 
investigate how government and civil society danced together, looking for contradictions and 
correlations between social objectives and the government’s program.    
Much of the international media coverage of the Zimbabwean transition in the early 
1980s was focused on the simmering violence, the exasperation of the white settlers who had lost 
their African prize and the possibility of a Zimbabwean economic miracle that was not to emerge. 
What would independence mean, what projects for the transformation into a fairer society would 
be pursued and how would the new government empower social and economic objectives that 
had been squashed in the past? 
Independence came to Zimbabwe on April 18, 1980, when the transition period came to 
an end with the lowering of the British Union Jack in Rufaro Stadium in Salisbury before 
dignitaries from the community of states. This negotiated independence was, however, marred by 
a sense of incompletion as the downfall of Rhodesian UDI was won in a hasty settlement and not 
on the battlefield. The Lancaster House solution promised to make two Zimbabwes, a private-
property recognizing continuation of settler power and a political regime won through universal 
suffrage and, thus, with the capacity to represent and struggle for an authentic and legitimate 
African state. In this way, the Lancaster settlement set the stage for imperfect independence, as a 
contradiction, in which whoever controlled the Zimbabwean government would enjoy political rule 
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but only by maintaining much of what had been built by decades of settler privilege. The enemy 
once fought on the battlefield would, therefore, still need to be confronted in the factory and the 
field, despite the victory won over the control of the state.   
Independence appears in the terminology of Chimurenga, a Shona word meaning “a 
collective struggle” that came to embody the aspiration against colonial dependence. The first 
Chimurenga was the Shona/Ndebele revolt against the British in 1896/1897, the second was the 
bush war against the settlers culminating in the establishment of Zimbabwe in 1980 and the third 
would be conceptualized by Zanu loyalists as the struggle against Western values that threatened 
to end Zanu rule and, thus, the promise of the revolution in the end of the 1990s. The continuing 
struggle evoked by the term has currency not just within Zimbabwe but also across post-
independence Africa (Raftopoulos, 2004). As Paul Nyathi remarks about the post-1997 crisis, 
other political leaders in Southern Africa have  
hesitated to criticize the ZANU PF government because it has managed to portray these 
events as a fight against a renewed threat of colonialism, as a “Third Chimurenga 
(revolution) in which a small Third World nation finally teaches the colonizer Britain a 
lesson and takes land back from the whites (Nyathi, 2004).  
Independence had meaning not simply as the problem of political (black) versus 
economic (white) control of the destiny of the country. Overcoming impediments to freedom also 
meant altering the inherited system that colonized the African mind in addition to its land so that 
social and economic injustices could finally be addressed. Independence was a return to 
something lost, going back home. 
Shortly after Zimbabwean Independence in 1980, a reporter from the Boston Globe, in a 
an attempt to discover what this freedom entailed to Zimbabweans found Betty Chikove hanging 
her wash in Mabuku Township outside Harare.  "If I had wings I would fly like a bat," she told him, 
"I can't guess what is in store, but the war was so hard on us. Now we can walk standing up 
again. No more curfew, no more passes.  We can go home.  I'm looking forward with confidence" 
(Lockman, 1980).  
In speaking of going home, Chikove was referring to her rural home in the Marondellas 
(Marondera after 1982) where she fled with her family to escape the violence of the war. 
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Violence, insecurity and terror displaced around 1.3 million mostly rural Zimbabweans and 
decimated agricultural production (Bratton, 1981). Many thousands were directly traumatized by 
the violence. During her interview, Chikove pointed at a young woman who came from behind the 
house, "That child there was tortured by electricity," she was raped by an electric cattle prod, "she 
has no mind now. We brought her here and tried to get her a doctor but we had no money" 
(Lockman, 1980).  
Independence for Chikove entailed a return to home; government was to both facilitate 
this going home and provide for basic needs. Her stress on returning home was echoed in the 
government’s policy priorities to return the country to normalcy. Pointing to the tension between 
Zanu’s agenda for economic transformation and its economic conservatism, Christine Sylvester 
provides this quote from the Transitional National Development Plan of 1982: 
The triumph of liberation has given the people and Government of Zimbabwe an 
opportunity to create a new order, to rid the Zimbabwean society of vestiges of 
exploitation, unemployment, poverty, disease, ignorance and social insecurity.... While 
the inherited economy, with its institutions and infrastructure has in the past served a 
minority, it would be simplistic and, indeed, naive to suggest that it should, therefore, be 
destroyed in order to make a fresh state. The challenge lies in building upon and 
developing on what was inherited, modifying, expanding and, where necessary, radically 
changing structures and institutions in order to maximize benefits from economic growth 
and development to Zimbabwe as a whole (Sylvester, 1985). 
Already Zanu’s approach was pragmatic, seeking to provide the conditions for continuity 
in reconstruction by “building upon” its inherited system. As Jonathan Moyo writes about the first 
two years, “As might have been expected, Zanu-P.F.'s pragmatic outlook at the national level 
invited allegations from the party's fringe on the left that the 'revolution had lost its way', and that 
its leader had changed his mindset from socialism to capitalism” (Moyo, 1992). While Zanu’s 
political objectives were transformative--as in Mugabe's declaration of the need to "disorient the 
masses," its pursuit of them through a gradualist reform strategy would avoid the shock of foisting 
independence on a traumatized people.  
Government agencies were left in tact while the large goals of the provision of free 
education and repurposing of health and agricultural programs to serve black as well as white 
populations were underway. But achieving Independence through government restraint was 
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largely resonant with the social objectives of the Zimbabwean population emerging from the war 
and now looking to be left alone by their government.  
Chikove explains,  
"People can't just come up and tell you to tell them everything anymore. Now that we are 
free, we can just say 'No more questions' to anybody. In the other time black people 
didn't have the right to keep their privacy. You could lie but you couldn't say no more 
questions" (Lockman, 1980).  
Chikove's comments should be understood as referring to her desire to end the interview 
with the journalist but they are also interesting in how strongly they link independence to the state 
of being left alone, not to be bothered. The colonial experience of government had been for 
villagers like Chikove an intrusive, external repressive force that relocated communities, stole 
their land and cattle and forced them to become cheap labor. Independence was to be the end of 
this meddling.  
Independence as the return to normalcy with the modest goals of adding value to the 
lives of citizens without transforming them into something else resonates with the experience of 
many who set out in 1980 to be left alone to carry out the family and community objectives at 
home that were interrupted by the war and the colonial legacy. The white settlers had not just 
taken the land and resources away from the African population; they had pursued a state based 
on their own privilege and interests alone creating an entrenched, uneven development (Mtisi et 
al., 2009). The new independence promised to right this wrong but was also replete with 
contradictions. How could the government both incorporate the freedom to "go home" and pursue 
social transformation?   
For Zimbabwe, Independence in the 1980s implied government restraint. Zanu needed to 
provide the stability and social services required to rebuild the tattered social fabric. As Thomas 
Mapfumo, also known as the Chimurenga musician sang about the end of the war, "The drum 
has sounded. The chief who does not sleep, war is over in Zimbabwe. Life is back to normal in 
rural areas. Old people are happy to go back to the reserves" (Mapfumo, 1984). 
This aspiration for the expansion and security of the private sphere is easily missed 
because Independence also raised expectations around material advancements that required 
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positive action and, at the very least, the end of the normalized deprivation that African 
communities suffered in the colonial years.  Again Mapfumo,  
Give us somewhere to sleep in Zimbabwe, Give us some food. Give us some clothes. 
That is happiness. That is what the people want. Look its confusion in Zimbabwe. 
Conversation at the busstops. Confusion because of hunger.... We are eating hyenas. 
That's confusion. Conversation at the markets (Mapfumo, 1984).  
Meeting social objectives required a change in which state institutions would move from 
repressor to benefactor. Mugabe's disorientation of the masses would not come through another 
shock but through the availability of tools for self-development, particularly education, health and 
the provision of basic services. In the first two years of independence, the government saw 140 
percent increase in school enrolment, an economy that grew by almost 15 percent and added 
60,000 jobs as people returned home (Hawkins, 1982). The masses would be led but they would 
also lead by expanding their own opportunities.  
Independence unleashed particular social objectives that also had political implication. 
Social objectives for righting the ongoing repression of women and pursuing women's rights and 
equality were developed through female guerilla fighters’ experience with the discriminatory 
machismo of their male comrades (Staunton, 1990). The aspiration for women's rights asserted 
itself on the political playing field even as new political institutions were in a formative phase.  For 
example, member of Parliament from Manicaland and deputy minister of posts and roads, Naomi 
Nhiwatiwa, at the opening of a Red Cross health clinic in 1981 (speaking in Shona):  
Let it be the law of the land that women be paid the same salaries and men for similar 
work, that husbands and wives live together in the same house, that child-rearing be 
given the same status as professional work (Lockman, 1980).  
The Department of Information declined to publish her remarks at the time, an indication 
that she had hit a nerve and an illustration of how in the 1980s women's rights were an early 
issue of contestation within Zanu’s objectives.   
We have been expected to be sexually passive, otherwise we were considered 
prostitutes or bad girls. Well one of the freedoms we have won is the freedom to express 
biological need, which is as important to life as air, sleep or food (Lockman, 1980).  
Nhiwatiwa sees the lack of freedom as being a social not a political issue. In this way, 
she highlights a problem of African culture, something that Zanu cannot directly address while 
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“leaving people alone.” The struggle for independence had a social intent and used political 
structure and logic, without opposing it. For example, Agnes Mapfumo, who began as a domestic 
worker and became a leading skills-trainer helping to form the Zimbabwe Craft Cooperative in 
1980, said in 1987,   
We started at the peak of the war when things were very difficult. Although the war was 
very hot in the rural areas we never stopped, and the freedom fighters understood what 
we were doing.... Independence doesn’t bring all the answers.... Although we participated 
very actively in the liberation struggle, after Independence most women are still excluded 
from planning and decision-making. They are also excluded from taking up challenging 
positions aimed at effecting change... (Bond-Stewart, 1987). 
The sort of resonance that supports a government's political objectives is not the same 
as the wholesale enthusiasm for these objectives. Women like Mapfumo, began to focus on what 
they could do outside of the sphere of power in which they acknowledged their own 
disadvantage. Her area of work was to "respond to the demand" so that the young people she 
worked with would solve the problem of unemployment themselves. She acknowledges the value 
of the generalized Independence struggle while being clear that for the specific emancipatory 
objectives of women independence as autonomy and self-improvement is paramount.  
Also strongly illustrating the resonance of the general political Independence struggle and 
the specific movement for women’s emancipation in 1987, Cornelia Mzaca Nkomo, who was 
working in the ranks of the Organisation of Rural Associations for Progress (later discussed in 
Chapter 4), emphasizes the way in which the struggle opened her mind: 
I increased my awareness when I joined the struggle. There were promises of equity but 
there were times when men were regarded as bosses. For example, very few women 
were trained in the air force and artillery. Why? I wanted to. There was something wrong 
somewhere. We had more possibilities than we had at home, but not enough. Men were 
supposed to cook. They agreed to do little things like helping with cooking but they didn’t 
agree with big things and we couldn’t question them.... To women who read this book – 
you must learn to be critical of everything, even what we say. You should think for 
yourselves and improve on the ideas of others. You should encourage debates about the 
real problems facing women, and come up with concrete solutions (Bond-Stewart, 1987, 
p.15).  
It was the participation in the struggle that helped Nkomo to clarify for herself the 
continuing injustice to women in Zimbabwean society. In this way, the emerging women's 
movement not only validates the struggle for Independence as political objective, it sees itself as 
 79 
developed and developing hand-in-hand with this struggle. The independence struggle is 
formative to its own consciousness of emancipatory objectives. The struggle has taught Nkomo 
that social justice will not be given to women. It must be part of a painful journey that includes a 
self-critical (and politically critical) standpoint.  Independence, as a state of freedom from 
dependence that must be attained through personal struggle, thus resonated with women’s rights 
groups in Zimbabwe while they did not want a largely male dominated government to fight their 
battles for them.  
Zanu’s idea of independence was not the same as the expanding private sphere, or a 
growing and vibrant civil society, with its diverse struggles for independence but rather the 
construction of a unified national transformation around itself and away from the past dependence 
on the powerful forces of Western capital. As Margaret Dongo reflected in an interview with the 
BBC in 2006,  
I’ve been a member of the central ruling party and also a member of parliament for 10 
years, and I’ve held a number of senior positions, some of them that involve policy 
making. You find that the policy-making process in this country, especially by Zanu PF, 
does not leave room for consultation. The whole thing has been outlined, 
created…designed like a dictatorship. One person will come in and say, “Mr. Mugabe, 
you know the people who are making life difficult for us? Tony Blair and the Americans. I 
think it’s better for us to put in a law so these people can’t play around with our minds, 
and we can do what we want (Margaret Dongo, 2006). 
Besides the pure power motivation of politics, the narrow pursuit of Independence as the 
dependence on Zanu, that is the government, for development is drawn from Zanu's own 
interpretation of its leadership in transformation.  The party is not a catalyst for transformation but 
the agent that guards against the re-imposition of external control. Independence is a stage in 
national development. It must be sacrificed for the greater good of reconstruction in the terms that 
will be set FOR the masses BY their leaders.  Elliot T Manyake, Minister for Youth Development 
emphasizes the link between imperfect independence and the pursuit of gender justice in the 
2004 National Gender Policy: 
The quest for social justice, equity and respect for human rights anchored on democratic 
principles spurred us to fight for our independence.... Our society has been described as 
highly unequal in terms of race and gender. These two factors impact on income 
distribution, political participation, power relations, access to, control and ownership of 
economic and productive resources. This situation continues to haunt our development, 
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especially human development efforts which are aimed at addressing issues of equity, 
social justice, human rights and democracy by putting value and worth to each person's 
contribution to society at all levels (Republic of Zimbabwe, 2000).  
The plan, written in 2004, is a very conscious attempt to reinforce the relevance of the 
political struggle for independence to the woman's movement and, thus evokes the linkage 
between racial and gender equality as central. This is a blatant attempt to evoke the parallels 
between the women’s movement and Zanu’s intentions to continue the Independence struggle. 
For much of its history, Zanu could count on the reproduction of the Independence frame within 
diverse associations as they sought both to bring in new members and protect their rights to 
autonomous action, as we have explored with some particular expressions of women’s 
aspirations above.  
In centralizing the role of struggle, national independence remained ever something that 
had to be won. At the same time, national independence was the return to normalcy—something 
of a past before the imposition of colonialism. Zanu let people re-create their own lives while 
ensuring the party was there to do it for them.  In this climate, political objectives strongly 
resonated with civil society associations, viewing real independence as a product of the political 
struggle even as they suffered the contradiction between the quest for autonomy and the 
government’s penchant to reduce it. The contradiction would play out on a variety of levels. First 
the struggle was to be transformed into the promotion of a shared sense of national identity. As is 
discussed in the next section, it would not be just any unity, however, but one that was 
manufactured and secured by Zanu. The struggle for Independence also had enemies both, 
internal and external. The construction and response to these enemies was a tool in Zanu’s 
arsenal to justify vigilance for its continued existence as the guardian of Independence. Finally, 
the political economy was another site of contention. Outwardly, tolerating and benefiting from the 
capitalist enterprises of settlers and foreign investors, Zanu set the conditions for economic 
development and, particularly, for the development of a political/economic elite closely connected 
with the party. 
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Promoting national unity 
Zanu has used the cause of building national unity to exclude pretenders to political 
power and narrow the field of who belongs to the polity and who does not. Its vision was a 
country of loyalty unified under its leadership, which initially put out an olive branch to its former, 
white repressors.  As Mugabe told a Boston Globe reporter in 1982,  
We are one people with a single loyalty. We have set an example at the upper levels of 
government. Why can't we create it at the political level as well? It's part of our transition. 
We want to be a democratic nation within a single-party system (Driscoll, 1982). 
The credibility to act and the capacity of Zanu to mobilize resources in the trenches of its 
struggle required order and discipline around the Party’s central role in Zimbabwe. Keeping the 
rank and file behind this vision legitimized actual violence and repression and required vigilance 
in maintaining a monopoly over political dialogue. How was unity to be constructed and 
maintained? In the early years, unity was associated with the process of reconciliation, which 
would bring the people together as one to understand and act as one on national, collectivist and 
socialist goals. As Peter Yates quotes the Minister of Labour and Social Services from a 1980 
article in the Herald: 
It is on the foundation of the principle (of reconciliation) that we are finding it possible to 
transform groupist objectives and inclinations into collectivist, popular and socialist 
objectives and aspirations....Our people as a whole are quickly transforming by accepting 
the principles of (national) unity and reconciliation (Yates, 1980). 
In her review of history education in Zimbabwe, however, Theresa Barnes notes that the 
association between unity and reconciliation was short lived, with reconciliation being reserved for 
the Black/White division, resulting not in unifying at all but in perpetuating the division. Unity was 
actually pursued, however, in the joining together of Shona/Ndebele as the Africans, excluding 
other ethnic groups (Barnes, 2004). To the extent that the school history curriculum reflected the 
prevailing political view, this is suggestive that Zanu’s conception of citizenship came to be limited 
to a single patriotism for the Shona and Ndebele. Extirpating this difference, also led to a decade 
of repression to which we shall return below. 
The telling of a national story, in which Zanu is the privileged liberator of the Zimbabwean 
people, was used regularly in rituals such as Independence Day celebrations and whenever a 
 82 
state hero died and found his or her way into Heroes Acres. In this repetition of a story the 
primary enemy of the African identity was the white settler, who continues to repress through 
profit seeking and ownership at the expense of the Zimbabwean worker and continuing to impose 
imperialistic, European values incompatible with a return to the African center. The land is at the 
center; the return of stolen goods stymied by the two-faced English who are blamed for never 
fulfilling their promises to shepherd its return after the Lancaster settlement. 
After the 1997 crisis, patriotism as loyalty to the party of liberators resurges at the center 
of Zanu hegemony. Terrence Ranger in 2004 discusses how patriotic history has been employed 
in Zimbabwe in the political crisis to serve the needs of Mugabe and Zanu-PF: 
Within Zimbabwe, 'patriotic history' has seemed indefensibly narrow, dividing the nation 
up into revolutionaries and sell-outs, in the spirit of Didymus Mutasa's remark that he 
wished that only the seven million revolutionary Zimbabweans could remain, or of Robert 
Mugabe's demand at the 2003 Heroes Days ceremony that the opposition must 'repent" 
and declare its commitment to the continuing revolution before any unity talks could begin 
(Ranger, 2004). 
Patriotic history has its limits "You could have too much history if a single, narrow 
historical narrative gained a monopoly and was endlessly repeated" (Ranger, 2004). The problem 
as the government began to see at the heightening of the political crisis after 1997 was that an 
alternative history of independence in Zimbabwe was taking hold with Zanu and Mugabe as the 
central repressive force, standing in the way of aspirations for human rights and participatory 
government. Ranger quotes Zanu-PF Information Secretary for Bulawayo, Sikumbizo Ndiweni, 
"The mistake the ruling party made was to allow colleges and universities to be turned into anti-
Government mentality factories" (Ranger, 2004). The independence struggle in which the 
government engaged was around vigilance to the continuing revolution. Thus, Zanu could 
mobilize support for itself through the rules of the game of war and the independence values it felt 
comfortable in monopolizing. "Each presidential candidate should produce manifestos which spell 
out clearly that they are going to uphold Zimbabwean values and heritage and restore a sense of 
patriotism among Zimbabweans," from a 16 February 2002 Herald article (Ranger, 2004). 
 Zanu was able to rally its base because its own version of nationalism was not yet dead. 
It still had power to assert itself.  
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The election, therefore, was history versus 'the end of history.' Tsvangirai was mocked 
not only for having failed to understand history, which amounted to more or less the same 
thing. ‘The depth of his knowledge of our history is so shallow that is frightening,’ wrote 
Olley Maruma (Ranger, 2004).  
Zanu was in touch with the authentic African perspective, which would protect the African 
space from the "bogus universalism" of the western oppressors, now in the guise of the British 
and Americans and the entire edifice of globalized values. This was not a new strategy; it had 
been a mobilizing force behind Zanu-PF's efforts to consolidate its power dating from 
Independence.  What was new in its response to the late 1990s crisis was the vehemence of 
Zanu's efforts to define and isolate its enemies. This was more than a diversionary tactic. It was a 
consistent and rational strategy based on a return to Zanu’s work to unify Zimbabweans under 
the revolutionary cause.  
More than power was at stake; the question really was whether the revolution would be 
interrupted. Zanu must reconnect with its social support—the veterans or unemployed youth 
inclined to join the struggle—both to rejuvenate its troops and to re-establish its authority with its 
civil society. The call to unity served the purpose of building an actual allegiance to Zanu’s 
objectives, but for an increasingly small portion of the population. The veterans and landless, as 
they were without resources, were willing to use violence to assert the primacy of the land cause.  
Eradicating the enemy within: Gukurahundi  
Symbols and social support have been employed alongside violence to eradicate 
difference and the enemy within. A horrific example is Mugabe’s use of the 5 Brigade to terrorize 
the Matabele regions of the country until 1988, when a unity accord dismantled Zapu, Zanu’s 
main competitor. The government campaign against dissidents (that led to violence and 
repression focused on the Matabeleland and Midlands provinces) stands out as an extreme 
example of Zanu’s use of violence to eliminate alternative political objectives. Called by the 
government Gukurahundi, from a Shona word meaning the summer rain that washes away the 
chaff, the cleansing of political opposition has roots in the simmering violence that continued after 
Independence among resistance fighters that were not integrated in the new Zimbabwean army. 
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After the Lancaster agreement, Zanu agreed to integrate Zipra (the military wing of Zapu), ZANLA 
(the military wing of Zanu) and the remnants of the Rhodesian army into a Zimbabwean National 
Army (ZNA).  
By September 1980 only 10,000 former guerillas had been integrated into the ZNA and 
22,000 guerillas remained in the 14 rural assembly points formed under the provisional 
administration led by the British. Angered by the government’s attempts to move them closer to 
urban centers and not seduced by the prospects of returning to the agricultural economy some of 
these bored and worried soldiers became violent (Borrell, 1980).   
The fighting often took the form of inter-party violence with guerillas lining up along 
Zipra/ZANLA divisions. An investigation into two early incidents of violence in November 1980 
and February 1981 among Zipra and ZANLA factions, the Dumbutshena Report, was never 
released but the Director of Public Prosecutions later said the November 1980 clash in which fifty 
men were killed was caused by the “unprovoked action of ZANLA and the use by them of heavy 
weaponry” (Dzimba, 1998). The insecurity and violence and Mugabe’s retaliatory dismissal of 
political members of Zapu from the government and the ZNA, is cited as a cause behind the wave 
of Zipra desertions and the ensuing lawlessness as some dissidents began to pillage and 
terrorize villages largely in Matabeleland (Dzimba, 1998). 
The violence served to bring to the fore several levels of social divisions: it exacerbated 
fears that the Ndebele sought conditions to reassert their dominance over the Shona; it 
undermined Zapu’s case for peaceful coexistence under a multiparty solution, and in providing an 
opening for South Africa’s clandestine meddling in destabilizing the country through the creation 
of a “super Zapu” force, it legitimated the use of violence against dissidents that Mugabe would 
exploit.   
Tribal identity seemed to many at the time to be a significant challenge to national unity 
and was certainly underlying Mugabe’s reference to loyalties.13 The Rhodesians had manipulated 
                                                      
13 See for instance, news reports from the time such as this one in the Christian Science Monitor, 
“Tribal rivalries grew rather diminished during the war and while Mr. Mugabe has brought five 
Patriotic Front men, including Mr. Nkomo, into his Cabinet, there is dissatisfaction on both sides” 
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and heighted distrust between the country’s two largest tribal groupings—the Shona and the 
Ndebele—and it had always been in their interests to break any shared identities among them 
while using their cultural and political institutions to maintain control. The settler government used 
but it did not invent the contesting ethnic identities, Ndebele nationhood was also promoted and 
sought by the Ndebeles themselves (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009). 
The Ndebele people had settled on the southwestern plateau in Zimbabwe sometime 
after the 1840s in a migration that split them away from an Nguni offshoot of the Zulu tribe in 
South Africa. For Zanu, the fact of the historical Ndebele invasions could be used to justify the 
repression of its rival Zapu because of the purported danger of Ndebele aggression and 
unfinished conquest even though separatism was certainly not the only strain, and probably not 
the dominant one, of political objectives among the Ndebele. Nevertheless, it was convenient for 
Zanu’s pursuit of single-party power that the two parties, Zanu and Zapu, garnered support along 
the divisions of this separation, 14 with Zanu associated with the Shona majority and Zapu with the 
Ndebele minority.  
Inter-tribal violence raised questions of ethnic difference in the country and was thus to 
be opposed in the quest for national unity. As Eppel remarks even though it was framed in the 
language of crushing Zapu dissidents the real purpose of the Gukurahundi was to stifle a 
potentially legitimate seat of resistance in the Ndebele homelands.  
There is a continuity in approach by Zanu PF over the decades: apparently legitimate 
fronts for political repression have been maximally exploited in government 
propaganda—then, the need to crush dissidents, now, the need to redistribute land—and 
the large grain of truth in this rhetoric has silenced that international criticism that could 
have changed the situation” (Eppel, 2004).  
                                                      
Borrell, J. "Zimbabwe troubled by outbreak of political violence." Christian Science Monitor, 17 
September 1980, 1-1. 
14 See, for example, Tony Rich’s analysis of the 1980 elections in which he argues that Zanu’s 
win in the 1980 elections was not primarily caused by ethnic divisions. Rich, T. (1983) Legacies of 
the Past? The Results of the 1980 Election in Midlands Province, Zimbabwe. in J. D. Y. Peel and 
T. Ranger (eds) Past and Present in Zimbabwe. Liverpool: Manchester University Press, pp. 52-
55. 
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Tribal exceptionalism could not to be tolerated. But the danger of Zapu went beyond its 
links to the Matabele and their different claims to nationhood. Zapu’s political legitimacy also 
sprang from its corner on the market of legitimate claims to the struggle for freedom in the 
country, which put it in direct conflict with Zanu. Many had been awoken to the idea of 
independence through Joshua Nkomo, Zapu’s leader, for example, Mishek Sebanda a preacher 
from Nkayi who grew up in Bulawayo (in Matabeleland South) describes his own support for 
Nkomo. 
Nkomo is the one who started this freedom thing when he was with the National 
Railways. We used to go for our meetings after work. He is the one who made us realize 
that things were not equal between the races because we, the blacks, were segregated 
by the whites and the Coloureds…. We supported Nkomo right up until his death 
(Staunton, 2009). 
In this way, Zapu was a viable opposition. Mugabe saw a way to silence it for good by 
playing on the need to expunge the violence of the dissidents. This fact employed by Zanu to 
legitimate a decade of violent repression eventually led to Zapu’s demise and cemented Zanu’s 
hegemony. 
In 1983 Mugabe used the 5 Brigade to launch a campaign purportedly against Zapu’s 
reputed military capability but actually against the civilian populations of Matabeleland South, 
North and Midlands. The justification was the discovery of secret caches of arms in 1982 
(CCPJZ, 1997). Maintaining arms stockpiles in secret locations had been a policy of both Zipra 
and ZANLA as a hedge against the resurgence of the Rhodesian Army and the potential failure of 
Lancaster to come to a workable political solution. But Zipra weapon stockpiles bolstered fears of 
Matabele exceptionalism and quest for power. Interviewed after having his passport confiscated 
and being prevented from leaving the country on state business in 1983, Zapu leader Joshua 
Nkomo said,  
I have a feeling they are using the dissident problem to crush Zapu. They want to get at 
Zapu and eliminate Zapu and impose a one-party state. (Cowell, 1983)  
It is ironic that Nkomo himself was not a member of the Ndebele tribe but came from a 
minority tribe called the Kalanga that lives among the Ndebele but are more closely related to the 
Shona.  
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The campaign rapidly escalated from 1983 when the 5 Brigade, which had been trained 
by North Korean forces, began to murder and terrorize villagers. In 1997, The Catholic 
Commission on Human Rights and Justice released a report on the atrocities that documented 
and counted thousands of deaths and abuses. As the campaigns were carried out in secrecy, the 
total number of deaths, torture and beating victims may never be known but conservative 
estimates are about 30,000 deaths (CCPJZ, 1997). While the campaign was intended to wipe out 
support for Zapu-linked dissidents, its scope was horrific, including the withholding of food, brutal 
torture, sexual violence and intimidation. The report gives eyewitness accounts that illustrate both 
the apparent irrationality of the repression and the fear it engendered:  
On the 10th June 1983 at 4 pm I was taken from my workplace in a Puma vehicle, along 
with 2 others who worked for another store in Tsholotsho. We were taken to Mbamba 
Police Camp, about 40-50 km away. When we got there we were separated. My friend 
and I were accused of telephoning Bulawayo to warn our masters to stay away, because 
the killers (the 5 Brigade) were still there. The 5 Brigade had made it known that they 
wanted to kill my master, Y, and my friend's master, K. They had gone to hide in 
Bulawayo. I was beaten and lost 4 teeth on the spot, and 12 others after this. My friend 
was tied with his hands and feet together. They would hang him head down and feet up 
until he was paralysed in both hands and feet. He died from this in 1993. From 1983 he 
was on and off in hospital (CCPJZ, 1997). 
Such occurrences were not tied to any actual dissident activity. Although, it is possible 
that such snares caught some of the actual dissidents, the real point was to establish guilt as a 
commitment to an Ndebele identity, speaking the language and identifying with Ndebele symbols 
and pride. People were beaten or tortured for not speaking Shona or for varying types of 
allegiances to Zapu. In the dozens of remote villages where the 5 Brigade carried out its 
activities, daily life was violently disrupted and the point seemed to be merely the demonstration 
of the overawing power of the military.  The following report about Commander Jesus illustrates 
the tortuous attempts to explain the regime of pure fear as a legitimate political response to 
organized violence: 
Commander Jesus said he found his boys doing nothing - beating up people instead of 
killing them. He did not mind thousands of people being killed. "You are going to eat 
eggs, after eggs hens, after hens goats, after goats cattle. Then you shall eat cats, dogs, 
and donkeys. Then you are going to eat your children. After that you shall eat your wives. 
Then the men will remain, and because dissidents have guns, they will kill the men and 
only dissidents will remain. That's when we will find the dissidents” (CCPJZ, 1997). 
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The Gukurahundi did little to stop the dissidents, who were already disassociated from 
political society and largely without greater political objectives—there were probably never more 
than 300 of them anyway (CCPJZ, 1997). By 1987, even as unity talks were underway between 
Zanu and Zapu, dissident attacks continued15.  
What the Gukurahundi did accomplish was to force Zapu to give up its pretensions to 
compete with Zanu on the political minefield (and thus to dismantle a separate seat of political 
legitimacy). While only a few internal voices within Zanu have ever acknowledged the extent of 
the repression of the Gukurahundi. Joshua Nkomo later would say explicitly that he agreed to 
merge Zapu with Zanu in the 1987 Unity Accords as the only way to end the government-
sponsored terror in Matabeleland. In this way, the Gukurahundi succeeded in eliminating Zapu 
once and for all while disciplining pockets of difference in the minority tribe. This strategy of fear 
plays an important role in forcing a narrow channel for legitimate political voice in Zimbabwe. 
Considering the goal of the Gukurahundi as the disciplining of Ndebele nationalist 
aspirations, it does not seem to have been in the interest of the Zimbabwean government to fuel 
Matabele separatist sentiments over the long run by taking away their security nor to approximate 
itself too closely to its own largely Shona roots, but it had the authority to wipe out legitimate 
opposition and, thus, used terror as a means to enforce political unity around itself. As Ndlovu-
Gatsheni remarked, “Gukurahundi violence provoked radical Ndebele cultural nationalism as well 
as radical Ndebele politics that sometimes contested the whole idea of a unitary Zimbabwe state” 
(Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009). 
Raw hegemonic power was certainly the intended outcome of the Gukurahundi. The 
campaign had to be secret, precisely because it violated the constitutionally guaranteed contract 
of rights and the Five Brigade, thus, reported directly to Mugabe and not to the army. By pushing 
underground any resistance to national unity under its flag, however, the government reinforced a 
                                                      
15 The Catholic Commission report documents that dissidents murdered 16 people on a farm in 
Matobo a month before the Unity Accord in December 1987. Catholic Commission for Justice and 
Peace in Zimbabwe, (CCJP), (1997) Breaking the Silence, Building True Peace. Report on the 
1980's Disturbances in Matabeleland & the Midlands. 
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generalized message of the paramount nature of national unity, and warned any who would 
oppose its complete hold on power.     
While the composition of Zapu had only loosely mirrored Matabele ethnicity, the hidden 
war served the purpose of repressing the legitimacy of Matabele-linked political claims; its 
purpose was, thus, not the remaking of ethnic identities but the suppression of opposition to 
national unity, packaged as the legitimate goal of eradicating dissident activity. Zapu and 
communities who might conceivably disagree with the primacy of the unified identity under Zanu 
were silenced, while the actual extent of violence was guarded to minimize solidarity with 
Matabele grievances but also because it undermined the rights of actual citizens. The idea of the 
Gukurahundi as a battle against dissident elements of ZAPU resonated with civil society’s bottom 
line of security and order but, only because the government’s version of events was all that was 
reported until 1997. 
Many Shona Zimbabweans chose simply not to believe the rumors of government-
sponsored violence raging through the Midlands, Matabeleland South and Matabeleland North, 
and to buy the legitimacy of government action against dissidents (Eppel, 2004). To publicize the 
actual violence under the 5 Brigade in the Ndebele regions would be tantamount to the public 
opposition that would bring back retribution.16  The use of violence to eradicate internal enemies 
to its project of Zimbabwe has thus also reinforced opposition to it, which paradoxically 
strengthens the truth of the danger of internal opposition. 
Guarding against the enemy without: Apartheid South Africa 
Overcoming the dependence of the Zimbabwean state on South Africa and Britain was a 
central part of Zanu’s platform. South Africa as the last remaining holdout of racist domination 
also wanted to shape a future Zimbabwean state from the Rhodesian settler regime, as it was the 
strongest state in the region that could offer any opposition.  South Africa failed to bring about the 
                                                      
16 Largely underground, the Ndebele have developed their own approaches to particularism, 
including the development of a United Mthwakazi Republic “that symbolizes the desire for a 
restored pre-colonial state” Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. J. (2009) 'Nation Building in Zimbabwe and the 
Challenges of Ndebele Particularism', African Journal on Conflict Resolution. 
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emergence of what it defined as a moderate state in Zimbabwe, one that would deny support to 
South African liberation movements and that would become a part of its planned Constellation of 
Southern African states (Dzimba, 1998). As the new political landscape emerged after 1980, 
South Africa resorted to a policy of overt containment of the Zimbabwean threat through 
occasional military incursion combined with economic control—Zimbabwe relied on both South 
African ports and markets—and clandestine activity.  In this way, South Africa became the clear 
threat and danger to Zimbabwean independence.  Mugabe declared in 1987, 
We are not militarily at war with apartheid, but apartheid is at war with us. And militarily, 
economically and socially, we are paying an enormous price (Mugabe, 1987).  
South Africa represented, however, not just a threat to Zimbabwe but the embodiment of 
continued African repression in the region and, thus, for Zanu, opposition to it formed a part of 
Zimbabwean political objectives. Seen from the lens of maintaining its own internal dominance, 
South Africa was a source of ever-present danger (the other) through which Zanu commanded 
the vigilance of its own society. But its leadership in opposing South African Apartheid worked not 
only because of the external danger but because it resonated with civil society’s belief in 
expanding freedom.  
The persistence of internal and external enemies forms a significant part of the identity of 
any state because of what Campbell calls “discourses of danger” that help to unify the people 
around a common cause (Campbell, 1998). In conceiving of the South African danger, Zanu was 
responding to South Africa’s real threat but also acting upon the shared experience of racial 
repression. Many Zimbabweans had experienced South African Apartheid first hand working in 
the mines17 and many others shared family, friends and other work experiences with their South 
African neighbors. Given the alternative of the Zimbabwean reconciliation policy, Zimbabwe 
provided an example to the world that African states could come to a political solution that 
included both black and settler populations. In this way until 1995, the struggle was pursued with 
                                                      
17 In the 1970s at its peak, South Africa hosted more than 600,000 migrant workers from the 
region. And under UDI, South Africa became by far the largest trading partner and investor in the 
isolated Republic of South Africa. Dzimba, J. (1998) South Africa's destabilization of Zimbabwe, 
1980-89, New York, St. Martin's Press. 
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the Mugabe taking a leading role in the Frontline States in standing publicly against South African  
Apartheid.   
Mugabe became more convinced that his country’s apparent success in creating a 
prosperous non-racial society was one of the most important reasons for South African 
destabilization…. Mugabe viewed the elimination of Apartheid as fundamental for 
maintaining a non-racial society at home as well as supporting the pan-African ideal of 
racial equality (Dzimba, 1998).  
This quote from Kenneth Kaunda, the president of neighboring Zambia, illustrates Zanu’s 
use of its moral example against South Africa, “Our former enemy and your ally the former 
Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith is now living in peace in Zimbabwe under the dynamic 
leadership of Comrade Mugabe, the man he detained for ten years.” (Meldrum, 1986) 
The struggle against Apartheid ended in 1995 in a pyrrhic victory. South Africa, by 
regaining its legitimacy as a regional power, pushed Zimbabwe out of the limelight and reduced 
Zimbabwean influence in the region. This vacuum of prestige was visible. Multinational 
corporations and regional embassies picked up roots from Harare and relocated to 
Johannesburg, Pretoria and Cape Town, some returning and others merely seeking to take 
advantages of new opportunities. To the extent that South Africa had been a useful reality for 
maintaining loyalty against an external enemy, this leg of support for Zanu’s power (and 
Mugabe’s influence) in the region had simply disappeared. A mere three years later, Zimbabwe 
would officially enter into the war in the Congo, which many see as a raw attempt to capture its 
resources. In light of its lost enemy in South Africa, it makes sense to consider that it needed a 
new enemy. This was not to be found in the confused mess of the Congo. A more effective 
strategy would be to go to the heart, as it would do in remembering land injustice and the whites 
and their surrogate in Britain and the United States. 
Seeking economic development and socialism 
Outside of the first few years of significant growth and its ability to expand social services, 
Zanu’s economic credentials were hardly superlative. But there were also bright spots in its 
economic management, such as its success in the 1980s in expanding education and health 
services and its management of drought relief that averted widespread humanitarian disaster. 
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The point here is not which economic policies would have led to prosperity, it is how Zanu had the 
political authority to pursue the economic policies it did.  In this way, we must deal with two sticky 
issues. The first is did Zimbabweans expect and did the government promise the imposition of a 
standard socialist economic ideology? And how was the promise of land reform central to its 
authority? 
Zanu and the socialist promise 
For the African population of the new country, the fixing of property rights amounted to 
little positive protection as it had been largely excluded from capital formation and land ownership 
by 1980—having been pressed onto communal reserves by the government and exploited as 
cheap labor by the farmers and industrialists. The new government confronted this reality by 
committing to a medium to long-term objective of achieving the return of the stolen land under a 
socialist framework that was consonant with collective ownership.  
What we would like to see established is a system which brings land ownership of the 
People as a whole. This means the state will act as the custodian for the whole People 
and all land owned by foreigners, some of it is not really managed by their owners or by 
its owners… (Mugabe, 1978). 
The People, the object of Zanu’s economic plans, inferred the African population of 
Zimbabwe. White ownership would be transformed by gradual, increasing incomes and black 
empowerment.  
Zanu’s main economic objectives as stated in the first government policy document, 
Growth with Equity, remain constant: to “achieve a sustainable high rate of economic growth and 
speedy development in order to raise incomes and standards of living of the people” (Benson 
Zwizwai, 2004). The economic goals, however, set in its plans (the Transitional National 
Development Plan (TNDP), the First Five Year National Development Plan (FFYNDP), the 
Second Five Year National Development Plan (SFYNDP), the Framework for Economic Reform 
(known as the Economic Structural Adjustment Program or ESAP), the Zimbabwe Program for 
Economic and Social Transformation (ZIMPREST) and the Zimbabwe Millennium Economic 
Recovery Programme) were not met.  
 93 
The government argued that its approach to socialism was constrained by the Lancaster 
agreements that provided blunt protections on minority white property ownership through 
constitutional protections to minority (white) interests for the first ten years.  Among these were 
(1) guaranteed representation of white MPs in parliament and (2) the sanctity of private property, 
a mechanism that assuaged white settler fears of immediate take over of their property. Both the 
British and Americans made oral promises at Lancaster House to aid the future Zimbabwe in the 
compensation and fair market purchase of white-owned farms properties.  
It is important here that the “socialist” state envisioned by Mugabe acts for the interests of 
the collective and decides the proper management and use of land. Socialism, in this sense, 
captures the “collective ownership” that would gradually replace “private ownership” but it is 
problematic because capitalist industry and agriculture production continued to be a mainstay of 
the country (Williams, 1983). The major transitions would have to wait, but Zimbabwe could build 
from expansion.18 
Development stands next to democracy as the most overused and abused term across 
Africa, employed as an obvious end to which all energy must be devoted and popping up 
regularly in government speeches and press as an exhortation and rallying call. Zimbabweans 
would have to, thus, work for the development of the country and development would come from 
the profits of capitalism. In this way, Zanu’s eventual capitulation to an economic structural 
adjustment program by 1990 is not so surprising while it was viewed as a nail in the coffin of its 
socialist aspirations.  
Despite Zanu’s use of socialist rhetoric, its main objective in economic management was 
mostly hands-off. Capital resources would be gradually transferred to the black population. But 
the more these resources came into the hands of the political elite the better, because the 
                                                      
18 With high, over 10 percent, growth in the economy in the first two years, this perspective may 
have been easier to sustain in the early 1980s, but even then, as Williams points out the logic that 
the white owners of the economy would be any more willing to part with their profits in the future 
than their assets in the present was essentially flawed. Williams, G. (1983) Equity, Growth and 
the State. in J. D. Y. Peel and T. Ranger (eds) Past and Present in Zimbabwe. Liverpool: 
Manchester University Press, pp. 52-55. 
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fundamental problem was not just the advancement of generalized black interests but the 
contradiction between Zanu’s political control and its exclusion from the economic control of its 
society. In this way, the goal was not just to expand incomes; it was to build the resource base of 
the party.   
On the economic front, then, Zanu’s attempts to bring the economy under its control left 
little room for capital expansion as resources were used for political patronage. This outcome was 
acceptable to the extent that it led to a relative loss of economic control of non-Zanu elements. 
Resource transfer to patrons of the Party also points to a consistent interpretation of Zimbabwean 
socialism as the repatriation of resource management in the hands of the centralized authority, 
namely Zanu leadership. 
The capture of productive resources in the hands of the political elite would be 
increasingly seen as outright corruption by much of the civil society as it became clearer that not 
everyone shared in black empowerment efforts. The limitation of economic opportunities afforded 
outside of the party structure laid bare corruption. The awareness of corruption was however 
smoothed over by the increase of state services and overall wealth until 1990 and because rural 
civil society counted on the government to balance the power of commercial farms. 
The combination of promise of change in redistribution of existing resources, namely land 
and basic necessities through welfarist policies, and the pragmatic stance that continues 
economic production through existing modes leaves intact social relations and is resonant with 
“being left alone.”  But it also limits advancement to the political sphere where resources can be 
captured and are to a great extent spent in maintaining the political (warrior) class. Land 
redistribution would hang over as an unfulfilled policy and a prerequisite to achieve economic 
justice in the country. The worsening economic conditions of the 1990s, as Bond and Manyana 
argue, not only gave the lie to the development plan of the government but also to the idea that 
reconciliation policies had succeeded to build the conditions for a socialist transformation.  Even 
as the government’s own broken promises and corruption were front and center, the largely white 
settler classes had spent a decade protecting their own interests.    
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The governmental success in the 1980s in investing in the social infrastructure created 
the conditions (primarily education, health and re-establishment of rural economies) for an 
expanding political consciousness. As civil society increasingly took Zimbabwe for a political fact, 
it was able to evaluate Zanu for its actions. In this way, efforts to effect positive changes against 
specific objectives were less and less isolated from each other. Coming together in networks and 
coalitions for a variety of causes acted to strengthen local work; it also protected groups from 
political persecution.   
Overview of Civil Society in Zimbabwe 
Associational life—certainly not consciously aware of itself as a civil society—provided 
succor to African populations from many of the worst aspects of Rhodesian colonization and gave 
birth to the conceptions of independence that mobilized young men and women to take to the 
bush. In the 1980s, civil society developed in the country largely in parallel to government 
objectives but a distinctive shift begins in the 1990s. 
While NGOs are merely stars in the universe of civil society organizations, they certainly 
are among the most visible associations and have become increasingly an important part of the 
landscape. An exact count of NGOs in Zimbabwe is hard to come by, but the number seems to 
be somewhere between 500 and 2000 throughout the two decades of independence.19 The 
Southern Rhodesia Council of Social Services was founded in 1962 to represent the interests of 
NGOs (or welfare organizations), changing its name to Voluntary Organisations in Community 
Enterprise (VOICE) in 1980, and then ten-years later to The National Association of Non-
Governmental Organisations (NANGO). NANGO categorized Zimbabwean NGOs as having 
mandates in the areas of disability, elderly, children, youth, environment, women and gender, 
human rights, health and poverty alleviation (Mukute and Maranga, 2006). It cited the 
                                                      
19 In 1992 Ann Muir estimates more than 800 NGOs (Muir, A. (1992) 'Evaluating the impact of 
NGOs in rural poverty alleviation: Zimbabwe country study', ODI Working Papers, 1-138.) in the 
country, NANGO calculates the number of NGOs at more than 2000 by 2006 (Mukute, M. and 
Maranga, T. (eds) (2006) Zimbabwe NGO Corporate Governance Manual, Harare.. )  
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development of NGOs in the country in three generations that, interestingly, roughly correspond 
to its own development:  
• Pre-1980, a first generation of relief and welfare focused organizations 
• 1980, a second generation of development organizations 
• 1990, a third generation of advocacy organizations  
• (Mukute and Maranga, 2006) 
•  
NANGO cited two factors for the shift into the third generation of policy advocacy for 
NGOs, the movement from socialist to market-driven policies and Zimbabwe’s increased 
participation in United Nations global conferences. Around the middle of the decade it notes that 
NGOs engage in policy advocacy in response to major policy failures (Mukute and Maranga, 
2006).  
Sarah Dorman suggests that the new policy-advocacy NGOs also emerged in relation to 
a new set of problems that civil society wanted to solve, such as HIV/AIDS.20 She observes that 
before 1998 NGOs in Zimbabwe were not consciously critically of government. “In general the 
government was neither avoided, nor perceived as an opponent” (Dorman, 2001. p. 125). NGOs 
were not apolitical, however, even if one takes a very restrictive view of what constitutes political 
action. Organizations and groups were active for social change and advancement that would 
permit their members to enjoy the fruits of liberation.  These groups either provided or pushed for 
greater justice in the form of services or change of practice. As my friend Livion Njini, who had 
been an advocate on the behalf of disabled people for the National Council of Disabled People of 
Zimbabwe (NCDPZ) and later one of the first leaders of the Community Foundation for the 
Western Region of Zimbabwe, boasted, “We won parking places for disabled people before they 
did in Britain.”21 
                                                      
20 She also mentioned homeless people and women’s rights but it is hard to see on the surface 
how these are new issues. Dorman, S. R. (2001) Inclusion and Exclusion: NGOs and Politics in 
Zimbabwe. 
21 Even in a 1986 paper, Njini (then called Nyathi) points out that the NCDPZ does not provide 
services, “The operational programmes of the organisation are geared to campaigning for 
equalisation of opportunities, i.e., access to all community services available to the general 
public. As a voice of all disabled Zimbabweans, the Council plays an important role in the process 
of liberating the nation's disabled persons” Nyathi, L. (1986) 'The Disabled and Social 
Development in Rural Zimbabwe', Journal of Social Development in Africa, 1, 1-5. This clarity 
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Still the emergence of a third generation of NGOs that consciously employ policy 
advocacy signaled an important shift in political awareness. Civil society organizations had 
learned the government is deaf to some of the objectives they pursue. Even where, as with the 
unions, the case had been made that there was no reason to oppose government—the socialist 
government was on the side of the worker—the realistic pursuit of social objectives started to 
require not just helping the government to do the right thing but applying leverage to shift its 
direction. The culture of collaboration, as Dorman calls it, may have shielded an understanding of 
the great gulf that had actually begun to grow between civil society and its government. 
In fact, the country had, by 1996, such an aura of stability and advancement that the 
United States Agency for International Development had placed it on a list of 10 countries around 
the world that could be “graduated” from US assistance. (The USAID FY98 Congressional 
Presentation, 1998) and would later scramble to strengthen its support of human rights 
organizations.  
The dangerous limits on criticizing government, however, were clear. A degree of 
invisibility and a shield of neutrality were necessary to get things done. This “culture of restraint” 
permeated associative culture and was accepted by many Zimbabweans, who nevertheless, 
found channels for expression and action. It could be heard in the words people used to describe 
things that needed to be changed. The words “hope” and “wait,” overused in common dialogue 
suggested to me a pervasive sense of powerlessness and while “hope” for change still rumbled of 
the limits of Zimbabwean patience it also accepted that the government was out of the control of 
its people.    
With the political field, fortressed off from direct assault, the fundamental problem 
remained. One could not wait on government promises, whether it was for water in Matabeleland 
or for the emergence of a black entrepreneurial class to develop the industry and business the 
                                                      
about advocacy clearly predates the emergence of third generation NGOs as described by 
NANGO and Dorman and suggests that the early adoption of advocacy strategies was driven by 
need, particularly of the most marginalized communities in the country, such as the disabled who 
were extremely cut off from participating in society. 
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country needed. This growing disbelief in and impatience with government promises 
characterized the political stance of civil society into the mid-1990s.  
Conclusion: The Autopoietic State 
The first decade of political development in Zimbabwe drew from the authority of Zanu as 
a liberating force supported by the resonance of its political objectives even where the fit was 
imperfect. The continued struggle for Zimbabwean independence enabled the expansion and 
consolidation of Zanu power—through building unity, eradicating internal enemies, guarding 
against external enemies and economic development policy—major challenges that justified for 
many the creation of a strong, central authority and imparted Zanu with sufficient power to 
maintain its aspirations for a one-party state. Pursuit of these objectives drove the party-cum-
government into the creation of a closed, autopoietic system increasingly deaf to the growing 
diversity of social objectives. The limited perspective of the political elite was cut off from the key 
nutrients of the social objectives being pursued on the ground. 
But Zimbabwe’s civil society was developing alongside the political regime in the 1980s. 
People did not need to agree with Zanu’s particular actions as long as they could largely embrace 
the reasons for its action as they also sought an ideal of Independence that had both 
transformative and pragmatic aspirations. Even Zanu’s efforts to eliminate opposition and 
monopolize resources were largely given a free pass in the 1980s because of its accepted 
leadership in the struggle. 
The chapter positions Zanu/Zimbabwean political objectives not as primarily anti-
democratic per se but as closing off political space for goals other than those consonant with its 
own. While Zanu maintained leadership over much of Zimbabwe in the 1980s and 1990s, already 
significant fissures and flaws in its authority began to show themselves, around corruption, 
economic vision, abrogation of human rights and its increasingly exclusionary approach to 
governance. Zanu’s core authority remained unchallenged as political competition, where it 
existed, revolved around whether one party should be endowed with all the power of the state 
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and not whether Zanu’s political objectives themselves were desirable. In fact, even where 
political opposition emerged—opponents tried to out-Zanu Zanu in the framing and construction 
of their messages, leading them to reinforce Zanu’s political hegemony.  
The rest of the story has two critical components: 1) questioning how and in what way the 
government had lost political authority by 1997 and 2) asking why this was sufficient to extend an 
irresolvable crisis but not to bring about its resolution. We take up this strain in the next three 
chapters that follow elements of the construction of civil society opposition, first through a 
grassroots development movement that sought to locate the initiative and ownership over 
development in grassroots communities, second through the initiation of strikes over new taxes 
on workers and others that bloomed into an expression of people’s power and finally through the 





CHAPTER FOUR: DO IT YOURSELF DEMOCRACY – ORAP  
The Organization of Rural Associations of Progress (ORAP) grew out of civil society efforts to 
help rural peasants become agents of their own development. As a grassroots empowerment 
effort, it embodied the ideals of grassroots, bottom-up democratization and focused on creating 
the conditions to empower villagers to accomplishment their own social objectives. It laid the 
groundwork for opposing imposed policies by pursuing locally legitimate goals and making use of 
government resources as needed. While ORAP helped shape more democratic expectations and 
provided a refuge for the accomplishment of local objectives, it worked with the government to 
pursue development programs and initiatives for its constituency and avoided direct 
confrontation. In this way, it remained largely on the periphery of government opposition starting 
in 1997. The indirect strategy of offering a political alternative to top-down development ceased to 
be as effective in creating a refuge for ORAP members and associations after 2000 when ORAP 
also suffered sanction from the Zanu government for its independent efforts in drought relief.     
 
Around 1999, I had the opportunity to bring a program officer of an international 
foundation to meet a vibrant community group that had been working for years as a member of 
the Organization of Rural Associations for Progress (ORAP). After a drive from Bulawayo, we 
passed through long corridors of acacia trees sprouting their new leaves and arrived at the 
outskirts of a rural village in Matabeleland South. A group of mostly woman dressed in colored 
scarves poured from a compound of grass-thatched rondavels on our entrance. Each sang 
together in a harmonious welcome expressing in the isiNdebele language their pleasure in the 
meeting and their hopes to share what they had learned about community development. After a 
tour of their poultry and garden projects, we sat together under a giant tree that offered shade 
against the afternoon heat. They began to show us stuffed toys made from sisal they planned to 
sell to earn income for their other projects.  Almost shyly they offered them for sale. The program 
officer I brought sat stiffly and politely complemented them on their work. As we left, she leaned 
over to me and said, “I wanted to buy one of those, but as an outsider and a donor, I did not want 
to give them false hope that I would support them.”   
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Outsiders often see villagers or peasants as primarily objects of development or as 
dependents on outside assistance that is necessary for them to improve local conditions. This 
reinforces a development conundrum whereby assistance, even of the most well-meaning variety, 
is often the very medium in which dependence is reinforced. At the same time, donors talk about 
building and strengthening rural participation in the development process. In whose development 
processes should they participate? Do they really own the development process, when their 
donors do not engage with them as equals—for instance, in buying a simple stuffed toy?  
ORAP, launched soon after Independence in 1981, stands out for its practical 
methodology that looks to reestablish villagers as the drivers of their own development. Begun as 
a development approach, it resonated with the government’s objectives for rural development but 
also provided a refuge for community autonomy and action. Over time the democratic leaning 
implications of its approach created a civil site of resistance to the government’s attempts to 
monopolize the development agenda and formed a critical perspective on the political regime.    
Rethinking Development 
Sithembiso Nyoni and others launched ORAP to foster development by adding support to 
localized initiative and knowledge. ORAP grew from something called the Rural Development 
Coordinating Council (RDCC), changing its name soon after to better reflect its emancipatory 
methodology. The idea was that development must be owned and the initiative of those who are 
to be developed.  How could this be put into practice?   
The group began by stressing that development should be a process led by the dialogue, 
knowledge and understanding of villagers as the subjects of development who could better build 
from their own assets, cultural knowledge, ideas and material resources than from imposed 
development projects. It soon began to put in place a movement structure that grew over the next 
twenty years to provide material and technical support for initiatives originating from smaller 
groups.  Many of these community groups, such as women’s clubs, that joined ORAP pre-dated 
its formation (Mattocks and Steele, 1994, p. 58). The associative ground was fertile because 
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community-based organizations had already been active, often as a way of reducing negative 
impacts of colonialism or settler policies but also to accomplish a wide range of local goals from 
burial societies to agricultural groups. These small groups were not a focus of national 
development policy—except where they fit the definition of collectives Zanu sought to support as 
a path to socialism—and largely flew under the NGO and government radar (Wekwete, 1990, p. 
2). ORAP found a natural constituency among some of these groups with whom its take-the-
initiative approach strongly resonated. ORAP objectives stand, thus, as a window on the social 
and economic objectives of the region and how these objectives related to political authority.  
Nyoni had earned a masters degree in rural development and carried out fieldwork in her 
home region in Zimbabwe. Having formerly worked with the YWCA on women’s development 
programs, she had learned that merely teaching skills and coming with the answers to 
development challenges was ineffective (Bond-Stewart, 1987). It was important instead to see 
effective development as an ongoing dialogue in which the answers are arrived at together by all 
involved in the process. From the very beginning ORAP’s approach rested upon a strong 
emphasis on empowerment that demanded real power rest in the hands of those who were to be 
developed. Furthermore, ORAP understood a problem with the concept of empowerment itself. 
The power to act and change one’s situation Nyoni felt was not something that one could be 
given. The only way to really empower another was to give up one’s own power and share in the 
challenges of another. As Nyoni said in 1994,  
You can only empower people when you disempower yourself so that you feel what it 
means to be powerless. Then, with those who feel powerless, one works out a strategy to 
get somewhere. Power exercised is power lost. Power shared is power gained (Dube, 
2004). 
Shared power was carefully suffused throughout ORAP’s structure. Its brochures and 
literature emphasized the organizational structure in which family units are organized into village 
development groups and then regional associations. The organizational chart consciously inverts 
the hierarchical structure, putting the myriad of family units, composed of five to ten people in the 
lead, at the top of the diagram where one would normally expect to see the top governance 
structure of an organization (Nyoni, 1987). 
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Figure 3 - (Nyoni, 1987, p. 54) 
In this graphic depiction ORAP’s role as a supportive foundation for community action is 
clearly to add value to the work of its members by creating associative support structures all the 
way up the associative chain.  In this way, the more local and close to a ground a structure is the 
more it can count on various levels of support. Family units have the honor of leading their own 
development processes counting on resources, knowledge, resources and solidarity from groups, 
umbrellas, associations and the ORAP advisory board (where the staff and organizational 
structure are also lodged. This organizational structure was well known by both staff and ORAP 
members who held ORAP’s management accountable to it.  
ORAP structure was paired with a development philosophy that was repeated by staff 
members and mobilizers to the extent that it was regularly communicated and incorporated into 
all activity.22 As a philosophy, ORAP’s message is distinct because, first, it was communicated in 
Ndebele (not English), the language of most of the groups with which ORAP works and second, it 
                                                      
22 As Sibanda reports, ORAP members embraced the “ORAP family approach” confirmed by their 
internalization of its terms in ‘groups’ discourses on development and their hopes, and in 
interviews in which members describe the ORAP approach. Sibanda, A. (2002) 'Voicing a 
Peasant Alternative: The Organisation of Rural Associations for Progress (ORAP) in Zimbabwe', 
Peasant Organisations and the Democratisation PRocess in Africa, 1-13. 
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emphasized that local actors must decide their own relationships to government, capital and other 
development agents. The central tenets of the philosophy are: 
Zihluze - Examine yourself 
Ziqoqe  - Mobilize yourself 
Zenzele - Do it yourself 
Zimisele - Commit yourself 
Ziqhatshe - Be self-employed 
Zimele  - Be self reliant 
Qoqelela - Little by little…save and invest or mobilize resources (Dube, 2004) 
By 1983, ORAP had 300 affiliated groups and by 1987 this had doubled to 600.  In 1987, 
it also counted on 800 family units that would grow to 4000 by 1990 (Sibanda, 2002). The number 
of actual members of ORAP in the1990s seems to rest on largely interpolated data, and is put at 
half a million members (InterAction, 1998) to 1.5 million members (Jones and Kurey, 2000).  This 
fuzziness with accounting for members, I remember as being a fact of life from within ORAP.  To 
my knowledge ORAP maintained no database of members, no member cards and few scribbled 
notes with names were maintained within the main headquarters. At the time, I supposed that this 
was due to the potential risks its members could suffer although I was also suspicious that that 
the swollen numbers were really about increasing the support from ORAP’s donors.  The greater 
the number of members, the greater the support. Whatever the case, with the recent background 
of the Gukurahundi, I don’t think it is surprising that ORAP was reticent to record member 
information. 
The sheer quantity of its programs -- drought relief and food distribution, small dam 
construction (Give-A-Dam), improved kitchens, support for village initiatives, microcredit, Zenzele 
college and the creation of a community foundation, among others—attest to a significant breadth 
of involvement. At the same time, its bottom-up, participatory approach was imminently fundable 
and it was in the enviable position of attracting donors. As Tomson Dube reported Nyoni’s 
approach to donor funding:  
When she looks at donors, she sees people of goodwill who want to share resources with 
others. In this case, donor money is good money…. When donor conditionality stops 
people from being themselves, it becomes a problem. ORAP has been careful and has 
still to be careful as to what donor money it receives. It has to be money that is liberating, 
not money which generates dependency (Dube, 2004, p. 83). 
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An important aspect of ORAP’s methodology is dialogue in which rural villagers make 
their own decisions and build from their own knowledge, while they could call on ORAP for 
support (Dube, 2004). To make this happen, ORAP recruited official village mobilizers who were 
responsible for staying engaged with groups in their areas and acting as a voice of the 
movement. Mobilizers were supported by field staff working out of the main ORAP compound on 
the outskirts of Bulawayo. The largely educated and city-residing field staff of the NGO was open 
to criticism for not sharing the same challenges of the groups with which they worked. ORAP 
compensated for this by deferring power over its activities to a board composed largely of 
members chosen by the development associations and through emphasizing staff and 
management linkages with the rural areas. The challenge was to transform into a participatory 
culture in which village members would be empowered to do for themselves, as Nyoni remarked:  
I am now coming to a very sensitive issue. I am a little disillusioned. What is the meaning 
of participation in a society that doesn’t allow participation? You can encourage women to 
participate but that is not the issue. The issue is to create a society where everyone 
participates as equals. Most African societies are not participatory by nature. Am I 
realistic to expect participation? (Bond-Stewart, 1987). 
ORAP’s track record 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, ORAP was recognized locally and internationally for its 
development philosophy. In 1993, Nyoni won the Right Livelihood Award for her work with ORAP. 
The award is known as an alternative Nobel Prize that honors and supports those “offering 
practical and exemplary answers to the most urgent challenges facing us today” (The Right 
Livelihood Award). Even ORAP’s relatively small efforts, such as a Grameen Bank-like 
microcredit program were positively evaluated outside of Zimbabwe (Iserles, 2003). The creation 
of Zenzele College in partnership with the School of International Training (SIT) in Brattleboro, 
Vermont and BRAC in Bangladesh, ensured that ORAP’s perspectives were increasingly known 
in development circles (after the US State Department issued a travel advisory for Zimbabwe, the 
SIT partnership had to close down because SIT could no longer insure American students whose 
payments made up a good bit of the College’s income (Dube, 2010)).   
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In Zimbabwe, ORAP’s challenge was the translation of its philosophy into actual benefits 
for the population it served. A series of droughts in its region (1982-1984, 1986-1987, 1991-1992 
and 1995-1996 (Musemwa, 2006)) diverted a lion’s share of its energies to providing emergency 
relief to drought stricken villages. Partly the importance of its drought relief program to ORAP 
(starting in 1992 with a proposal to UNDP) was that opened up significant financial and material 
support from international agencies, (Dube, 2004) but the importance also derived from the need 
to show immediate assistance in the communities where it worked. It was important to remember 
this because in a practical sense, the scope of its drought relief efforts tended to dwarf its other 
programs tying up much of ORAP’s infrastructure and capacity in emergency work. Evidence of 
this was clearly visible in the parking lot of drought relief vehicles that rumbled through its 
compound in suburban Bulawayo. Responding to emergency needs, interestingly an area of 
contention with the government that did not want to dilute the impact of its patronage monopoly in 
rural areas, was key to maintaining credibility with its community and an area of vulnerability as 
ORAP relied on the government’s agreement that it could distribute food in the rural areas. Relief 
activities stretched across a broad sector of programs: 
ORAP members have worked to alleviate the affects of drought, which affects 
southwestern Zimbabwe every three to five years, on average. Through programs 
designed to ensure a stable water supply (such as through building dams and improving 
wells and boreholes), to store food following good harvests, to transport food from 
surplus to deficit areas during hard times, and to develop and popularize the use of 
drought resistant strains of crops (including indigenous varieties), ORAP prevents large 
human and animal migration during droughts which can result in additional pressure on 
the small amounts of land remaining arable during difficult periods (Annorbah-Sarpei et 
al., 1993). 
It is, however, the self-accomplishment of personal, family and community objectives that 
differentiates ORAP from a drought relief agency that merely provides food and goods to 
communities that cannot produce for themselves. In practice it is difficult to separate the material 
support ORAP channeled to communities over two decades from the accomplishments of the 
communities themselves because its constituents demonstrate ownership of the ORAP identity.   
Irene Ncube speaks highly of ORAP’s various programmes. She says that the ORAP 
Food Security, Rural Livelihoods and Water Development department extended loans to 
the people to purchase dairy cows. The villagers also have small vegetable gardens. 
Ncube referred to the Dema Family Water Project, which was jointly constructed by the 
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community and the ORAP department of Water development. Here there is a water tank 
which can hold 9000 cubic metres.  The water is used for homes, small vegetable 
gardens and medium-scale irrigation schemes (Dube, 2004). 
By 1995, ORAP’s departments mirrored many government social agencies—water, 
education and drought relief—as well as taking on profit-making and income-generating 
functions, such as the purchase of a petrol station and hardware store, and involvement in 
agriculture and other community-owned enterprises. As a CSO behemoth, its institutional 
demands occasionally drove what was often called “ORAP the NGO” (to distinguish it from the 
larger movement) into conflict with its own community managed board, which took seriously the 
responsibility to make the major decisions affecting their own areas.  
ORAP’s development paradigm sought to mend the mistakes of “top-down” power 
models,23 the paradigm was clear about its interest in the wholesale reduction of dependence. As 
such, far from avoiding power and politics, ORAP was immersed in a fundamentally political 
approach to development. It was banned for a period during the Gukurahundi, but had succeeded 
in building a mostly collaborative relationship with the government. And, yet, at the same time, it 
was moving forward an alternative political approach—one that would expand citizen participation 
and strengthen the link between democratization and political authority. 
ORAP and Political Authority 
ORAP’s reach into the rural areas made it a serious political force in the very areas that 
Zanu counted on for the support of its hegemonic control, namely rural villages. Quite possibly, 
one of its saving graces with government was that its activity focused on the Ndebele hinterland, 
as opposed to rural constituencies in the rest of the country. Zanu’s hold was not as strong in the 
region because it had been a Zapu stronghold and was part of what Dorman called a perceived 
                                                      
23 As Sibanda says, “ORAP strongly believes that if meaningful development is to take 
place, rural people have to be the masters of their own destiny and, therefore, they need to 




tribal threat to Zimbabwean unity (Dorman, 2001).24 As we saw in Chapter 3, the Gukurahundi 
campaign of the 1980s targeted Matabele difference. For Zanu, then, ORAP was an alternative 
power base that, while not a direct competitor, claimed a significant rural constituency.  
Building a refuge for political participation 
Nyoni and ORAP staff were highly conscious of ORAP as an alternative political space.  
The goal of empowerment was about developing the capacity or power of rural village groups to 
meet their own objectives. As Nyoni said in 1987, “Development is about giving people power, not 
power in the negative sense but power in a human sense” (Bond-Stewart, 1987). The negative 
sense, one would presume is control over others for the sake of control rather than the 
accomplishment of socially validated objectives. ORAP sought to grow individual and collective 
capacity to set and meet objectives without undue dependence on the formal, political space.  
Once you open up a tiny window for people to see who they could be, even if it is later 
closed, that can no longer be taken away from them. I want to work in rural development 
where people question themselves and their history, and create a present and the 
future…I hope that women see themselves building an alternative society, created and 
moulded by them, by people who want to live fully (Bond-Stewart, 1987). 
ORAP’s goals were, thus, very political from the beginning. It pursued the struggle for 
independence from the bottom up, referring back to the culturally accessible Ndebele concepts of 
Zenzele and Zimele even while the act of speaking Ndebele was being openly persecuted under 
the Gukurahundi. In this way, ORAP embraced the same goals as Zanu for expanding 
independence but denied the centrality of the party or of party politics to constructing freedom for 
others. Because of its access to government programs, such as drought relief, and its 
development goals, ORAP inhabited a political pocket in which the government’s monopoly 
remained imperfect. Of course, ORAP was not the only alternative development organization in 
the country. Others like Environmental and Development Activities (ENDA) and Silveira House 
                                                      
24 Dorman quotes Mugabe from a 1981 article in the Herald, “If you show divisionist attitudes the 
enemy will come among us and will destroy us. Our forefathers fought together during the first 
Chimurenga war and it is our duty to be united as well.... Dissidents still have shallow mentality 
(sic), because they are encouraging tribalism in the country. Zimbabwe was not liberated for any 
one tribe and it is pertinent that she remains united” Dorman, S. R. (2001) Inclusion and 
Exclusion: NGOs and Politics in Zimbabwe. 
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employed participatory methodology and had similar goals to build on the knowledge and goals of 
rural villages (Mattocks and Steele, 1994).  Alternative development initiatives like ORAP 
provided, thus, a refuge for community organizations from top down patronage to pursue their 
development objectives and attracted funding of a significant scale to carry out income generation 
and drought relief programs.   
While it would be hard to reconstruct all of the social objectives of ORAP members at this 
time, it is clear that they agreed on the tenets of self-driven development and wanted to minimize 
the debilitating reliance on patronage and centrally controlled development without directly 
opposing Zanu. Left alone, Zanu’s misguided directives could be more safely ignored because of 
their irrelevance to real development initiatives spearheaded by the communities themselves, 
“The history of development efforts to date has shown that these “recipients” are apt to ignore or 
positively reject such patronizing dominance from the center. Development must be of the people 
and by the people themselves” (Nyoni, 1987). The direction, as resonant with the ongoing 
liberation objectives of Zanu, would be the liberation of the colonized mind: 
Development for us became the liberation of a people: a struggle which brings social, 
political and economic changes. Development became a process which involves the poor 
in the thinking, deliberating and strategizing for change (Nyoni, 1987, p. 52).  
While Nyoni was the face of the ORAP movement, its empowerment goals were 
interpreted and employed by both staff and community members of the organization. The identity 
of the ORAP movement as an alternative space to meet political goals, to strengthen the power 
and capacity of villages comes out strongly in their language and perspectives. As a 1994 paper 
quotes Livion Njini, then ORAP administrator, who went on to become one of the founders of the 
ORAP-created community foundation on which I was working: 
Self directed development is not easy, for our people had been conditioned to believe 
that they are not able to think for themselves and were not allowed to take part in 
decisions and discussions about their lives. Therefore, unless they take control of their 
development process, in terms of how and who should do it, development cannot take 
place (Mattocks and Steele, 1994). 
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Space for dialogue and education  
Both ORAP’s philosophy around power and control and its structure worked for the 
democratization of development politics. By inverting the decision-making control of local 
initiatives, it was able to offer villagers an active experience in participatory democracy and 
supplement this with processes for ongoing dialogue about development priorities. While, ORAP, 
like other civil society organizations, very carefully avoided political confrontation in the 1980s, its 
efforts to relocate decision-making from the government or large donors into the hands of those 
who had both little access to this power and few material resources reduced the negative impacts 
of government policies and taught people how to govern themselves. As Connie “Thandi” Nkomo, 
who directed ORAP in the late 1990s and early 2000s, said:  
I believe development has to do with making decisions. When one is able to make a 
decision one is empowered… at independence, communities felt disempowered and the 
regime of that time made them believe that they could not think for themselves or solve 
their own problems (Dube, 2004). 
Nkomo’s implicit criticism of the government’s approach to development—her words 
could also be taken to refer to the former colonial regime, but the point is applicable to the 
fledgling government—was made in the midst of a difficult time for ORAP in the early 2000s. At 
this time, tension within ORAP was growing as it was across the country. While it attempted to 
counter the top-down patriarchal mode of development there was something new in its relation 
with the government, a growing sense that the government was a problem standing in the way of 
equitable development that actually could not be ignored or managed.  
The Alternative Collapses   
By 1995, ORAP was a well-known and vibrant movement and Nyoni was already a local 
political figure, respected for her development work. While its liberation approach had resonated 
with formal political objectives (i.e. the quest for independence), its empowerment messages 
around development were also creating spaces in the rural areas for independent political debate 
and analysis that was outside of the party-political apparatus. Even though, ORAP was on the 
margins of the political structure, and careful not to oppose the Zanu regime, the independence 
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vision it offered in Zimele, Zenzele (etc) was one in which the government was not in the center 
and therefore a threat to which Zanu would respond by seeking to neutralize ORAP’s 
independence.     
It is not surprising, thus, that the threat from ORAP autonomy was addressed by 
approximating its leadership, Sithembiso Nyoni, closer to Zanu power. In this way, Nyoni was 
asked in 1995 to become a government minister (Dube, 2004). From my own observations, I 
believe her decision to accept the invitation did not come easy. People within the ORAP network 
told me they understood Nyoni’s invitation to be a square attempt to bring ORAP under political 
control. Nyoni herself recognized this, however she felt that participating in the government would 
help her to spread ORAP’s message of empowerment and work on a larger scale.  With access 
to government resources, she could provide significant support to communities in the region and 
could also better protect ORAP.  Nyoni entered government as Deputy Minister of Public 
Construction and National Housing in 1995, was moved to the office of the minister of state in 
1997 and appointed a non-constituency member of Parliament and Minister of State for Small 
and Medium Enterprises Development in 2000 (Nyamutata, 2009). Nyoni’s departure from ORAP 
also provided the opportunity for cultivating new leadership. The leader chosen to replace her, 
Connie “Thandi” Nkomo, had worked with Nyoni for many years.  
From the point of view of ORAP’s tolerance and support of political objectives, the 
moment represented a turning point. Its leader’s ascension into a government portfolio was hard 
enough for the group to manage, polarizing many with the suspicion that she was joining the 
enemy. For her part, ORAP’s new executive coordinator, Nkomo, attempted to mend and repair 
the fences by emphasizing the positive aspects of Nyoni’s governmental portfolio while stressing 
the continuity of ORAP’s objectives.  
[Nkomo] says that she had been skeptical about having an NGO activist involved in 
politics but then came to the conclusion that development is politics (Dube, 2004). 
Nyoni’s ascension to government portfolio would certainly make it harder to maintain a 
distance from the political regime; however, ORAP’s relationship with government had already 
been collaborative and overtly symbiotic. Up until around 1995, ORAP as a movement sought to 
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mobilize even government resources for community development; the relationship was largely a 
collaborative one in which ORAP saw itself as naturally assisting government to be responsive to 
communities. As Grace Moyo, an ORAP staff member, told Sarah Dorman, “We are the hand of 
the government to help it boost the people” (Dorman, 2001, p. 123). This is not to say that ORAP 
simply supported the government. It focused the accomplishment of its political objectives 
through ongoing grassroots dialogue in a way it believed was consonant with its empowerment 
approach and by seeing government as a resource that could be used by communities. ORAP 
internalized democratic/transparent governance in itself, rather than investing in the 
transformation of the formal political sphere. “[Phineas Sibanda, an ORAP member] observes that 
today people are involved in development because of ORAP’s transparent methods” (Dube, 
2004).25 
ORAP didn’t just swallow political overreach and violence (such as the Gukurahundi) that 
went against the grain of its own empowerment objectives; it acted as a refuge for persecuted 
communities to continue working towards the accomplishment of their goals. Here we see 
selective resonance of government objectives in the practical work to meet social objectives. 
ORAP communities invited the government’s attempts to improve services, such as water 
provision on which they relied.  
While the ORAP Water and Environment Evaluation Report of 2001 highlights that the 
provision of water is a basic right to the people to be provided by the government of the 
day, it further acknowledges that this requires large amounts of resources which 
organizations like ORAP can try and compliment government’s efforts (ORAP, 2001).  
The “government of the day” is a rather amusing expression since Zanu is the only 
government ORAP had ever known but it certainly shows that ORAP saw its objectives as going 
beyond Zanu. ORAP was both well connected politically and jealous of its space for autonomous 
                                                      
25 Nyoni clearly sees ORAP as a democratic alternative based on local realities and challenged 
by the continuing imposition of outside agendas and values. “This is a very democratic structure, 
which facilitates people’ s participation all around. On paper it could be a perfect example of a 
people’s movement. But it does not operate in isolation…. Self-colonization and the rural elites 
emerge, individualism creeps in, universalism is often imposed on us both from our national 
government and from the international donor community…. The rural poor are part of our nation 
and our only hope for bringing about change” Nyoni, S. (1987) 'Indigenous NGOs: Liberation, 
self-reliance, and development', World Development, 15, 51-56. 
 113 
action. Its tentacles stretched deeply into government structures. In 2002 Harold Sibanda, ORAP 
Coordinator of Training, surveyed ORAP members in two districts, Filabusi and Umzingwane as 
part of a case study on the NGO role in policymaking. He found that many ORAP groups were 
intimately linked with the state. As many as 77 percent of ORAP village leaders were active as 
political leaders in some government structure, 81 percent acknowledged receiving government 
support and only 22 percent of its members in these associations identified the state as an 
obstacle to their development objectives (Sibanda, 2002). Many of the challenges they saw were 
related to bureaucratic inaction but they also cited the high cost of irrigation water that members 
saw as stemming from the national government’s lack of follow through on its promises to 
implement a solution to the region’s lack of access to water.  Given this picture, ORAP and its 
members maintained significant links and ties with formal power, largely through practical 
development and did not see it as the main obstacle to accomplishing their objectives. 
On the other hand, ORAP from its initiation avoided anything that could be seen as 
politically partisan. While it rarely criticized the government, part of what brought people together 
was a shared feeling the government was neglecting their interests, and that they had to take 
independent initiative to be full participants in the development process. Taking the reins of 
community development was a positive way to channel resistance to disempowering political 
policies that fortified citizen dependency on the state. This party neutrality would become harder 
to maintain in the post-1997 crisis period. 
With Nyoni’s entrance into the government in 1995, ORAP moved away from its delicate 
political balance of separation and engagement even though she herself stressed that she was 
not a part of ORAP in her official capacity. Nevertheless, Nyoni had embodied the empowerment 
objectives for many who were now confused about ORAP’s ability to shelter them from the 
patronizing development policies of Zanu. The alternative political/development space it had 
worked so hard to expand over fifteen years had moved closer to national politics. As a practical 
approach, ORAP’s work did not change. Members emphasized continuity and continued to 
espouse the same development philosophy. The board created a new honorary president’s 
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position for Nyoni, to both honor her continuing importance to the organization while creating a 
degree of separation from direct management and decision making, and both she and the staff 
stressed the positive benefits for the movement from her new position. Some donors raised 
concerns. At least one told me that it could not support the fledgling community foundation we 
had launched as an ORAP initiative because Nyoni continued to serve on its board. While Nyoni 
herself was aware of the implications of her government role with potential funders, she felt 
strongly that this role was about the expansion of ORAP’s empowerment approach and that it 
was possible for ORAP’s independence and connection to government to coexist, because of the 
consonance of political goals to uplift rural communities. As Dube reports his conversation with 
Nyoni,  
She is proud that the world can look and say ORAP grassroots women produced a 
leader, a Councilor, an MP and a Minister. For her, ORAP is an organization that 
recognizes people’s power. People’s power is a force that enables one to act, to change 
a situation. Empowerment is about life and helping people to take care of themselves 
(Dube, 2004). 
Returning to education 
But for ORAP staff and members maintaining ORAP’s independence from Zanu the party 
was also a priority because they wanted to protect the autonomy and freedom they had won 
through their empowerment efforts. ORAP’s civic education efforts provided an outlet for this.  
ORAP had been involved in civic education efforts for many years. In fact its attempts to 
create a development dialogue from the beginning should be seen as a dialectic approach to 
emancipatory citizen education. In its 2001 Annual Report, ORAP describes its objective as “to 
advocate and lobby for broad-based (civic) progressive change in rural communities according to 
the priorities and needs of the grassroots communities themselves” (ORAP, 2001). ORAP’s goals 
were certainly not to challenge Zanu’s one-party state through civic education but they were 
about democratization through increasing the power of “grassroots communities themselves.” 
ORAP’s hands-on involvement in civic education was carried out through development dialogues 
in its community associations. While ORAP did not play an overt role in the street protests that 
erupted from 1996, many of its members, graduates of these development dialogues, did. The 
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Matabeleland states were to become a place of strength for the opposition as well as the urban 
areas.   
The civic education dialogues made ORAP a legitimate voice in “bridging the rural urban 
gap” (Gumbo, 2002) and led it to participate in the February 1999 National Working People’s 
Convention that grew out of the discontent. The Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions convened 
the Convention to: 
…map out strategies to protect workers from the biting economic conditions, after a 
government ban on all forms of collective job action, by beginning to put into place a 
strong, democratic popularly driven and organized movement of the people (Dansereau, 
2001). 
The Convention provided the basis for a democratic vision that sparked the founding of 
the Movement for Democratic Change as a political party later in September of 1999. ORAP’s 
self-driven development approach is reflected in some of the key resolutions of the Convention, 
particularly  
“that measures be taken to restore a people driven process towards social 
development, that mobilises and organises capacities within communities and that 
matches them with complementary inputs from the state, according to agreed and legally 
defined standards...” (MDC, 2004), emphasis added.  
The problem to be solved here was to restore community empowerment, indicating that 
the groups participating in the convention had come to see the reconstruction of government as 
necessary to the accomplishment of self-driven development. While ORAP as an organization 
had been largely silenced from opposing the political regime, the principles of the movement 
found broad agreement and served as one of the justifications for seeking a change in national 
politics. 
Aftermath 
By 2000, the Matabeleland region had become very politically active and was soon to be 
a region of strength for the MDC. ORAP used its links to government to try to defuse the growing 
conflict between the government and civil society organizations. Building on her government role, 
Nyoni held a meeting in Bulawayo in 2000 with NGO leaders in the region in which she explored 
the mistrust between government and NGOs (Dube, 2004). Nkomo, her replacement at ORAP, 
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on the other hand, moved more directly into the fray. She saw the empowered poor as an 
alternative to political malfeasance, “Poor people’s efforts are a bright spot in the darkness 
occurring in the rest of Zimbabwe” (Jones and Kurey, 2000). 
ORAP, however, was dependent on the government for its hallmark food security 
program. Its ability to distribute food and relief in the rural areas was endangered by the 
government’s closing off of rural villages to outside assistance, carried out largely through its 
control of the registration process, but also by the growing grassroots persecution of families that 
supported the MDC by Zanu youth members and veterans.  
In October 2002, during the run-up to elections in Insizwa, Zanu politicians tried to give 
political speeches during a scheduled ORAP food distribution, thus implying its food distribution 
was a result of Zanu patronage. In the ensuing conflict, Zanu youth ended up confiscating 
ORAP’s three metric tons of maize and distributing it to their supporters. The World Food 
Program, on whose behalf the assistance was being distributed, responded by cutting off food 
distribution for three weeks (Human Rights Watch, 2003) ("Violence & politicisation of food aid 
continue", 2002).  
ORAP’s response was to stress that its food aid was apolitical, as it struggled to maintain 
its capacity to act in rural areas. ("Zanu PF hijacks food aid distribution from WFP", 2002). The 
link, however weak, between the MDC and ORAP became a point of contention for Nyoni by 
November 2002 when she faced accusations that ORAP was “manipulating food aide” on MDC’s 
behalf in Insizwa (Mutsaka, 2002). ORAP was caught in a political snare that would reinforce its 
dependency on the government and discipline its political action, even as the loss of funding and 
growing difficulties in carrying out its objectives would strip it of its vibrancy throughout the 
decade.  
As ORAP attempted to conduct its activities in the face of political change and crises and 
a new drought that affected the region in 2004 and 2005, it found itself facing the opposition of 
Zanu mobilized youth and veteran’s groups involved in land invasions. By 2004 ORAP had 
withdrawn from many districts, apparently impacted by political sanction and the food situation 
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was worsening (Kwinika, 2004). By 2005, ORAP had mended its fences with government 
sufficiently to be allowed to distribute food. But it had gone too far and was accused in Tsholotsho 
of enabling political speeches by Zanu officials, in contravention of an October 2004 high court 
injunction for ruling party officials to stop using food distribution as a political strategy during 
election periods (Nkosi, 2005).  
The emergence of the land disturbances directly affected ORAP groups by creating 
upheaval in the rural areas and in the reduction of rural farm jobs. Despite its own internal 
pressure to take action on the land issue (Sibanda, 2002), neither ORAP nor its members had 
ever taken an active role in land redistribution. Nyoni acknowledged this difficulty in 2002, “When 
we talk of the land issue, it is not an easy issue as some of us fought hard to get some pieces of 
land" ("Consultant Slams Sidelining of Women in Land Allocation", 2002). 
Nyoni herself remained important to Zanu throughout the period of crisis. After she lost 
an election in 2005 and was given a non-constituency post in the lower house of parliament, The 
Zimbabwe Independent remarked in 2005,  
She does not need to win an election to remain in government. She appears to live a 
charmed life in which the presidential crane is always at hand to pluck her from the 
political scrap-yard, which is where the electorate in Zimbabwe believes she belongs” 
(Nyamutata, 2009). 
ORAP still exists today. While it may have an important role to play in the future, it did 
lose the support of some of its strongest supporters who no longer saw it as a viable vehicle for 
their social objectives and certainly not as the promise of an empowering alternative to the 
political regime. The point, however, is not the final relevance of ORAP or its outlook to rise 
again. The point is that it was crucial to reproducing locally accessible political ideas--Zimele, 
Zenzele, etc.--that had concrete meaning in terms of real and immediate aspirations. These 
values resonated strongly with villager women because they offered a space for resistance to the 
development dependency in which Zanu was complicit. As such they became more enfranchised 
and more empowered to act on their own objectives.  
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Conclusion: The limits of alternatives to political authority 
The development challenges and philosophy that drove ORAP and its membership were 
sufficiently resonant with Zanu’s ongoing struggle for independence to secure its survival and 
coexist with political objectives. Regional frustrations over exclusion from government priorities 
(particularly the long delayed Matabeleland water project) found an escape valve in the diversion 
of attention to community-led initiatives (as opposed to actively pursuing State power) even while 
ORAP’s do-it-yourself philosophy and methodology sought to return the power over development 
back to the communities.  
ORAP reinforced the government’s authority by pursuing seeking liberating approaches 
that would address the injustices of colonialism, inline with the continuing struggle for 
independence; by strengthening local development initiatives and by providing for the democratic 
participation the government did not. But the ORAP development approach, while it was not 
opposed to the government’s policies was never the same. It required the transference of power 
to the most marginal of the population built on a commitment to direct democracy that not only 
necessitated citizen participation in their own development but insisted on their power over these 
initiatives. In Nyoni’s words, “What is the meaning of participation in a society that doesn’t allow 
participation?”  ORAP’s response was to fill in the gaps for an alternative that provided: 
1) A political refuge in which the participation vacuum was filled by direct engagement of 
community groups in decision-making processes and leadership over their own projects.  
The ORAP initiative sought to weaken the dependency of communities on government 
not by cutting them off but by developing and acting on the objectives they conceived.   
2) Space for democratic dialogue and education in which both expectations and the 
meaning of development and participation were developed by groups themselves. Being 
an active participant in one’s own development was an educational process that changed 
people and their expectations for the organization of political society. As Nyoni puts it, 
“Once you open up a tiny window for people to see who they could be, even if it is later 
closed, that can no longer be taken away from them.” 
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By 1997, as the government moved to incorporate ORAP into its own structures, the 
contradiction between Zimbabwe’s highly centralized political authority and the growing demands 
for accountable governance pushed people into the streets to demand the transformation of 
authoritarian structures. There is no evidence that the ORAP movement played a direct role in 
these events but, during this time, it became more active in pushing for change through civic 
education efforts and joined with other groups in the National Working People’s Convention in 
1999. The ideas for which ORAP groups had struggled so hard would emerge as central to the 
motivations and visions “to restore a people driven process for social development…” as stated 
by the National Working Peoples Convention. Political authority had to come from the people.  
Nevertheless, ORAP was effectively kept from transforming into a more effective force for 
advocacy and change. The selective collapse of the rule of law during the veterans’ invasions of 
farms and the resulting persecution of MDC supporters by Zanu members weakened community 
power and autonomy. As its food security programs became increasingly difficult to carry out, its 
social programs became even more difficult (and some, like Zenzele College, had to be 
scrapped) in the polarized society in which independent power centers that were not aligned with 
Zanu were persecuted by the party stalwarts and their allies.  
As Dube writes in 2004, “By contrast, in Zimbabwe today, institutions of governance have 
been removed from people’s development and daily lives.  Power and leadership is seen as 
separate from the people. Leaders exercise power. They do not share power (Dube, 2004). The 
meaning and exercise of power itself is contested. Once the crisis moves into full force in the mid-
2000’s ORAP can no longer maintain the place of refuge, nor the space for dialogue and 
education because its apolitical stance, adopted for institutional survival, directly contradicted its 
core objective to support the transfer to and strengthening of community power.   
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CHAPTER FIVE: PEOPLE’S POWER AT LAST - THE ZCTU  
The Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) began its own existence as an attempt of the 
Zanu government to bring the labor movement under its wing. Its close approximation to the 
government began to change around the end of the 1980s and accelerated with the imposition of 
the country’s first structural adjustment program in the 1990s. Seen as the abandonment of 
socialist goals, the ESAP weakened the legitimacy of Zanu’s objectives for labor. As a result, 
ZCTU began to lead more effective work actions and participated with the churches and human 
rights organizations in efforts to reduce the negative impacts of the ESAP. It was a ZCTU strike in 
1997 against new taxes to pay for veteran’s benefits that brought the country to a standstill and 
that was the first decisive demonstration of people power, leading to more and more calls for the 
resignation of Mugabe and an end to the Zanu-led government. The expression of people power 
catalyzed by ZCTU counted on wide participation of civil society with protests in all the urban 
centers. While it did not result in the dismantling of the political regime, it called into question the 
legitimacy of government action and seeded a new political movement. 
 
On December 9, 1997, the day broke with many streets in the normally busy towns of 
Zimbabwe deserted; commuter routes abandoned, the bright sun illuminating the sidewalks 
outside of silent factories and retail shops shuttered and silent for the day. The call for mass 
action kept many home from work and sent thousands to rally in the streets. Up to 30,000 people 
marched in protest in both Bulawayo and Masvingo (Bulawayo is the second largest city in 
Zimbabwe; Masvingo’s total population in 1992 was only around 52,000 people) ("People's Power 
At Last", 1997). Protesters also filled the streets in Gweru, Chigutu, Chinyohi, Chinredzi and 
Gwanda. In Harare, the only site of violence, protesters were met with tear gas when they tried to 
assemble in Unity Square. Police used dogs, rubber batons and even a helicopter to disrupt them 
and some protesters responded by throwing rocks or rioting ("Zimbabwe now police state -- 
analysts", 1997).  
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Much of the news coverage of the day focused on the violence in Harare26 but the 
remarkable story is that people overcame fear for the most part to express their discontent 
peacefully across the nation. Many observes blamed the violence on the attempts of Home 
Affairs Minister Dumisa Dabengwa and Police Commissioner August Chihuri to stop the protests 
in Harare. For example, Welshman Ncube, a well-known law professor at the University of 
Zimbabwe who later joined the Movement for Democratic Change, publicly criticized their rational:  
Even more astounding is when the police commissioner, who should be a custodian of 
the law, eventually got served with the order but had the audacity to summon a Press 
conference and refer to the court order as a so-called court order reflecting his utter 
contempt for the courts…. Worse still, Dabengwa in the true fashion of a despot, 
confidently declares that the police can shoot people at demonstrations but the question 
is shooting people for what and why ("Zimbabwe now police state -- analysts", 1997)? 
The High Court had issued an order to the police on Monday afternoon, a day before the 
protests began, not to interfere with the protests in any way. The police chief later claimed that he 
had not been aware of this order until noon on the day of the protests, when police and protester 
confrontations were well under way ("Hell hath no fury like a government on its last legs ", 1997). 
Moral outrage was wide-spread, tapping into a broad discontent among students, 
women’s groups, social justice activists, business owners, transport drivers and many others who 
no longer believed in the absolute power of the government to raise their taxes without debate. 
Placards at the protests, spoke against the divisive tactics of the political regime “Don’t blame 
whites for your failures,” “He is trying to please his ruling clique for their own ends, not for the 
benefit of the nation as a whole,” and claimed a space for a new type of unity separate from the 
Zanu’s quest for a singular national unity with itself at the head, ”Mugabe has no support among 
the real people so he is going to buy the war veteran’s support at the expense of the working 
people. The central committee is a clique which suppresses the masses” ("Muckraker: Who's 
fooling who?", 1997). 
                                                      
26 See for example: Shaw, A. "Violence erupts as police fire tear gas." Associated Press, 9 
December 1997b., "Policeman hurt, vehicles burned in violent Zimbabwe demos." Agence 
France-Presse, 10 December 1997. 
 122 
Almost overnight a sense that it was possible to change and improve the country’s 
politics began to sweep across the land. Large scale participation in the stayaway and protests of 
a broad swath of Zimbabwean society—certainly including most of its towns and cities--is often 
underplayed or presented as acts of solidarity with workers (Alexander, 2000, Bond and 
Manyanya, 2002, Saunders, 1997) but the protests clearly went beyond labor concerns by 
mobilizing a wide and diverse cross-section of civil society. Transport drivers and businesses 
ferried workers and others free of charge into the city centers (Kunene, 1997) or blocked people 
from going to work or shops. Members of other groups, such as students, protested or stayed 
home even when they were not among the 50 percent of the Zimbabwean work force with formal 
employment. Reports of white business people and farmers closing their businesses provided the 
seed for the government’s persistent argument after the event that the white community had been 
behind the actions in order to propel their own interests.  
The Stage for People’s Power 
The days leading up to the mass actions reveal much of the contours of public 
discontent. Government’s decision to fund veterans’ benefits immediately emerged from veteran’s 
protests in the first half of the year. In early 1997, government froze the Veteran’s Compensation 
Fund amid widespread allegations of rampant corruption and fraud.27 Allegations that non-
veterans, the politically connected and Zimbabweans living abroad were receiving payouts from 
the fund for aliments supposedly connected to the Liberation War led to the formation of the 
Chidyausiku Commission (led by Justice Godfrey Chidyausiku who would later be chosen to chair 
the Constitutional Commission).  
                                                      
27 “The unexpected high figure, age of some of the claimants and purported beneficiaries and 
alleged abuses of the War Victims Compensation Fund recently led the Government to suspend 
further disbursements of funds under the facility and order investigations into the allegations and 
come up with a water tight policy on who should qualify.” Quote from The Herald, 18 April 1997 in 
Mhanda, W., (2011) The Role of War Veterans in Zimbabwe's Political and Economic Processes. 
SAPES Trust Policy Dialogue Forum. pp. 1-15. 
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In July, veterans in the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association 
(ZNLWVA) under the leadership of Chenjerai Hunzvi, immersed in a half-year struggle to win the 
compensation promised them, disrupted an African American Summit in Harare ("War Veterans 
Disrupt Summit", 1997) and in August a protest during Mugabe’s speech at the annual Heroes 
Day celebration was called “an unprecedented lack of respect and discipline” by Joseph Msika, 
Zanu chairman, who went on to say that while the government would ignore the demonstration it 
would hurry to make sure the money due them was given to the veterans ("Mugabe Shaken by 
Unprecedented Protest on "Heroes Day"", 1997). This did not stop the veterans who later that 
week invaded and took over Zanu headquarters holding hostages for the day and taunting the 
police whom they argued should refuse to be used by these people “who are enjoying the fruits of 
our sacrifice” ("War Veterans Ransack Mugabe's Party HQ", 1997). 
Mugabe announced his intentions that month to make good on the looted fund by 
providing $4 billion in immediate and long-term assistance to veterans groups ("The worst is still 
to come", 1997, Wetherell, 1998). This promise baffled Zimbabweans who wondered where the 
money for this would be found. The suspense built up over the next weeks. Speculation raged. 
Rumors, such as the idea that this money might be raised from the Post Office Savings Bank in 
which pension funds were kept, raised temperatures even further. By October, the World Bank 
expressed its own displeasure by withholding aid payments, soon to be followed by the 
International Monetary Fund, until it was clear how the government planned to finance its 
promises.28 Finance Minister Herbert Murerwa said,  
We will have to do a juggling act but I must confess this is a serious problem…. We 
would need to look at some cuts with both recurrent and capital expenditure, and we 
would also look at other sources like outside financial markets. Social stability has a cost 
("Zimbabwe government admits war veterans pensions a serious problem", 1997).  
Not only did the veterans get fulfillment on the promises made to them but Mugabe 
signaled that he was going to finally take new action on the land issue, quite possibly a threat at 
                                                      
28 The World Bank would disburse 60 million dollars in December and the IMF would agree to re-
enter negotiations for an Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility, both concerned about the 
damage to the Zimbabwean currency. "World Bank releases 60 million dollars for Zimbabwe." 
Panafrican News Agency (PANA), December 23 1997. 
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this point meant more for the international financial institutions than for domestic consumption.  In 
the interim, the government also moved forward on its intention to repatriate white-owned 
farmland by drawing up a list of more than 1700 commercial farms to be confiscated in the 
beginning of November that amounted to 12 million acres or about 44 percent Zimbabwe’s 
commercial agriculture ("Whites despair over Zimbabwe farm seizures", 1997). A beleaguered 
stock market agitated over the land seizures and Mugabe’s promises to veterans reacted 
immediately. On November 14, otherwise known as Black Friday, the stock market fell by 7 
percent in its single biggest one-day loss and the Zimbabwe dollar lost 70 percent against the US 
dollar ("Zimbabwe stock market in record plunge", 1997). 
Finally, the suspense ended with a shock in November when Murerwa announced a 
comprehensive tax bill that laid out a plan on how to finance the commitments to veterans. The 
bill included sales tax and fuel and electricity levies as well as a 5 percent increase in income tax 
to raise the money for 50,000 veterans to receive a one-time payout of Zim$50000 (about 
US$1500) and a Zim$2000 monthly pension to begin in March of 1998 ("Date set for mass 
protest", 1997). The imposition of a levy for specific purpose was not without precedence. For 
example, in the face of a 1992 drought the government had imposed a 5 percent temporary 
development levy, which was later made permanent. The proposed new taxes were different in 
that they elevated the interests of a minority (the veterans) above those of others groups.   
While most Zimbabweans are not against the payment of gratuities and pensions to ex-
combatants, they are opposed to the manner in which the government is trying to raise 
the money by further burdening the already suffering masses. Zimbabweans are actually 
among the highest taxed people in the world ("Enough Is Enough, Zimbabweans Tell 
Mugabe", 1997). 
Mugabe and his ministers would have a difficult task keeping the party faithful behind the 
bill. On November 27, Parliament blocked Murerewa’s attempts to fast track the bill so that taxes 
could go into effect before the December recess. Not only were the normally quiescent 
parliamentarians deeply concerned by the tax provisions, they sought to openly debate them. 
Margaret Dongo, a veteran herself and a rare independent Member of Parliament said, “We 
cannot sacrifice the 11 million people [country's total population] for the sake of satisfying the 
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concerns of a few thousand [war veterans]” ("New taxes to raise additional revenue to pay war 
veterans in Zimbabwe", 1997). Still Murerwa did not budge. He did not really need the Parliament 
to impose the new levies because the Finance Ministry in Zimbabwe is empowered to set and 
collect taxes without Parliament’s approval. By November 29, the Finance Ministry announced in 
a statement that petrol and diesel would go up in price by 3.9 and 5 percent respectively and 
taxes on all goods and services by 2.2 percent ("New taxes to raise additional revenue to pay war 
veterans in Zimbabwe", 1997). Already, the ZCTU was launching into action, announcing its 
intention to organize mass action, as ZCTU’s Gibson Sibanda said, “The government’s total 
disregard for the plight of its people has undermined its legitimacy” ("New taxes to raise additional 
revenue to pay war veterans in Zimbabwe", 1997). 
As confusion was growing in the capital, despair and anger began to move like wildfire 
across the land. With Zimbabwe’s dismal economic performance, how could the government 
demand more revenue? Why did 50000 veterans deserve assistance any more than the roughly 
half the country, or six million people, who lived below the poverty line (Human Development 
Report Zimbabwe, 1998)? And how could the government be trusted with more money when it 
was implicated in the looting of the pension funds to begin with? 
One of the ironies is that Mugabe and Zanu clearly felt they were being responsive to 
veterans groups who had won their success by taking to the streets but seemed to show little 
awareness of how their actions would be more broadly judged. It was hard for anybody to 
understand how things could go so wrong so quickly. But what could be done? Opposition politics 
had been largely crushed, with ZAPU, the last dinosaur to go down, the few small parties were in 
no position to lead an effective opposition. The Parliament, perceived as waking from its slumber, 
neither had the track record nor the trust of the people to represent their interests. In fact, outside 
of Zanu’s fifteen years of monopolization of power, there was very little leadership on political 
issues. Or so it seemed. 
Actually, there were several sectors of civil society that had become increasingly 
concerned about the political environment. For one, the ZCTU had begun to grow more and more 
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skeptical of its partnership with Zanu around socialist objectives, particularly after the adoption of 
the ESAP in 1991 doused socialist hopes with a comprehensive neo-liberal economic approach 
that according to ZCTU saw real salaries fall by 60% from 1990 levels (Saunders, 1997).   
While the ZCTU by no means rocketed to strength on the backs of its efforts to advocate 
for workers, it had become increasingly savvy about what to expect from government and was 
coming off the back end of a successful series of labor actions (this will be picked up again 
below). The ZCTU took on the challenge of organizing and leading a worker’s response to the 
new taxes. It built up support in the days before December 9, by rallying workers across the 
country. ZCTU western region chair Milton Gwetu speaking to workers in Bulawayo was reported 
as saying on December 3, “All workers must not go to work on that day [December 9], because 
we want to map out strategies to force government to stop implementing the intended levy” ("Tax-
Weary Zimbabweans Plan Mass Action Over Levy", 1997).  
What nobody expected was that the ZCTU’s call would be so successfully answered 
across Zimbabwe. It was rapidly picked up and interpreted across civil society, not merely in 
solidarity with workers but also as a way of expressing widespread discontent with corrupt and 
authoritarian governance. ZCTU president, Gibson Sibanda, cited this corruption directly,  
"It is morally wrong for government to buy the latest Mercedes Benz vehicles at every summit held 
in the country, yet they cannot pay the war veterans from available treasury funds, without taxing 
workers” ("Some 30,000 Workers Join Demonstrations In Bulawayo", 1997).  
Morgan Tsvangirai clarified that ZCTU’s objectives went beyond the working class to 
organize on behalf of the economically and politically disenfranchised, “You can remove leaders, 
but not the cause. This is class warfare, between the haves and the have-nots” (Mutasah, 
2010b). Other groups picked up the anger over corruption. Reginald Matchaba-Hove of the 
Zimbabwe Human Rights Association (ZimRights) argued that it was the unilateral action on the 
part of the executive to press through taxes that was unacceptable in a democratic society 
("Discontent emerging over veteran's levy", 1997). David Chimhini, ZimRights executive director, 
is paraphrased as saying on December 5, “it was high time Zimbabweans should resist being 
treated as chickens or personal property of those in power and reject any attempts to effect 
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further taxes” ("Date set for mass protest", 1997). At a rally on December 10, Hopewell Gumbo, 
NUST university student representative said (rhetorically one imagines) students should burn 
American-made Cherokee Jeeps that were recently acquired for government ministers and 
governors ("Some 30,000 Workers Join Demonstrations In Bulawayo", 1997).  
Mugabe and his ministers were not completely deaf to the public outrage in the run up to 
December 9 but they were unbending when it came to reneging again on their promises to 
veterans. While parliament was able to scrap the five percent income tax—thus relieving some of 
the pressure, the government persisted in imposing the new levies (Gadaga, 1997) and thus 
showed it was unable or unwilling to understand the magnitude of discontent over its authoritarian 
means as much as the content of its actions.  
A Nation on Fire 
Anger surged in the week before the strikes. On the one hand people were simply 
revolting against the burden of the new taxes but on the other they began to question Zanu’s 
authority to tax—because the new taxes were perceived as benefitting only the veteran’s 
interests and were not publicly debated. Given the centrality of the veterans to the framing of 
liberation, dissenting Zimbabweans prepared themselves for the expected challenges to their 
patriotism, particularly by invoking the government’s failures to live up to its own liberation goals.  
Ben Hlatshwayo, a senior political lecture at the University of Zimbabwe who later 
became a high court judge, for example, in a 5 December editorial invokes the liberation song, 
Nzira Dzemasoja (The Principles of a People's Soldier or Leader), as an indictment of political 
leadership: 
These are the principles of good leadership  
- Kunenzira dzemasoja, dzekuzvibata nazvo 
We must not loot the people's property  
- Tisave tinotorawo zvinhu zvemasi yedu 
Return everything taken in need 
- Dzoserai zvinhu zvese zvamunenge matora 
Consult the people and respect their views  
- Taurai zvinetsika muruzhinji rwevanhu. 
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Hlatshwayo writes succinctly three reasons why Zimbabweans should question the new 
taxes: 1) the lack of political debate and accountability, 2) the belief of Zimbabweans that 
veterans are “no worse off than the rest of the population” and 3) the injustice of giving all 
veterans the intended benefit regardless of need (Hlatshwayo, 1997). The lack of accountability 
was evident in Zanu’s attempts to cut off even parliamentary debate. The Mugabe/Zanu power 
had finally over-reached itself, not merely by failing to engage Zimbabwean society in a debate 
over the need for new taxes but in sidelining its own institutions.  
The discomfort over the privileged position of veterans is somewhat more complicated in 
that the centrality of veterans’ claims to patriotic political goals had been long established (Kriger, 
2003) and, as we saw above, was acknowledged by ZCTU and ZimRights, even while these 
groups expressed their grievance with the government for its patronage of the veterans. Veterans 
had enjoyed the perception of privilege and were not immune to the brewing resentment, which 
was, however, directed against the government and not them. The call for a more measured 
approach to help the veterans was an appeal for the end of government corruption and a rational 
debate.  
Another major source of discontent is often cited as the slump in the economy and the 
imposition of the ESAP in 1991 (Muzondidya, 2009, Bond and Manyanya, 2002). The follow up 
on ESAP was being negotiated in 1997, which made the timing of the imposition of new taxes 
extremely unfortunate for a damned-if-you-do-damned-if-you-don’t political party. Ameliorating the 
effects of ESAP had emerged as a focal point of civil society coalitions (seeing the launch of the 
Ecumenical Support Services, for example).  Workers saw their real wages decline in the 1990s 
and the economy as a whole suffered, achieving an average growth of only 1.8 percent in GDP, 
well below the ESAP target of 5 percent (Human Development Report Zimbabwe, 1998), making 
government development language hollow. Social support services that were a hallmark of 
government success in the previous decade had begun to become less accessible and more 
expensive, exacerbating the distance between the government and many civil society groups that 
were committed to progressive social objectives. A Social Development Fund set up in 1991 to 
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ameliorate the negative impacts of the ESAP saw a decline in donor funding after 1992 and did 
not reach a majority of qualifying households (Human Development Report Zimbabwe, 1998). 
Both the World Bank and government of Zimbabwe touted the success of implementation of the 
ESAP but as Bond and Manyanya remark: 
If ESAP was largely implemented, and if the implementation was unsatisfactory, the 
subsequent period suggests that the political costs and social instability generated by 
ineffectual international economic integration are substantial. Zimbabwean society 
followed the trade union lead and in late 1997 re-awakened from a deep post-
independence slumber to demand socio-economic and political reform (Bond and 
Manyanya, 2002). 
The period of the ESAP was not marked only by economic decline but also by the public 
perception of increased dependence on the global financial institutions offering some political 
cover for Zanu even while it undermined belief in its ability to make the country independent of 
the control and domination of outsiders. Its capitulation to the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund was seen as the continuing ability of outsiders to call the shots (community 
theater under Ngugi wa Mirii, for instance, emphasized this imperialist control ("Obituary: Ngugi 
wa Mirii: Modern African playwright", 2008)). 
While people identified personal enrichment as a trapping of power, the sight of ministers 
in their Mercedes and Jeep Cherokees became harder to tolerate in the midst of ESAP-inspired 
austerity and reduced economic growth. What had become of the socialist promises for economic 
justice in the country? ZANU only seemed to understand a fair distribution of resources as the 
protection of the corruption of its members and the reward of the veterans. It was either simply 
ineffective or specifically incapable of mounting an effective plan to strengthen the economic 
freedoms of the majority of its citizens. For example, in the lead up to December 9, Givemore 
Magongorere, the head of the Public Service Association representing the majority of civil service 
workers, said, “The time has come for government to show total and practical commitment to 
reduce its prodigal expenditure by cutting down the bloated cabinet and streamline its activities 
right at the top" ("Tax-Weary Zimbabweans Plan Mass Action Over Levy", 1997). 
So while the economic decline, abandonment of socialism and government 
mismanagement and corruption sparked the discontent that erupted in December, it was also the 
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betrayal of trust and the yearning for accountable, democratic governance that was upfront in 
people’s minds. For many people, government no longer represented all Zimbabwean interests 
but could only be explained as organized around the pursuit of the personal enrichment of the 
political elite. The destruction wrought by ESAP was not the focus of the December protests but it 
was never far away in people’s minds as a reason not to trust the government’s intentions and 
actions on their behalf.  
ESAP too, which has weakened the labour movement to some extent, this time played in 
their favour. People who have previously ignored calls for protest, minding their own 
business, and fighting to make ends meet, finally discovered that it was only through 
collective action that they could get their message across to government ("People's 
Power At Last", 1997). 
In this way, on December 9, ZCTU surprised everybody by unleashing a broad base of 
dissent and anger that formed a movement hoping to sweep away authoritarianism in Zimbabwe 
and replace it with something more just and democratic. The economic conditions and the 
injustice of the proposed taxes were the agents that spread discontent so widely but it was the 
shared belief that the government must be stopped and that it no longer acted legitimately, which 
reverberated through the street protests. 
On the days of the stayaway, the government seemed eerily disconnected, as though it 
did not realize the extent of the challenge. While it sent police against the protesters in the capital 
Harare, it did nothing in other cities. The police commissioner himself may have been more 
interested in keeping Unity Square and Parliament in Harare secure for a planned State of the 
Nation address by Mugabe ("The worst is still to come", 1997). This address itself is interesting in 
that Mugabe used it to stress the need for collective responsibility to improve the country’s 
economy and announce that the next stage of the economic plan (after ESAP) called the 
Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation (Zimprest) would bring inflation 
down to single digits (to say this was not to happen is an understatement) and would begin to 
accelerate the privatization of parastatals (something the World Bank had been pushing for) 
("Mugabe Delivers State of the Nation Address", 1997). However, the irony of the positive, 
forward looking speech given with no reference to the tumultuous events transpiring that day was 
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not lost on Zimbabweans, “How could he call it the state of the nation address when there was no 
mention of the fact that the nation was on fire?” ("Arrogance at its Worst", 1997).  
As dramatic as the people’s power demonstration was for Zimbabwe, where it is an 
understatement to say that such events were uncommon, Zimbabweans did not resort to 
violence. They did not oust Mugabe in effigy, pull down hideous statues or erect tent cities. The 
majority of protests were largely orderly. It was as though the people had never heard themselves 
speaking and it would take time to decipher their own message.  But this message was heard. 
And it would set rolling a deep and committed challenge to Zanu’s power.  
The mass action was also largely quiet. While there were protests, many people simply 
stayed home on December 9 and 10. Most of the demonstration of people power took the form of 
withdrawal in a massive boycott of work and life as usual. There is little in the way of analysis 
about the scope of the stayaway, although the use of stayaways as a safe way to express 
political dissatisfaction would be repeated by ZCTU a number of times over the next years.29 In 
the climate of fear that stifled opposition to the government, staying home became an accessible 
dissent tactic for Zimbabweans. As a powerful expression of discontent it woke the government 
up to the dangers that lay in front of it. At the Third National Party Conference held in Mutare from 
December 5, the anger and anxiety among Zanu party members was palpable. Even though the 
Vice-President started with the regular warnings about the need to follow the party line, alluding 
to the practice of discarding dissenters during the liberation struggle, party members were in no 
mood to acquiesce to the new taxes. As Mugabe spoke about his intention to raise a five percent 
income tax levy, shouts of “Haditi” (which means we don’t want) rose up from the floor ("New 
culture develops in ruling party", 1997). In response, Mugabe instructed Murerwa to cancel the 
levy and find another way to raise the money for the veteran payments. The conference went on 
to bring up issues of expanding democracy through direct election of appointed seats in 
Parliament and even the idea of electing the Politburo. The sense of winning a victory was 
                                                      
29 At three different times in 1998 alone, ZCTU called for stayaways and continued to use the 
strategy up to 2007. 
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palpable. Moses Mvenge, MP for Mutare Central said, “This is a victory for parliamentarians who 
would have faced the wrath of their constituencies if this levy had passed. These are signs of 
changing times” ("New culture develops in ruling party", 1997).  
The income tax levy was discarded over the weekend but the price and sales taxes 
increases were still set to go forward and the ZCTU-sponsored strike was not called off. Still the 
rallying point was not the increase in taxes, per se, it was anger over political corruption and a 
political elite no longer seen as even pursuing broader social objectives outside of its own 
interests:  
A wave of national resistance beginning with MPs, then party delegates to the Mutare 
conference and ending on the streets of every important centre in the nation on Tuesday, 
conveyed to Mugabe and his cosseted coterie that they no longer enjoy a scrap of 
popular confidence and that furthermore they are now widely regarded as the political 
vultures we have long known them to be ("The worst is still to come", 1997). 
December 9 demonstrated that Zimbabweans could wield a broad people’s political 
power capable of cutting through patronage politics. Many who stayed away had little or no 
connections to a union, business owners participated by closing up shop, students skipped 
school and while many associations and communities acted in solidarity, participation was an 
individual choice that many made as a small act of courage. The protests and stayaway stripped 
the Zimbabwean regime of much of the loyalty it had commanded in the past. As protester 
Claudius Mutere said about his decision to challenge Zanu’s political authority, “We are saying 
'Down with Mugabe'. We are fed up with him and Zanu (PF). He has exploited us for 17 years. He 
must go” (Raath, 1997). 
By mid-day on December 10, it was already apparent that the Parliament, at least, had 
felt the pressure and was willing to respond. Members of Parliament blocked an attempt to 
adjourn until January arguing that the tax problem must be resolved first ("Zimbabwe News 
Roundup", 1997).  MP Edward Mabodza said, ‘‘this thing will not only oust the government...but 
us as well. Let's not play with fire where there is no water'’ (Shaw, 1997a).  
Later in the week, when Murerwa announced “the levy and fuel prices will be scrapped so 
that we can reduce the burden on the taxpayer" (Kunene, 1997) and left in place only the sales 
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taxes, people began to re-appropriate the idea of independence for themselves, with the party on 
the outside or even the problem to be overcome as in this unattributed quote, “Now we are truly 
independent tavakuzvitonga zvakazara (we are totally ruling ourselves). What happened on 
Tuesday was a sign that Mugabe's honeymoon in this country is over" (Kunene, 1997). Even 
while people were still savoring the possibility of challenging the government and were beginning 
to entertain the eventuality of changing the situation, attempts to re-establish the primacy of 
Zanu’s authority were under way using the pulpit of government and the brute force of repression.  
For example on December 11, Morgan Tsvangirai was assaulted by a group of six men and two 
women in his offices who hit him over the head with chairs and a coffee table ("Brutal assault on 
Tsvangirai", 1997, 'I will continue,' says Tsvangirai", 1997). Whether or not the attack was 
ordered as a political strategy, the event has been symbolic of the no-holds barred tactics the 
government would adopt in the long days of crisis that lay ahead. Police Commissioner Chihuri 
and Home Affairs Minister Dabengwa had been the first government interlocutors joining with 
veteran’s leader Chenjerai (Hitler) Hunzvi in accusing Tsvangirai of conspiring with the white 
community to organize the mass protests ("Brutal assault on Tsvangirai", 1997). Such 
foreshadowing of the government’s return to blame the white settlers and its strong return to its 
veterans’ base laid the foundations of the next chapter in Zimbabwean history. 
The veterans hold a privileged place in the story of the continuing struggle for 
independence, as they do in most nationalist movements. They had been there at the beginning 
and had sacrificed themselves for the good of the country. As such, while small in number, their 
support was important to maintain the political hegemony of Zanu. How did it come to pass that 
such an important bridge to civil society, the veterans, had been passed over and neglected and 
why was it so vital to get their support back?  
What the veterans wanted 
Over the two decades since independence, veterans had become less and less central in 
Zimbabwean society and outside of their symbolic importance to the continuing struggle may 
seem like an unlikely and dwindling group (as many were simply dying of old age) for government 
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to turn to strengthen its hegemony. Veterans were from the beginning one key to expanding and 
maintaining political power for Zanu. Independence, after all, grew from the sacrifices these men 
and women made in the field. In a country where the policy of reconciliation and integration (the 
creation of a single military and civil service) in the 1980s demanded fundamental trade-offs, the 
Zipra veterans initially provided Zanu with a group it could trust to see things its way. Its interests 
were their interests. But honoring and privileging veterans also was important to Zanu’s objective 
to continue the struggle. As a guerilla army turned political party, much of Zanu’s emerging 
political elite were themselves veterans and, thus, were able to count on veterans to carry forward 
party initiatives from security to socialism. This worked because of the national moral debt to 
veterans and because veterans saw themselves as uniquely privileged having carried the 
weapons in the Liberation struggle (Kriger, 2003). 
At the same time, the Zimbabwean guerilla fighters had made the ultimate sacrifice, 
losing family members, livelihoods and educational opportunities in the war—a point Zanu 
officials routinely made at political rallies and the annual Heroes Day. The demobilization period 
after 1980 was meant to reintegrate veterans into society but this was imperfectly accomplished, 
leaving many disgruntled and some angry that their white counterparts who had fought for the 
Rhodesian Army received greater remuneration or went on to real jobs or family farms (Kriger, 
2003). What then was the point of the struggle? What had Independence brought for them? Not 
all veterans carried this burden on their shoulders but enough did to persist in mobilizing their 
status in search of privilege.  
Until 1988, Zanu relied heavily on the continuing loyalty of the veterans, those who had 
fought in the ZANLA forces (ZIPRA, of course, in its connection with ZAPU was another story as 
we have discussed in chapter 3), to keep the new military under its wing and to provide access 
and control of other sectors of the civil services (Kriger, 2003). This was a real challenge, of 
course. The retention of white civil servants, many of whom had leading roles in the Rhodesian 
regime, was an Achilles heel in Zanu’s power.  Zanu was vulnerable to insurrection and, in the 
anti-apartheid era, manipulation and spying from South Africa. As a partial solution to these 
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issues, the presence of loyal veterans in strategic positions was an overt policy. Zanu privileged 
Zanla veterans with affirmative action policies, promoting loyal cadres in the military and police, 
and made accommodations for them for other civil service jobs (Kriger, 2003). 
Around 1988, Zanu shifted. It argued that it needed a broader, more equitable focus that 
would largely address veteran needs as part of the whole society (Kriger, 2003). Not all veterans 
agreed with this approach. Understandably their fall from grace did not sit well, as many saw their 
reduction of privileged states against Zanu’s broken promises—for compensation and for land 
redistribution. Meanwhile, some felt society in general was turning its backs to them unconcerned 
about their plight in competing with those whose lack of guerilla service gave them the luxury of 
better education and economic experience (Kriger, 2003).  
As significant as veteran status was to political legitimacy, Zanu had begun to sideline 
veterans in 1988, two years before it would dive into ESAP. Muzondidya argues that Zanu lost 
interest because its political agenda was confined by the constitution and party members saw 
indigenization (expanding economic power for black Zimbabweans) policies as a path to their 
own enrichment (Muzondidya, 2009). However, taking Zanu officials at their own words suggests 
that Zanu was aware in the 1980s that over emphasis on veterans’ issues could undermine its 
ability to build national unity, something it had won though its merger with Zapu.  As Kriger quotes 
John Nkomo, Minister of Labour, Manpower Planning and Social Welfare,  
One does not have to single out a particular group for preferential treatment eight years 
after independence…. We should now be addressing unemployment as a national 
problem that faces both the veterans of the war and those who were young during the 
war but have not attained the age of majority” (Kriger, 2003, p 209).   
Zanu understood its challenge to be about the consolidation of its power on a national 
level, across various sectors of society. To do so it would need some distance from veteran’s 
issues. War credentials still had currency in Zimbabwean society, but by pushing them to the 
side, Zanu sought to come into its own political maturity—and greater authoritarian control. And 
so it needed the veteran’s symbolism to reinforce its credentials as the liberator--the greatest 
honor of being buried at Heroes Acre, one of many ways this was tackled. But veterans could 
count on the government assistance…or could they?   
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A little bit of distance from Zanu actually may have strengthened the veterans’ voice. In 
April 1989, The Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA) was formed 
to represent veterans. Even as a young organization, ZNLWVA succeeded in negotiating three 
acts on behalf of its members (the War Veterans Administration Bill, War Veterans Act and War 
Victims Compensation Act in 1991, 1992 and 1993) (Muzondidya, 2009). It could also count on a 
hearing when needed, although it was not always pleased with the results. Such a privileged 
position really made coalitions and support from other civil society groups irrelevant because 
ZNLWVA already had more power than most to get itself heard.  
The original War Victims Compensation Fund (from the Victims of Terrorism 
Compensation Act) was actually a throwback to the Ian Smith regime in 1973 that was amended 
after Independence to “include almost all those who could have been negatively impacted by the 
war be it in education or loss of income” (Mhanda, 2011).  However, the Fund was never strongly 
promoted among the rank and file. That was to change by 1995 as veterans flocked to put in 
claims after revelations that the Fund had been looted by the politically elite—only some of whom 
could be considered authentic veterans (Mhanda, 2011). Revelations in the press in late 1996 
and early 1997 that the Fund was nearly empty and had made regular payouts to politicians, 
some of who were not authentic veterans between 1993 and 1996 sparked a new anger that 
overflowed into the streets. When the government stopped all claims to the Fund in early 1997 to 
investigate the alleged looting, veterans felt cheated and that they were being accused of 
malfeasance as a scapegoat for the actual perpetrators of fraud. The Chidyausiku Commission, 
established to investigate the scandal, only seemed to make things worse by dragging in the less 
politically connected veterans to testify. 
Starting from May 1997, Veterans shocked the capital with public protests ("The worst is 
still to come", 1997), working up to the disruptions of Mugabe’s August Heroes Day speech and a 
veteran’s invasion of party headquarters. Thus, in August 1997, Mugabe loosened the pressure 
valve a little by announcing the government would make lump-sum payments to the veterans and 
provide life pensions (Kriger, 2003). The solution calmed the capital’s bruised nerves and re-
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directed attention from the investigation over government malfeasance but it also unleashed a 
much greater angst, not against the veterans who were largely untouchable but against the 
government itself, which would have to find the funds for the payments. In November of that year, 
250 veterans invaded the Commission proceedings and halted them by singing revolutionary 
songs to support ZNLWVA leader Chenjerai Hunzvi who was meant to give evidence about 
allegations of misuse against him ("Heavy security as Zimbabwe war funds probe resumes", 
1997). 
The veteran’s cause had considerable sympathy, particularly as the looting of their fund 
was a prime example of government corruption around which simmering resentment was 
growing. But this sympathy failed to translate into significant coalitions and social support for the 
veteran’s cause—such a thing might have altered the course of events by avoiding the 
polarization between veterans and many other civil society groups the government would later 
exploit. But, while veterans as a group have not been particularly powerful (outside of those, of 
course in the ruling party) they have believed themselves to be the true force behind the liberation 
struggle and have not sought to collaborate and work with other groups in society.  As Kriger 
explains,  
To understand guerrillas’ self depiction as “forgotten and neglected”, it is important to 
appreciate their frames of reference, their belief that they deserved to be rewarded for 
war service, and their conviction that their war contributions were superior to those of 
other groups who participated in the liberation struggle—all ideas that were endorsed 
initially by the ruling party for its own purposes (Kriger, 2003). 
While Zanu had attempted to moderate veterans’ status, it never abandoned them; 
veterans understood its ongoing liberation struggle and, therefore, could count on hearings for 
their issue. This fact, documented by Kriger, undermines the idea that Zanu simply rediscovered 
the veterans when it needed them in the late 1990s. Zanu had no intention to transition to a post-
veteran society, but really needed to expand its hegemonic influence over a broader group. It still 
continued to give veterans enough attention to keep them active. 
Another key element of the government strategy emerged in August in Mugabe’s Heroes 
Day Speech when he announced that 1772 commercial farms had been “earmarked for takeover 
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by the government” but the protesting veterans inured to promises of land that never materialized 
were unmoved ("Mugabe Shaken by Unprecedented Protest on "Heroes Day"", 1997). Despite 
steps that the government had taken to pave the legal path for land seizures (such as the 1992 
Land Acquisition Act), many felt that the negation of property rights would never hold up. The 
government went on the offensive to fulfill promises for fast track land reform that had gone 
forward at anemic pace since 1990. By laying the path for the land grab in 1997, Mugabe sought 
to bring the party back inline with the popular land goals that had been its legacy. Before it was 
hijacked by party members angry over the tax hikes, Mugabe had intended to highlight the land 
issue at the Mutare conference—as he said, “in this respect, all party members here should 
discuss this issue frankly and in detail, focusing properly on how the land to be acquired should 
be distributed and managed without any decrease in production" ("Leaders should learn from 
mistakes", 1997)—clearly seeing it as the important issue that would reinvigorate party power.  
ZWNLVA emerged as the single most important association upon which Zanu leaned 
heavily to rejuvenate its hegemony in the face of widespread dissent, and this could already be 
seen by 1997 in its land and reparations policies. It had already buckled to a series of labor 
strikes, capitulated to investigate its own (largely) fraud in the War Victims Compensation Fund, 
and was presiding over a flailing economy. With the South African problem resolved after the 
1995 elections and budgetary constrictions, it may very well be that Zanu had let down its guard. 
Or it may be that it already understood its social support was waning. Bringing the veterans close 
and doing it quickly was thus a very rational response, by so doing Zanu reinforced its hegemonic 
troops and, if it unleashed their interest, could count on their vociferous support. By paying them 
off, it was not only buying their loyalty it was driving a deep wedge between them and the rest of 
civil society.  
In the run up to the December strikes, ZimRights Chairman Reginald Matchaba-Hove 
warned “that rewarding a segment of society at the expense of others would thrust a wedge 
between war veterans and the rest of society as many people made individual and collective 
sacrifices to liberate the country” ("Discontent emerging over veteran's levy", 1997). Hove is 
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reported to have used the same word “wedge” in a news show when he said, “people are trying to 
drive a wedge between the war vets and the public” ("Muckraker column: Mugabe presides over 
a vanquished tribe", 1997).  
Manipulation of the veterans was indeed very strategic. The farther the veterans strayed 
from seeing their social objectives as one among many competing and valid objectives, the more 
radical and closed off they became. Finding a remedy for the veterans capable of answering their 
grievances (which the party itself had created, if not intentionally, then through corruption and 
mismanagement) required returning to nationalist roots and mobilizing the sectors of society in 
which Zanu’s formulation of nationalist objectives still resonated (Kriger, 2003, Bond and 
Manyanya, 2002).  
This raw hegemonic approach to legitimacy, illustrates well before the crises of land 
invasions and the blatant utilization of the veterans for political ends that Zanu’s approximation to 
the veterans was not merely rhetorical symbolism but that this segment of civil society provided 
it—or certainly the inner core around Mugabe—with the most power to act. If Zanu had made a 
mistake before it was in being too pliable to demands of non-veteran civil society, which had 
allowed for the propagation of universalist values and diverse social expectations, diverging from 
its narrow vision. Terrence Ranger in 2002 in making a point about the promotion of a single 
narrow nationalist history in Zimbabwe for political ends, gives a marvelous quote from Zanu 
Information and Publicity Secretary from Bulawayo, Sikhumbizo Ndiweni, “The mistake the ruling 
party made was to allow colleges and universities to be turned into anti-Government mentality 
factories” (Ranger, 2004). If that were the case, in 1997 Zanu would begin reasserting hegemony 
by rejuvenating its natural constituency. 
Veteran leadership in ZNLWVA rose to the challenge, yes. Some for personal gain, yes. 
Some out of dismay and disbelief that Zimbabweans had abandoned their cause but most 
importantly because the objective repatriation of the land and the return of their status were their 
exclusive social objectives. It is important to point out here that veteran’s groups were not 
monolithic and not all participated in the ZNLWVA approach (Kriger, 2003). But those who did 
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moved forward with the vociferous and potent leadership that had seen the re-awakening of 
fortunes and an opportunity to reclaim the goals for social transformation. This was the beginning 
of the social shock that was to be the catalyst to bring much of civil society together in opposition.  
Still it was not anger against the veterans that erupted in the streets but a fierce demand 
for the government to change its ways. For most protesters, the veterans were still untouchable, 
as indispensible to Zimbabwe as sadza (a staple food made of corn/maize meal), but the 
veterans’ leaders—most notably Hunzvi who would become as infamous for his militancy in the 
next years as he was for his middle name, Hitler—seized the opportunity to press further for their 
demands. And would soon lead the charge in the land occupations that brought Zimbabwe into 
the next millennium.   
Transformations in the ZCTU 
The ZCTU may seem like a peripheral candidate for a window into civil society.  Many 
analysts exclude unions from civil society or lump them into a gray zone because unions focus on 
workers in the sphere of production and they play a highly political role.30 But these hybrid 
institutions--the church, unions, universities—in Zimbabwe supported and magnified the voice of 
organizations and associations that were able to access them and they emerged as foci of 
dissent. They were used as resources to express, direct, and magnify repressed discontent. In 
this way, starting from its base with the workers, ZCTU was a catalyst for the expression of 
people’s power in Zimbabwe in December 1997 and increasingly acted as a mouthpiece for civil 
society until its leader Morgan Tsvangirai took the lead in a new political party, the Movement for 
Democratic Change, that grew from a broad-based Working People’s Convention in 1999.   
The genesis of the ZCTU, perhaps, made it an even more unlikely model of civil society 
organization. In 1980, the Zimbabwean government introduced the ZCTU as a way of addressing 
                                                      
30 Cohen and Arato, often discuss unions in the context of political parties. Civil society 
associations enable the collective bargaining of workers by pressing for the rights of collective 
bargaining but unions themselves are a formulation of a modern welfare state that become 
unnecessary as the rights are guaranteed by the transformation of the state. (Cohen and Arato, 
1992)  
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the historic imbalance between the largely settler-run businesses in the country and the 
indigenous work force. Its intentions were clearly to keep the unions close to the party 
infrastructure (Raftopoulos, 1992). While an umbrella association of unions, the United 
Federation of Trade Unions, had already been formed, Zanu preferred to create its own grouping 
because it was reluctant to deal with an organization formed independently of the state and 
suspected the Federation of links with Zapu (Raftopoulos, 1992). The Lancaster House 
agreement had cobbled together protections for capital investors in Zimbabwe, largely leaving in 
place the worker/owner relations that had prevailed for the foreseeable future. Already workers 
were pressing for better conditions. It was, thus, not surprising that Zanu felt it needed a close 
proximity to the labor movement to ensure it could influence the capitalist productive sector.    
The ZCTU was launched to represent and coordinate the 52 unions in the country. In the 
1980s, its linkages to government weighed it down and many assumed its leadership was directly 
controlled and put in place by Zanu. It also had trouble gaining significant traction or concessions 
for its members. It was accused of corrupt practices and was severely limited in taking 
independent action by the 1985 Labour Relations Act that vested much power in the Ministry of 
Labour (Cheater, 1991). While the Act technically legalized strike action it contained several 
provisions that undermined labor autonomy by making it illegal for workers in “essential services” 
to strike, requiring government permission for strikes and giving the Labour Minister the power to 
amend collective bargaining agreements (Ncube, 2000). 
The original intention had been to integrate ZCTU into the party structure. As a socialist 
party, Zanu assumed an antagonistic relationship between workers and capitalists and took a 
paternalistic hand in supporting the work force based on the idea that its objectives and those of 
the workers were the same (Ncube, 2000). This weak autonomy translated in the 1980s as a 
legacy of inaction and a growing irrelevance of unions to the labor movement itself. By 1985, at 
the ZCTU annual conference, the organization began to seek greater autonomy and by 1987 was 
complaining about high-levels of unemployment, inflation and wealth distribution (Alexander, 
2000). 
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The tide turned in the 1988/1989 mass mobilization of University of Zimbabwe students. 
Jocelyn Alexander quotes Tendai Biti, a student leader at the time who would later become MDC 
Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs, who says the movement “…was the first time people 
criticized the legitimacy of these heroes. It showed you, you could make noise and not get killed” 
(Alexander, 2000). Students remained a vital force in solidarity with the labor movement all the 
way through the period. While the improvement of their own conditions was a central motivation 
for their actions, they contributed both activists and thinkers who were willing to criticize 
government policies. Speaking at worker protests in Bulawayo on 9 December 1997, where over 
30,000 protesters heard from the ZCTU and civil society activists, student council president at the 
National University for Science and Technology, Hopewell Gumbo said, “The government is 
committing an economic genocide, and if the current leadership is tired of ruling, its high time they 
quit, to leave room for committed people with the welfare of the majority at heart" ("Some 30,000 
Workers Join Demonstrations In Bulawayo", 1997). 
Many observers note Zanu’s rejection of socialism, as it embraced the neoliberal 
economic principles of the ESAP, put pressure on the ZCTU and unions to take a more active 
role in the promotion of workers rights (Bond and Manyanya, 2002, Raftopoulos, 1992, Cheater, 
1991). For its part, the ZCTU took steps to eliminate some of the corruption that had become the 
norm in its leadership and turned its attention to strengthening democratic practices in its 
operations (Raftopoulos, 1992). While minimum wages and access to social services, particularly 
education and health, had improved the position of workers, real wages for commercial and 
industrial workers had gone down—in 1989 purchasing power was 13 percent below 1980 levels 
(Raftopoulos, 1992). The situation was only to become worse as the economic policy behind the 
ESAP envisioned the maintenance of an inexpensive workforce as one of the drivers for 
development. For the labor movement, the move away from direct overlap with government 
objectives was the lead in to a learning decade in which numerous labor actions would help 
clarify that the movement needed to go beyond strikes to address the democratic accountability in 
government, if it sought a real commitment to both expand employment as well as secure 
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worker’s rights. The momentous kick off to this was a strike by nurses and teachers in 1990 that 
was the longest in post-independence history.  
Nevertheless, the ZCTU itself was still battling with a lack of trust and identification within 
its own society. A report produced in 1991 found that:  
…half of the number of workers we interviewed did not know anything about unions at all. 
Of the other half, many of them were members of the union sometime in the past but 
resigned because they said they no longer had confidence in the union, or that the unions 
are powerless, or that they were useless anyway (Schiphorst, 1991).  
By 1990, ZCTU’s strength was largely in the urban centers of Zimbabwe where it had a 
base of an estimated 400,000 members, or nearly a third of the country’s formal-sector workers.31  
But ESAP began to drive a greater wedge between the government’s labor policy and the ZCTU. 
Bond and Manyana stress ZCTU’s mounting opposition to neoliberalism and Zanu’s opening door 
to multinational business but in their quote from Tsvangirai’s 1991 interview with Africa Report, 
Tsvangirai was already speaking about democratic objectives just as much as he was about 
resistance to global neoliberalism or the creation of a working class consciousness, “What we are 
looking for in Zimbabwe is a democratic space. Because what is going to be sacrificed in this 
programme [Esap] is democracy…” (Bond and Manyanya, 2002). “Democratic space” has, thus, 
become essential to even begin addressing the objectives of workers. Gains made through strike 
action were just as rapidly eroding through economic policies that were not debated or vetted 
democratically. 
Imposition of structural adjustment and government responses were a large inducement 
to new action on the part of the ZCTU. In 1989, ZCTU criticized the terms of the Investment Code 
and used May Day celebrations in 1991 to attack structural adjustment programs (Raftopoulos, 
1992).  These actions signaled a note of independence from government. Nevertheless, ZCTU 
was beginning to feel the pressure for more effective action for workers as the government’s 
economic policies, both in response to structural adjustment and its economic management. 
                                                      
31 These numbers are quoted from Raftopoulos (Raftopoulos 1992).  An article from the 
Zimbabwe Independent in February 1998 estimates more than 600,000 members (Zimbabwe 
Independent, 13 Feb 1998).  
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Consequently, ZCTU was beginning to be more critical of government policies and take action on 
the part of its member unions.  
Clearly Zanu was no longer the worker’s party but neither was ZCTU merely the 
representative of workers; it began to think more broadly about the economy. In 1996, ZCTU 
published its influential report Beyond ESAP: Framework for a Long-term Development Strategy 
for Zimbabwe just as government was in the midst of negotiation for a second phase of the 
program. Tapiwa Mashakada, a ZCTU spokesman, stressed the collaborative nature of the new 
approach, “Instead of just criticizing the government's failure in the implementation of ESAP, we 
decided together with other civic groups to come up with our own ideas on how the second phase 
of ESAP should be implemented” (Rusere, 1996). Material conditions were worsening; 
unemployment hovered at 42 percent. The report called for the establishment of a consultative 
economic council that would represent divergent views. The government did later seek to create 
such a council in 1998 but the council was shunned by civil society organizations because it 
planned to invite participants in their individual capacity instead of as representatives of their 
organizations (Alexander, 2000). The scope of Beyond ESAP is large and speaks on behalf of 
many Zimbabweans with provisions, for example, to expand employment, help Zimbabwean 
business and abolish the reintroduction of school and medical fees (Rusere, 1996). It is the 
convergence of social objectives on improving governance that was beginning to capture the 
imagination of civil society about the existence of better alternatives to the official policy. 
The churches were already working along concurrent lines with the ZCTU. The Lobbying 
and Advocacy Group (LAG) of the Ecumenical Support Services, established in 1992 to seek, 
among other things, a “civic response to economic reforms that lead to the exploitation of the 
already marginalized people of the South”, had attended a World Bank civil society consultation 
with the Economic Justice Network and other NGOs in 1995. Afterwards it released a 
communiqué that stressed, “…[the people] are required to take an active role in defining the 
development paradigm through churches, civic groups and NGOs” (Dorman, 2002). The group 
drew up a list of over 50 individuals who wanted to be part of consultations on ZIMPREST and 
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wrote the Finance Ministry only to be sidelined by the Minister who finally wrote back to tell them 
that the draft document would only be open to stakeholders after it had been discussed by heads 
of ministry and cabinet (Dorman, 2002). While Dorman notes that LAG had not been successful 
in either dealing with government or bringing on board more NGOs to its cause, it shows that the 
more progressive churches had become convinced that the accomplishment of their justice and 
poverty alleviation goals required engagement and scrutiny of the government. Dorman and 
others interpret this period as the beginning of political engagement, but, to the extent that groups 
like the Ecumenical Support Services were responding to social justice goals in their 
establishment, this may be too narrow a definition of politics. At any rate, church groups should 
be counted among the key supporters of the 1997 people’s power demonstrations, particularly 
the Ecumenical Support Services, The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe, 
Silveira House (Catholic) and the Methodist Synod (Muzondidya, 2009). The Zimbabwe Women’s 
Resource Centre and Network and the Mutasa Project, concerned with the social and economic 
burden borne by women were two of the organizations also that supported the stayaway 
(Muzondidya, 2009). 
The ZCTU had increased social support for labor action over time starting with a poor 
showing at an anti-ESAP rally in 1992 that was disrupted by police and the launch of its paper 
The Worker in 1993 (Alexander, 2000). A series of labor actions throughout the 1990s led up to 
one of the most successful strikes in Zimbabwean history in 1996 when doctors, teachers, nurses 
and other government employees, involving nearly two thirds of the civil service or 160,000 
workers, won concessions for health workers and marked a renewal of union power (Muzondidya, 
2009, Bond and Manyanya, 2002).  
The mission of the ZCTU is to promote, advance and safeguard the economic, social and 
constitutional freedoms of workers by securing a legal, political, democratic and good governance 
framework in Zimbabwe through strengthening its capacity and independence and those of its 
affiliates (ZCTU, 2010). As such ZCTU served as a rallying point for general dissatisfaction in the 
political realm in the 1990s and moved beyond its specific objectives in supporting workers in 
 146 
their struggle for fair working conditions. Using the normal union strategies to push for change—
strikes, work stayaways and protests—it managed to mobilize citizen energy and gave an outlet 
for expression about politics.   
Morgan Tsvangirai’s emergence as the founding head of the Movement for Democratic 
Change (MDC) in 2000 is, in the story of democratization, taken to be the critical moment in the 
development of the national crisis from the late 1990s. After this, the story moves squarely into 
the competitive realm of party politics. But Tsvangirai’s political role is deeply rooted in the 
particular links among civil society associations and the ZCTU in the 1990s. Still, the narrative 
that tends to prevail is one in which the leadership of Tsvangirai is the key political factor in the 
rise of political opposition. For example, Martin Meredith in his biography on Robert Mugabe 
conveniently equates ZCTU to Tsvangirai, calling it “Tsvangirai’s ZCTU,” (Meredith, 2002) a label 
which collapses the actual workings of both a number of trade unions and workers within the 
ZCTU but also misses the consonance with civil society associations that gave rise to the 
unprecedented power that the ZCTU ended up wielding.   
Conclusion: Withholding Political Authority 
The people’s power protests of 1997 went beyond the expression for worker’s rights to a 
widespread demand for accountability and democratic governance. Because government had 
split with its socialist promises and capitulated to the ESAP, not only did workers suffer a fall in 
real income but they shared a generalized understanding that government was unresponsive to 
their needs, had isolated itself from public debate and their leaders were only out for themselves. 
The track record of political corruption (cronyism and misspending) and a lack of outlets by which 
people could participate in decision making suggested that there was little chance for social and 
economic progress as long as the Zanu government was in place. 
The loss of belief in the legitimate power of Zanu went well beyond labor to church-based 
and human rights groups that also had begun to see the political regime as the major obstacle to 
progress. The ZCTU emerged as a catalyst to people’s power. Workers connected with diverse 
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allies in the universities, student movements, legal sector and urban associations. These groups 
shared a common objective to demand a more accountable order based on openness, rule of law 
and fostering the conditions needed for economic growth.   
Muzondidya concludes that the government’s increasing use of coercion and its lack of 
tolerance for political diversity had not laid the foundations of democracy in the 1990s 
(Muzondidya, 2009). It is interesting, however, to see the strength of mobilization in 1997 and the 
leading role of a variety of activists who had joined in the new struggle as the foundations of 
democracy that had grown up in a context of increasing awareness of the need for rule of law and 
government accountability against the tide of government corruption and patronage. Clearly the 
foundations for democracy must have been considerably stronger than Muzondidya thinks. ZCTU 
had been kept in check until the 90s by Zanu’s attempts to represent workers. But as it learned 
economic growth and expansion of economic justice that could meet the needs and demands of 
workers could not be left in the hands of Zanu, it provided more effective opposition as an 
independent organization. The real decline in wages, the stagnation of the growth in jobs and the 
inconsistent commitment of the government to the issues that drove them were factors, leading 
urban workers to defect from the party.  Zimbabwe’s neo-patrimonial political mechanisms of 
control increasingly became unstable, as they were particularly bad at meeting the diversity of 
objectives of its civil society. This is not a problem that Zanu could solve by throwing more 
resources at the population. Workers and other organizations wanted not just jobs but a 
commitment to expanding those jobs and to democratic rights that would lead to an increasing 
social capacity for political participation.  
But civil society was NOT unanimous in its support of the nationwide strikes. The 
veterans through ZNLWVA, sought their own gains, even though their initial grievance (the 
mismanagement and corruption of the veterans fund) shared much of the same framing in terms 
of government corruption. For the veterans the payment of their reparations represents more than 
a purchase of their loyalty, it returned them to a position of social prominence. This reinvigoration 
of the social sector that most closely resonated with the plans and objectives of the government 
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suggests Zanu was not only aware of its problem with its own civil society but understood the 
necessity of supporting the base closest to its own hegemony in order to coerce a re-imposition of 
its own power.  Of course even Zanu was not monolithic. The Mugabe faction had lost much 
social capital within its own structure. The political alliance with the veterans is not then just a 
strategy to control “external” civil society but a way of purging the party line dissidents who were 
jumping ship. The veterans would prove a sufficient force to divide the opposition, as we move 
beyond the expression of people’s power in withdrawing support for political authority in the next 




CHAPTER SIX: CONSTRUCTING A NEW ORDER - THE NCA 
The struggle to remake the constitution of Zimbabwe emerged concurrently with the people’s 
power demonstrations of 1997. At the behest of the Zimbabwe Council of Churches (ZCC) and 
other groups and activists, the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) was launched in January 
1998 to establish in Zimbabwe “a) a new tolerant, transparent and democratic, legal, political, 
social and economic order and b) a new constitutional framework upon which governance can be 
founded.” The government countered by creating its own constitutional commission that adopted 
the participatory consultation process originally proposed by the founders of the NCA. The 
resulting draft constitution was altered at the last minute to include expanded presidential power 
and the ability to confiscate land without compensation running against the grain of public 
submissions. As an attempt to remake the constitution, and thereby the institutional basis of the 
social contract, the NCA did not succeed. It did, however, succeed in establishing a participatory 
framework for constitution making and in winning the “no” vote in the national referendum on the 
draft constitution. The NCA was also a significant factor in the birth of the Movement for 
Democratic Change, the opposition party that would challenge Zanu’s rule over the next decade. 
 
In 1997, a small group of individuals and organizations came together to debate the 
problem of the constitution. Zimbabwe’s constitution settled at Lancaster House had been 
inherited and originally allowed for temporary measures such as the requirement of parliamentary 
seats for the white settlers. Both Zanu, interested in consolidation of party power and the land 
question, and those concerned about the democratization of the political sphere saw the 
constitution as flawed. By 1997, Zanu had already amended the constitution 15 times.32 With 
several of the amendments came increased party power and a stronger executive presidency.  
The constitution became an area of democratic contestation for many of the same groups 
that backed the ZCTU in the 1997 people’s power demonstrations. The problem as they saw it 
                                                      
32 Brian Kagoro and others cite 17 amendments to the constitution.  Many amendments were 
relatively uncontroversial, such as lowering the age requirement for black senators from 40 to 30 
or renaming Tribal Trust Lands as Communal Lands. But many also seriously altered the political 
terrain, such as increased power of appointment to the head of state over appointment to the 
Judicial Service Commission, Attorney General and Electoral Service Commission (A4 1984) or 
the establishment of an executive presidency with immunity from prosecution (A7 1987). Kagoro, 
B. (2010) Chaos and Transition, Forthcoming. 
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was not merely the power-seeking activities of the political class but the lack of political 
participation, the perceived empty symbols of patriotism and the shared frustration over the 
accomplishment of social and economic objectives that were stymied by political fiat. 
The framers of the initiative that would become the National Constitutional Assembly 
(NCA) were driven by their experiences in pursuing social objectives for labor, marginalized 
groups, victims of human rights abuses, students and women. They pointedly were not joined by 
ZWNLVA (the veterans organization) and many charity or development associations such as 
ORAP participated only on the periphery (ORAP’s work on civic education is discussed in 
Chapter 4).  
Re-making Political Authority 
One of the founders of the NCA was Tawanda Mutasah from the Justice, Peace and 
Reconciliation Department of the Zimbabwe Council of Churches (ZCC). As a passionate activist, 
he had trained election monitors for Students for a Democratic Movement and was involved in 
organizing and political monitoring for ZCC. He was, by 1997, frustrated about the lack of open 
governance:  
For me, I watched as the late minister of justice put forward Amendment 7 that created 
the executive presidency…. The verbal gymnastics were typical. Nobody for instance in 
civil society talked for anything more than 10 minutes about the amendment, which was 
far reaching and nobody talked about it. Within that context we had been trying to build 
civic capacity for engagement in governance (Mutasah, 2010a).  
As he described it, the idea of launching a process that would lead to citizen participation 
in creating a new constitution emerged from a discussion he had one day with his friends 
Deprose Muchena and Brian Kagoro in which they were concerned with the lack of proactive 
political strategies in civil society. “…there was need for a major initiative that would be a rallying 
point for civil society in Zimbabwe given the exigencies in the country then” (Mutasah, 2010b). 
Noticing a Zimbabwean flag that decorated the office, they wondered how it might be possible to 
re-create the hollow symbols of nationalism, like the flag and the constitution, into vital forces for 
democratization.  
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…whatever quarrel anybody had with the way Zanu PF was running the country, 
Zimbabwe was a reality to which we all ought to subordinate ourselves…The country 
belonged to all Zimbabweans, and the people had the right to enter into a new social 
confidence with one another, to give birth to nationhood once again, to reclaim lost public 
space, and to have the platform to say “we the people...” (Mutasah, 2010b). 
Enthused by the idea of engaging people in a democratic initiative around the 
constitution, Mutasah, Kagoro and Muchena began sharing it with others. As Mutasah says the 
idea “snowballed.” As it grew, the initiative garnered support from others within ZCC, ZCTU 
(including Morgan Tsvangirai), Lovemore Madhuku who worked for the Friedrich Ebert 
Foundation that would later provide seed support, CCJPZ, ZimRights and many individuals 
(Mutasah, 2010b).  
Were the initiators of the NCA also well-connected elite? Bond and Manyana argue that 
the drivers of the early constitutional activism were the well-educated middle class of 
professionals (the national bourgeoisie), making them also disconnected from the working and 
unemployed poor, which explains their lack of critique for misguided, neo-liberal economic 
policies (Bond and Manyanya, 2002, p. 92). This meme associating the NCA with middle class 
interests seems to be widespread and runs counter to the idea that it was an authentic 
expression of a cross-class alliance within civil society. It prompts Peter Alexander, for example 
to write about the interests behind the NCA, “One might also be justified in wondering whether, 
perhaps, the anti-Mugabe intelligentsia concluded that, since they could not rely on the middle 
classes as a whole, they needed to work even more closely with the unions” (Alexander, 2000). I 
tend to think that these attitudes evince a post-Marxian disdain for civil society, or anything that is 
not one hundred percent motivated by the workers interests. But it does seem to stretch credulity 
a bit that the church, development, poverty and student activists that came together with lawyers 
and the like had somehow planned to dupe the workers to work with them. While it is true that 
many of the founders were well educated and better off in Zimbabwean terms, they also came 
from the most significant networks advocating on behalf of and working with the marginalized and 
the poor. Far from acting as intermediaries to the pitifully small Zimbabwean capitalist class, they 
had explicit aims to increase the political enfranchisement of all Zimbabweans. The moniker 
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“middle class” is thus both too broad—in the sense that the constitutional activists were interested 
in more than the protection of middle class gains—and too narrow in that it disregards the daily 
and professional links that these supposedly middle class activists maintained across scores of 
social networks.  
The ZCC took the lead in convening other organizations and individuals around the idea 
and, thus, was born a social/political process that would shake the foundations of Zimbabwean 
politics. Working on the constitution gave a positive outlet for reconstructing a social contract that 
promised to channel peoples’ power in a positive direction. The goal was no longer simply the 
removal of the political regime but the creation of a political regime more conducive to the goals 
and aspirations of Zimbabwean civil society. But the motivations were to address the constraints 
on achieving social objectives (overcoming poverty, hunger and disease) around which 
participants were organized: 
…it may be said that the vision was inspired by the community and everyday work of the 
various participating organizations. In this work, they variously realized that, without good 
and democratic governance founded on the firm foundation of a democratic Constitution 
in this country, the multi-pronged, well-meant, efforts to fight poverty, hunger, and 
disease in Zimbabwe would come to naught (Mutasah, 2010b). 
The idea caught on. In a first meeting held on May 20, around 20 civil society 
organizations and concerned individuals met to give shape to the idea (Kagoro, 1999). Many of 
those present would, later in the year, take on significant roles in the demonstrations or serve as 
interlocutors for reporters and others to qualify citizen demands in the strikes discussed in the 
previous chapter, including Tsvangirai of ZCTU and Chimhini of ZimRights, who publicly warned 
of the growing anger before the December 1997 protests ("Date set for mass protest", 1997).   
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Figure 4 – Constitution-related activities of civil society organizations 
In the list above is Mutasah’s analysis of the breadth of constitution-focused activities of 
civil society organizations and individuals before the founding of the NCA. The list is interesting 
for a number of reasons.  For one, it illustrates that the strategy of channeling dissatisfaction in 
the direction of the constitution was built on the experience of human rights and justice-oriented 
objectives. Many involved were lawyers or law professors who had observed that many 
Zimbabweans did not understand the constitution’s important role in limiting political power. 
Another reason the list is interesting is that observers of civil society in Zimbabwe often see the 
late 1990s as hallmark years in which civil society suddenly threw off its excessive caution, rare 
Some Activities of Civil Society Organizations, before the Launch of the National 
Constitutional Assembly – digested from Tawanda Mutasah’s testimony (Mutasah, 2010b) 
• ZimRights was publicizing opinions on the Human Rights situation, and had 
convening seminars about electoral reform 
• Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights had expressed an interest in drafting a 
working outline of good principles of Constitutional practice 
• Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace consistent monitoring of human rights, 
publicizing findings, and carrying out extensive education on Democracy and the 
Rights of citizens.  
• Zimbabwe Women Lawyers Association, the Zimbabwe Women’s Resource 
Centre and Network, the Women’s Action group, WiLDAF, and other women’s 
organizations, were monitoring human rights and working on gender- disaggregated 
analysis and advocating for legal/judicial reform, including monitoring constitutional 
and legal amendments from a women’s rights perspective. 
• Foundation For Democracy in Zimbabwe was contributing to education for 
democracy and working on democratic theory and grassroots political mobilization. 
• Legal Resources Foundation was working on judiciary reform, rule of Law and the 
justiciability of the Human Rights Charter in the National Constitution. 
• The Church/NGO Voter Education National Committee was holding extensive 
Voter Education workshops at the local level and this touched on such issues as 
participation, voter education and democracy-building 
• Ecumenical Support Services was convening seminars on tolerance and 
constitutional comparative analysis 
• The Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions was advocating for good governance 
and accountability, human rights, and grassroots education 
• Zimbabwe Council of Churches was working on improvement of electoral systems 
and institutions, and economic justice. It was in the process of translating the 
Constitution of Zimbabwe into layman’s terms and local language 
• Legal academics, such as Madhuku, Ncube, Makamure and Hlatswayo, and 
political scientists such as John Makumbe, Masipula Sithole and even Jonathan 
Moyo, had written on different facets of the Constitution, issue-specific campaign 
fliers, and constitutional comparative analysis. 
• Parliamentary Reform Committee was engaged then in the much-vaunted 
parliamentary reform project, eliciting opinions from the Zimbabwean public on the 
role of Parliament  
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advocacy and striving for neutrality to take a more political role (Dorman, 2001, Sibanda, 1994). 
While it is certainly true that opposition politics and even political debate were off limits and 
potentially dangerous activities, political engagement was not lacking in many forms including 
monitoring human rights and civic education as the list above demonstrates. Each of the 
organizations involved in the 1997 development of the NCA brought to the work a history of trying 
to improve political institutions and the rule of law that provided valuable experience.  
Founders came together around the constitution for a number of reasons with a shared 
objective to reconstitute the political sphere in an authentic constitution as a voice of the people. 
“In the minds of the founders of the NCA, it was only through a broad-based Constitution making 
process that the people’s wishes could be ascertained. They were mindful also of the fact that the 
supremacy of any Constitution is derived from the fact that it is the word of the people” (Kagoro, 
1999). 
Planning for a civil society-led constitutional process was pursued in a very workman-like 
manner. On May 4, the group held its first technical committee meeting. At the meeting on May 
20th at the Quality International Hotel in Harare it adopted an initiative to create the National 
Constitutional Assembly. The outcome of the meeting of twenty NGOs was a taskforce (that 
included CCJPZ, ZCC, ZCTU, ZimRights and the Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA), the 
Women’s Action Group (WAG), and Zimbabwe Women Lawyers (ZWLA)) and an advisory team 
of seven consultants (Tendai Biti, Everjoyce Win, Prof. Welshman Ncube, Priscilla Misihairambwi, 
Brian Kagoro, and Lupi Mushayakarara) (Kagoro, 1999). On June 11, a taskforce was elected to 
move forward the establishment of the organization (Mutasah, 2010b) . 
Meeting participants wanted to create a constitutional process that would not challenge 
Zanu power directly (as they were aware that this would immediately be squashed) but they also 
wanted to create a structure that would not be dominated by Zanu. As a strategy, they decided to 
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invite Zanu to participate in meetings but agreed that while there should always be “a chair” for 
Zanu at the table, it was as one among many33 (Mutasah, 2010b).  
Given the fear of how Zanu would respond to a civil society-led constitutional initiative, a 
tension emerged between those who wanted to go slow by focusing on constitutional and civic 
education as a more indirect challenge to Zanu and those who felt that the end goal should be 
direct citizen participation in the drafting of a new constitution. As Mutasah explains, the 
constitutional goal was shared by all but the extent to which it should be tackled directly would 
remain a point of contention, even as the group prepared to formally launch the National 
Constitutional Assembly on 31January 1998 (Mutasah, 2010b). In this way, the NCA was created 
with a mandate to advocate for and design a new constitution as well as to engage in civic 
education with an end of raising understanding among both rural and urban Zimbabweans about 
how the government worked and the role of the constitution in shaping this. Its founding 
objectives were to: 
• Initiate and engage in a process of enlightening the general public on the current 
Constitution of Zimbabwe;  
• Identify shortcomings of the current Constitution and to organise debate on 
possible Constitutional Reform;  
• Organise the Constitutional debate in a way which allows a broad based 
participation;  
• Subject the constitution making process in Zimbabwe to popular scrutiny with a 
view to entrenching the principle that constitutions are made by, and for the 
people; and  
• Generally, encourage a culture of popular participation in decision making 
(Kagoro, 1999). 
 
Participants were motivated by a shared belief that Zanu had become the law in 
Zimbabwe through the power wielded by the president instead of the constitution. They saw the 
need to create the unity and clarity of a new social contract. Addressing the source of political 
authority, the constitution, seemed like an ideal strategy.  
                                                      
33 “We would set up a process that included everybody, including every political party, including 
ZANU PF. We would reserve a chair for ZANU PF in the room. If they did not send anybody to sit 
on it, and they claimed from outside that they were being excluded from the process, we would 
point to their empty chair. And it would be for the people, and history, to judge” Mutasah, T. 
(2010b) NCA Testimony. Chaos and Transition. pp. 1-23. 
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For a country that lacks a coherent unifying national agenda, this is an opportunity to 
create one around the constitution-making process (Nyathi, 1999). 
But it was the developing dialogues around democracy and citizen’s rights that emerged 
as an end in the process as much as the hopes of producing an improved constitution. As the 
objectives above show, the NCA founders wanted to prepare Zimbabweans through education, 
discussion and debate to give them a taste that “constitutions are made for and by the people.” In 
comparison to ORAP’s efforts to create an alternative, more democratic space for development, 
within the context of national political realities, the NCA sought to transform the political realities 
themselves. On January 31, 1998, the NCA was launched as an open access, independent NGO 
to 
 work with other similarly minded organizations or individuals in Zimbabwe in establishing 
or striving to establish in Zimbabwe; a) a new tolerant, transparent and democratic, legal, 
political, social and economic order and b) new constitutional framework upon which 
governance can be founded (National Constitutional Assembly, 1997). 
Moving to confrontation: The NCA 
The NCA would not have a honeymoon period to design and create its programs. The 
debate over the need for a new constitution had already taken root within Zanu itself. With 
government protests on the immediate horizon, Masvingo MPs inserted a demand for 
constitutional change at the December 1997 Mutare Biannual Convention. It was not just the 
tardiness of addressing the Lancaster House Constitution that worried them. They were also 
dissatisfied at how Mugabe and his Finance Minister had attempted to manipulate Parliament to 
impose new taxes for the benefit of the veterans as we discussed in the previous chapter ("New 
culture develops in ruling party", 1997, Raftopoulos and Savage, 2004).  
By February 1998, Dzikimayi Mavhaire who had been among the most vocal at the 
December congress introduced a bill to launch an independent constitutional conference. This 
was clearly an attempt to broaden parliamentary powers. Mavhaire said, "This review must focus 
on the executive presidency, especially the matter of the term of office," an unmistakable 
reference to Mugabe’s tenure. He went on, “We parliamentarians seem to be useless. We cannot 
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make a decision in this government. We are just there to give the ruling party the required 
majority number of seats" ("Zimbabweans: Constitution Must Be Re-Written", 1998).  
Protests and strikes continued in the capital throughout the period. In April, thousands of 
students demonstrated in Harare singing songs of solidarity for Mavhaire and calling for Mugabe 
and other Zanu members to step down in protest over the shooting of University of Zimbabwe 
student Morememories Chawira by police ("UZ students take to the streets as court spurns police 
application", 1998). At the end of May, Mavhaire was suspended from Zanu for his constitutional 
advocacy (particularly for saying Mugabe must go) but the pressure for constitutional reform 
would be redoubled as those associated with the NCA continued to make the case for 
constitutional reform (Tulani, 1998, Choto, 1998).  
While the protests were unrelenting, the idea of deposing Mugabe confused some 
Zimbabweans who really could not imagine the country without him. Edwina Spicer nicely 
explores this sentiment in her 1995 documentary on Zimbabwean democracy. As a village 
woman she interviews asserts, “Some of them should go but the father must stay. There should 
be no ideas of trying to remove him. The President must stay” (Spicer, 1995). In order to address 
this prevailing strength of neo-patrimonial politics in which the government is perceived as an 
extension of the family with the “father” demanding respect and obedience, civic education and 
dialogue were seen as necessary to educate citizens on the purpose of government and its 
institutions. Towards this end holding public workshops was one of the main activities of the NCA. 
It created public education materials to explain how the challenge of the constitution related 
directly to the social and economic objectives of Zimbabweans.  
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For example, the cartoon illustration above from a 1999 NCA brochure on citizenship 
shows citizens grappling with governance and corruption issues (“money is wasted on non-
essentials”) in the context of social objectives (food, education, jobs and capabilities) and the 
need for less executive power to enhance political participation. (National Constitutional 
 




Assembly ( NCA), 1999). From 1998 to 2000 the NCA trained over 600 trainers to take these 
messages to the public and started conducting a national series of workshops to inform the 
constitutional dialogue (Dorman, 2003).   
NCA’s strategy of inviting Zanu to a seat at the table and expanding understanding of 
civics expressed a different view of governance that emphasized participation and representation 
as opposed to the Mugabe-the-father hegemony pursued through control and opposition.  
Currently we have an authoritarian constitution with political and economic power in the 
hands of a few, benefiting a minority. Power is used in a negative, dominating way. 
People are subordinate (under the control of others) and politics is based on 
personalities, power struggles and empty promises, resulting in a weak society 
characterized by apathy, dependency and corruption (National Constitutional Assembly 
(NCA), 1999).  
When NCA held its first meeting in the beginning of February 1998, it invited Edson 
Zvobgo, ruling secretary for political affairs to participate. Not only did Zvobgo not respond at first 
or attend the meeting, he soon after announced Zanu’s intention to lead a constitutional review 
itself—an act that would enable Zanu to re-assert its leadership over the constitutional process 
and quiet its critics. Zvobgo is quoted as saying, “It is the government of the day that must lead 
the campaign to review the constitution” ("Zimbabweans: Constitution Must Be Re-Written", 
1998). It is no surprise that Zanu would reject the NCA from the beginning since the independent 
constitutional process it had proposed was a direct incursion into the closed off political world 
Zanu had worked so hard to create.  
Zanu’s response: The Constitutional Commission 
The new interest in re-constituting the nation could be used by Zanu to rebuild its 
authority, a necessity it had realized in the 1997/1998 atmosphere of people’s power. Welshman 
Ncube, a Zimbabwean constitutional scholar characterized Zanu’s position, “Over the years Zanu 
PF has insisted that the Zimbabwean constitution should not limit the exercise of public power, 
but should facilitate its exercise in the service of the people” (Ncube, 1999). While it had 
amended the constitution, Zanu had never launched a full constitutional review and it certainly 
was not going to allow the NCA to take the lead. As Zvobgo said, “How can a few people sit 
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under a tree and claim to be a National Constitutional Assembly. They are neither constitutional 
nor an assembly” (McCandless, 2006). This oft-quoted remark raises the problem of political 
representation, as a central flaw the government would exploit. NCA could not purport to 
represent the Zimbabwean people, but the government could.   
Throughout 1998 and the first months of 1999, a formal process of constitutional review 
was initiated by Mugabe. Taking the steam out of the sails of the NCA meant incorporating its 
participatory approaches but in the context of constitutionally mandated authority to the 
government of the day. “If democracy is to thrive and become a national heritage, then the 
nation's political course to change government or its leadership can only be that of an orderly 
democratic process as prescribed by our constitution" ("Mugabe Calls for Constitutional Reform", 
1998).  
The Zanu politburo is thought to have discussed Zvobgo’s recommendations on how 
Zanu could take back the constitutional issue from the Parliament just before the suspension of 
Mavhaire from the Party in May. Not long after in late June, the party finally became clear on its 
response to the constitutional calls; Mugabe announced at a party central committee meeting his 
support for a Zanu-led constitutional process, by urging interested parties to “certainly have the 
freedom…so that whatever definite and positive issues that emerge are included in a proposed 
document to be put to the people by referendum” ("Mugabe Calls for Constitutional Reform", 
1998).    
Almost a year later, on 21 May 1999, commissioners appointed by Mugabe were sworn 
in to a commission established under the Commission of Inquiry Act (over the opposition of the 
NCA because the Act gave all powers over commissions to the President (Machipisa, 1999). Out 
of 396 commissioners, 150 Zanu MPs and Ministers composed the bulk, with the remaining 
chosen from various sectors of civil society although many had direct ties with the party (Dorman, 
2003).34 While the Commission was, thus, dominated by Zanu, its inclusion of commissioners 
                                                      
34 Dorman quotes Margaret Dongo from a Herald Article’s point that 'three-quarters are the ruling 
party's politburo, central committee members, provincial chairpersons, and so-called indigenous 
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identified with the broader civil society provided some support for its claims of being independent 
of the party. With a mandate to seek the broad participation of Zimbabwean society, the 
commission represented a very new governmental approach, in fact the very one the NCA had 
been calling for with the critical exception, of course, that the commission was not truly 
independent.   
How to relate with the new Commission, a mirror image of its own approach, was a 
difficult challenge for the NCA. NCA’s complaints that the government could subvert the process 
for its own ends were derided by government officials and interestingly countered with a call on 
the norms of the international community, as Paul Themba Nyathi describes,  
Minister Zvobgo's response is that this is a special commission whose importance would 
be guaranteed by the interests of the international community. The reasoning is that the 
president would dare not defy international opinion - ha! ha! ha! Nothing more need be 
said” (Nyathi, 1999).  
 
The Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) is born 
In at least one way, it appeared the NCA had won in the political game of pressure and 
compromise. Zanu, which had never produced much constitutional debate in Parliament, never 
mind civil society, had embraced its participatory/democratic principles. Building on the growing 
social consensus for these principles, around the same time, discussions were underway to 
launch a new political party that would champion this cause directly.  
In June, Tsvangirai announced preparations for the Movement for Democratic Change 
that would build on the democratic fervor emerging from the people’s power demonstrations and 
the constitutional engagement of the NCA and civil society (Sayagues, 2000a). The new party set 
itself the ambitious goal of contesting national elections in 2000. Tsvangirai and others from the 
NCA and its member organizations, particularly the ZCTU would take on leadership roles in the 
new party, trading in their positions in civil society organizations to compete directly for political 
                                                      
business persons aligned to the party Dorman, S. R. (2003) 'NGOs and the constitutional debate 
in Zimbabwe: from inclusion to exclusion', Journal of Southern African Studies, 29(4), 845-63.  
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power. As Tsvangirai remarked at the time "You don't form a political party to remain in the 
opposition" ("Tsvangarai ready to take on Mugabe Alliance with Zapu 2000 possible", 2000). 
The MDC would become the first viable opposition in Zimbabwe since the merger of 
Zapu in the unity talks in 1987.35 With this event the challenge from civil society to Zanu began to 
crystallize and narrow, moving from the diverse realm of civil society’s social objectives to the 
single dimension of capturing the right to set the political agenda. MDC set its sights on a rural 
strategy, knowing that its support was good in the urban areas. By November it launched a rural 
outreach program, in Tsvangirai’s words,  
"It was gratifying to see all that support and feedback we got from the Zimbabwean people in the 
towns and cities, and what we need to do now is to complete the process of taking the party to the 
grassroots, make it national and ensure that no-one is left out" (Viriri, 1999b).  
For some of the members of the NCA, the formation of the MDC was one of the answers 
they sought as they could now challenge Zanu directly on the battlefield of politics.  
Finally, the end of Zanu’s authority, or is it? 
The NCA was experiencing its own divisions. Some NCA members, such as Ben 
Hlatshwayo and Lupi Mushayakarara accepted invitations to join the Constitutional 
Commission,36 believing they could accomplish more from within the government-initiated 
process than by continuing with the NCA. For one thing, the appointment of the credible Justice 
Godfrey Chidyausiku as chair, they felt, would provide some protections against political 
interference (Shoko, 1999). A public debate about the NCA’s relevancy ensued. Hlatshwayo, a 
law professor and commissioner, suggested that NCA was being pigheaded to press for a perfect 
                                                      
35 Actually the MDC’s pursuit of opening up the political space followed some of the same script 
its predecessor opposition parties. such as the Zimbabwe Unity Movement, particularly the battle 
against the one-party state and authoritarian over reach, but the ability to hear and the 
commitment to act on this message had been mobilized to a much greater extent by the people’s 
power demonstrations and stayaway. 
36 Mushayakarara stepped down from the Commission several months later over her concerns 
that it would merely be another mechanism for consolidating Mugabe’s power, “Zanu-PF may well 
produce a constitution which appears to address the concerns of the people, but its main concern 
is power. Unless there's a miracle, Zanu is assured of remaining in office after next year's 
elections "Zimbabwe Constitution: Just a piece of paper?". BBC, 19 November 1999. 
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constitutional process, when it had succeeded in getting government to adopt many of its 
principles. Singing the praises of the Commission’s process and stressing his belief that the NCA 
should not conduct a “parallel” constitutional process but should monitor the official one, 
Hlatshwayo wrote,   
History, accident, fortune or misfortune has given [the NCA] the specific role of "critical 
monitor" of the national process currently underway, and the NCA should now start 
playing this role consciously, deliberately and, consequently, responsibly. Our dear 
"friends" should start by unveiling their own constitutional blueprint that they claim to have 
been crafting over the last three years” (Hlatshwayo, 1999).  
Rather than boycott the process, which was the NCA’s official position, it should, he 
reasoned, monitor and follow the official process. In fact, it looked like Zanu had gained the upper 
hand. By adopting not just the objective of writing a new constitution but pursuing the broad, 
participatory process the NCA had originally outlined, it divided the independent critical positions 
(with many seeing this as a practical path to a new constitution) and silenced many of its 
opponents by co-opting them on to its Commission.  
Zanu apparently had two unsurprising goals for the constitution in mind. First it wanted to 
secure its political control by strengthening presidential powers (Muleya, 1998) and second, it 
wanted to take away constitutional limits to land reform, thus freeing up its ability to nationalize 
farms owned by the white settlers and their predecessors.37 The goal of moving forward more 
radical land redistribution seemed self-serving and insufficient. As Mike Auret of the CCJPZ told 
the Financial Times, “"Race and land are the two arrows left in the Zanu-PF quiver. They have 
nothing else left to offer the people."(Mallett, 1999) The power left in the unfulfilled revolutionary 
goals around the restoration of land to the original African owners was probably not taken as 
seriously as it deserved by many. As we saw in the last chapter, some veterans embraced it 
                                                      
37 Zanu had been working on its land agenda consistently since Mugabe announced 1700+ listed 
farms to be reallocated in 1997. The land was clearly the issue over which he believed the party 
would regain its legitimacy. In the run-off to the yes/no vote on the constitution Justice Minister 
Emmerson Mnangagwa told voters they would be more likely to receive land if they voted yes on 
the draft constitution because it would remove the guarantees over compensation in the old 
constitution. Cauvin, H. E. "Zimbabwe Constitution Vote is a Showdown for Mugabe." New York 
Times, 12 February 2000. 
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along with a group that has largely been called “unemployed youth” and which deserves further 
study itself.  
By articulating much of the NCA language and goals of broad citizen participation, Zanu 
trumped the NCA with its own constitutional process. Still, NCA maintained an independent 
position in the process that made it a clear voice of criticism within civil society—and it was 
regularly called on to interpret events by the independent media even though it was ignored by 
the state press. At its people’s constitutional convention held in Chitungwiza in June 1999, NCA 
members supported making minimal changes to the Constitution before the 2000 election but 
endorsed “the alternative process under the NCA and that that alternative process was the only 
other process on constitutional reform apart from the Chidyausiku Commission [the Constitutional 
Commission]” ("NCA Remains Only Hope for a People-Driven Constitution", 1999). 
In fact, it began to look like the Commission would disprove the NCA’s criticisms by 
actually conducting an open, consultative process. Commissioners covered the country in 1999, 
calling public meetings38 and receiving public comments the Commission claimed to reach over 
one million Zimbabweans (Shoko, 1999). Responding to the worry that Mugabe could simply 
ignore the emerging picture of the public will which included reducing the power of the presidency 
and limiting its term, Jonathan Moyo said, "Because this has been such a public process, it's 
difficult to imagine that once it goes to the president, suddenly things will start disappearing" 
("Zimbabwe Constitution: Just a piece of paper?", 1999). But that is exactly what happened. 
In October the Commission met to review reports on consultations from across the 
country. The reports made it clear that Zimbabweans wanted a more limited government and one 
that was subject to the same laws as they were, some examples from the reports: 
• People in Manicaland overwhelming subscribe to the idea of limiting the 
president’s terms to two to five years. 
Manicaland  
 
                                                      
38 Approximately 5000 meetings are held in Zimbabwe, South Africa, Britain and the United 
States from August 16. MMPZ, (Media Monitoring Project Zimbabwe), (2000) A Question of 
Balance: The Zimbabwean media and the constitutional reform. 
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• There should be no immunity from prosecution for the head of state. He or she 
should be arraigned for trial during his or her tenure. No one should be above the 
law and the head of state should be treated like any other citizen.  
Mashonaland West 
 
• The office bearer must have a solid financial base to minimise embezzlement, 
greed and acquisitive tendencies, and avoid use of political office for acquiring 
wealth. 
Midlands Province (Shoko, 1999) 
 
Public submissions from organizations were to follow; the NCA, which was boycotting the 
process, of course, made no submission. Zvobgo, who presented on behalf of Zanu started by 
asserting that Zanu represented five-million card-bearing members, that is, more than five times 
the one million who had been interviewed by the Commission. Even on its own Commission Zanu 
felt the need to fight its opponents for its authority to represent Zimbabweans. Furthermore 
Zvobgo went on for one hour, ignoring the 20-minute time limit, because he felt Zanu constituents 
deserved to hear the full explanation of its policies. Predictably, Zanu, far from heeding the calls 
for more limited government wanted to strengthen the executive presidency and set term limits at 
two consecutive terms of six years, which made it clear that it had ignored the comments from the 
draft reports. Zvobgo summed up his attitude toward the event, “It would have been silly not to 
allow the party that runs the country to state its vision on the constitution...other parties have a 
right to be heard as well but to think that they are equal to Zanu PF is completely irrational” 
(Shoko, 1999). 
At the end of November, the original draft of the Commission’s constitution apparently 
reflected much of the public call for a more limited government, including a provision for a 
ceremonial presidency and term limits that could force Mugabe to resign before the national 
elections planned for April 2000. Despite the dominance of Zanu members in the Commission 
and the boycott of the NCA, the draft reflected the general submissions made in favor of a more 
limited government, at least in two key areas, limits on presidential terms and no extraordinary 
provisions for land reform ("Catholics Denounce Mugabe Constitution", 1999). Those who had 
participated in the process demonstrated their optimism and felt vindicated. But this was to be 
short-lived.   
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Mugabe’s aides allegedly altered the draft at the eleventh hour and returned a version 
that was consistent with Zanu’s own submission.39 Far from limiting Mugabe and Zanu’s powers, 
the new draft expanded executive power and wrote in the absolute power of government to 
repatriate land without compensation, despite that this was unpopular—of the 52 percent of 
people surveyed by the Commission who supported land repatriation, only 30 percent favored 
doing so without compensation (Shaw, 2003). The outcry was immediate and went well beyond 
the NCA; for example, the Catholic Bishop Patrick Mutume (also the head of the Catholic 
Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe) called the draft “fundamentally flawed” and 
“simply dangerous” ("Catholics Denounce Mugabe Constitution", 1999). In the month, 22 
members of the Commission resigned in protest over the changes to the draft (Shaw, 2000). By 
January 2000, any remaining optimism over the process among the NCA and its supporters had 
evaporated, while the government went on the offensive to promote the draft.   
In the run up to the polls in 2000 for a historic yes or no vote on the draft constitution, the 
stakes had grown enormous. While the level of new civic awareness is hard to measure, it began 
to be clearer to everyone that the new constitution did not represent the views of the majority. 
Musician Thomas Mapfumo, strongly supportive of the Chimurenga struggle for independence 
but increasingly a critic of Zanu, challenged the idea that Zanu had a privileged claim to the 
legacy of the struggle, "If the people say no during the referendum, then the leaders have to 
                                                      
39 I have not found a clear admission of responsibility on how the draft was changed. But, 
certainly this was the perception…. “But the day it was to have been finalised, commissioners 
discovered Mugabe's senior aides had secretly altered the draft to preserve his powers and the 
dominance of the ruling party” "Catholics Denounce Mugabe Constitution." South African Press 
Association, 14 December 1999.... “Top officials of the ruling party of President Robert Mugabe 
have been accused of tampering with the draft constitution to favor the ruling elite. The proposals 
are to be put to voters for approval at a referendum next month” Shaw, A. "New Zimbabwe 
constitution fair, says state panel, but doubts linger." Associated Press Worldstream, 7 January 
2000. Changes published in the Government Gazette were termed Corrections and Clarifications 
and included the introduction of compulsory military service, prohibition on same sex marriages 
along with provisions for the confiscation of land without compensation Hatchford, J. (2001) 
'Lessons on Constitution-Making From Zimbabwe', Journal of African Law, 2(45), 1-7. 
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accept that and take this whole thing back to the drawing board. Only then can the wishes of the 
people be accommodated" (Viriri, 1999a).  
Whether or not Mugabe’s team had altered the draft constitution turned out to be 
immaterial, he had the right to present whatever draft document he wanted to the people for 
referendum (Hatchford, 2001). This was confirmed by the high court in a challenge brought by 
two former Commissioners Lupi Mushayakarara and Obey Mudzingwa ("Zimbabwe's Constitution 
Vote", 2000, MMPZ, 2000),  
[The President] is not, in my view, required to put before the voters a constitution 
approved by the Constitutional Commission. He is entitled to put forward any draft 
constitution he so wishes to ascertain the views of the voters. It may or may not be 
considered unwise to make changes to a document produced by a body specifically set 
up to produce a draft constitution, but it is certainly not unlawful (Hatchford, 2001). 
Zanu had never “lost” an election and it could be relatively confident of this one. It 
saturated the airwaves with advertisements in favor of the constitution and even broadcast six 55-
minute documentaries on the Constitutional Commission (MMPZ, 2000). The NCA had already 
announced its intentions to oppose the constitution on principle but the shenanigans with the last 
minute changes invigorated its opposition. State-owned media, of course, closed itself off to 
advertisements for a “No” vote defending its decision by calling the material offensive and 
unbalanced (Hartnack, 2000). Barred from expressing their views in all but the independent 
press, NCA members took to the streets. They were aided by white, commercial farmers in the 
rural areas who printed pamphlets and t-shirts (Raftopoulos, 2009), which would be yet another 
social fact to be used as proof for Zanu’s charges that the white settlers had risen up against 
Zimbabweans. Still NCA recruited and trained monitors to go to the polls and a grassroots swell 
was underway. The government appeared confident during the whole period. Having never lost 
an election, it had put its faith in its formula of unchallengeable rural hegemony and its control of 
electoral systems but also launched a nation-wide publicity campaign as insurance (Hatchford, 
2001).  
As such, the euphoria that suffused many Zimbabweans when the “no” vote prevailed at 
the polls on February 12 and 13, 2000 was less over the averted disaster of the new constitution 
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than it was about the first taste of success in limiting Zanu power. With only a 20 percent voter 
turn (about a million and a half people out of a population of 6 million), the constitution had lost 
out by 54 percent and margins closer to 80 percent in the major urban centers (McCandless, 
2006). But the most important victory was the vindication of the NCA’s contention that democracy 
could work in Zimbabwe. As a “key informant” is reported by McCandless:  
The “No” vote empowered people to know that the decision is in their hands. How much 
power the electorate has defines their role in terms of the political and social activities of 
the country. The electorate is not more important than the ruler. The “No vote changed 
the thinking of ordinary Zimbabweans—who they are in relation to the Constitution. 
People realized they can vote ZANU in and out of power. This led to success in the 
Parliament. It was a process of testing politics” (McCandless, 2006).  
Lovemore Madhuku, a constitutional lawyer and member of the NCA wrote the meaning 
of the “No” vote was a repudiation of the Lancaster House constitution as amended, the partisan 
constitution-making process, the flawed constitutional draft that goes against the will of the people 
and an expression of the desire for a real constitution-making process,  
The Lancaster House Constitution can only remain the constitution of the country for as 
long as it is necessary for Zimbabweans to author a new, genuinely democratic 
constitution. For us in the NCA, there is no question of the Lancaster House Constitution 
remaining our constitution for longer than is necessary for Zimbabweans to produce a 
genuinely "homegrown" constitution (Madhuku, 2000). 
In the case of ORAP, a democratic culture of empowerment had been the goal, more or 
less by ignoring the restrictive aspects of the government agenda. The peoples’ power protests of 
1997 leading into 1998 demanded the end to unresponsive and corrupt government action. 
People withdrew from the social contract by refusing to work, but while there were calls for the 
President to step down, the protests did not bring down the government. Now, for the first time, in 
the Constitutional referendum, civil society had shown its capacity to directly deny Zanu the 
authority it sought through a No vote.  
Grasping Defeat from Victory 
If the nationwide strikes and protests that began in 1997 represented civil society’s broad 
opposition to Zanu’s unlimited authority and not just against the specific proposed veterans taxes, 
the rejection of the draft constitution was a positive statement that the people expected 
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government not just to create participation in name but to respect and abide by its outcomes.  
Until this point, resistance had not resulted in such a clear message.   
Put differently, we all felt that, though we were “a group of people sitting under a tree”, we 
had all–as women, youth, churches, workers, etc–over the years, in the organizations 
whence we came, done sufficient work to justify the confidence that there was a clear 
civil society mandate to initiate this process (Mutasah, 2010b). 
However, not even this victory was enough. While Mugabe had to accept the people’s will 
in the constitutional process because he had agreed to submit to the polls, he did not view the 
lack of a new constitution as a real check on government power. By July, he passed 
Constitutional Amendment 16A that gave the government the right to expropriate land without 
compensation, for which Britain, as the perpetrator of the colonial theft, was required to assume 
responsibility. The wording returns to the struggle against others who bear the responsibility for 
imperfect Zimbabwean independence: 
• under colonial domination the people of Zimbabwe were unjustifiably 
dispossessed of their land and other resources without compensation; 
• the people consequently took up arms in order to regain their land and political 
sovereignty, and this ultimately resulted in the Independence of Zimbabwe in 
1980; 
• the people of Zimbabwe must be enabled to assert their rights and regain 
ownership of their land…. (Hellum and Derman, 2004) underlining added 
 
While the legal justifications for land expropriation were prepared, the continuing 
revolution was being reasserted by a return to guerilla tactics and with the help of Mugabe’s 
social army, the veterans. Finally, the party could return to its revolutionary roots. And the 
veterans, the original national heroes, would take the lead.  Immediately after the constitutional 
vote, veterans started moving on to white settler owned farms, beginning with the invasion of 
Yotham Farm in Masvingo on February 12 and 13, to protest the outcome of the vote on the 
Constitution (Machipisa, 2000). The number of invasions snowballed and by March 9, over 300 
farms were occupied, with one veteran, Reason Mukapira making clear the revolutionary 
importance of their actions, "We will not be pushed out from here. We have fought for this land 
before and, if it means we have to lay our lives for it again, so be it" (Mutsakani, 2000). Farm 
invasions and squatting activities were not an unusual form of protest in the past, given both the 
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desire for expedited land reform and the fragility of protections for white ownership. These 
invasions, however, were different from the beginning.   
For one thing, veteran land activists felt strongly that the Constitutional vote closed off the 
path to land justice. The constitution would have empowered the Zanu government to take back 
the land by fiat, permanently ending the willing seller/willing buyer principle40 that had premised 
land reform on the gradual buy-out of the settlers. The centrality of commercial agriculture to 
national income was also a problem because it added a systemic economic incentive against 
ever taking radical action that could damage economic infrastructure. ZWNLVA issued a press 
release clarifying that it saw land as the central, revolutionary issue of the constitution and, 
ominously, that it would take steps to regain its lost power: 
The main factor we see as to the NO result is the weakness of the contributing Party's 
provincial structures, the reluctant mood, the failure to change with the times.... [T]his 
weakness of the structure has watered down our revolutionary aspiration and has 
proved beyond doubt the decay within us and that necessary and immediate steps 
should be taken to unify all revolutionary groupings of ZANU(PF) and consolidate the 
pillars upon which our support and power rests (Dorman, 2003). Emphasis added. 
The land invasions in 2000 quickly became widespread and violent both against the 
owners and farm workers who sought to protect their jobs.  In the beginning, the government 
appeared to take a neutral position in the invasions, as Police Spokesman Wayne Bvudzijena told 
reporters, "The police are just advising the veterans to move out of the farms, and for the time 
being some have already started leaving the farms" (Mutsakani, 2000). But it quickly became 
evident that the invaders were lockstep with the ruling party against the upstart MDC’s challenge 
for political power. Unemployed youth identifying themselves as Zanu mixed with the veterans 
and formed gangs that were intent on persecuting and accusing farm workers and others of 
participation in the MDC. Around the invaded farms, discovery or even suspicion of MDC 
membership was tantamount to a justification for beatings, loss of property, arson and many other 
                                                      
40 The 1992 Land Acquisition Act sought to gain land from white farmers on a “willing seller, 
willing buyer basis.” This principle was drawn from the Bill of Rights that was included with the 
Lancaster House Constitution.  Moyo, S. and Skalness, T. (1990) 'Land Reform and Development 
Strategy in Zimbabwe: State Autonomy, Class and Agrarian Lobby', Afrika Focus, 6(3-4), 201-42. 
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acts, which served to reinforce allegiance to Zanu, even if they were not centrally coordinated 
acts. For example, Simon Dube, a communal farmer from Mbembesi reports: 
So I can tell you, it was soon after the arrival of the war vets that this whole noise started. 
The war vets went around telling people they don’t want MDC supporters in the area, In 
fact, at that time, I didn’t know anything about MDC, until they started talking about it 
(Staunton, 2009). 
The resulting violent chaos and anarchy served as a reinvigoration of the Zanu 
revolution. Party loyalists even christened it as the “third Chimurenga” in which Zanu would set 
out to eradicate the new opposition in the social sphere, which was a sheep in the wolf’s clothing 
of the colonial aggressor. As Mugabe addressed a crowd of 2000 people at the party congress in 
Chinhoyi under the slogan, chave chimurenga (loosely translated “it is now war”), “Leave us alone 
to run our affairs. We don’t interfere in the affairs of Britain, and no one should interfere in our 
affairs” (Norman, 2004). With the reinvigorated revolution, Zanu’s propaganda resurrected 
revolutionary symbols and patriotic history.  It authored a history manual called the Third 
Chimurenga and commissioned patriotic, anti-imperial music for the Zimbabwean Broadcasting 
Corporation including songs called Chave Chimurenga, Hondo ye Minda (the struggle for land) 
and Zimbabwe ndeyeropa (Zimbabwe came through bloodshed) (Chiumbu, 2004).  
Land hunger and the chance for revenge against the enemies who stood in the way of 
the revolution (largely the white Zimbabweans and those who had strayed from loyalty to its 
ideals) brought Zanu party members and the veterans back in line, so that Zanu could keep an 
arms length as the veterans reminded the population of who was in control. Beatings, intimidation 
and torture all escalated in the run-up to the national elections in the context of waves of farm 
occupations.41 Violence was part of Zanu’s social message and, a consistent tactic employed in 
                                                      
41 There are many reported incidences. This report of Mashimba Jeremani who endured torture at 
a site called the Texas Ranch only to discover that his torturer was also his poll agent is 
illustrative of the raw, political violence that had been unleashed: “Jeremani (22) and two other 
opposition supporters were allegedly kidnapped on May 31 by Zanu-PF militia and taken to the 
notorious Texas Ranch, a farm occupied by war veterans and used as an operations centre. 
There they were tortured for two days. One of the three, Simbarashe Muchenwa, was later 
hospitalised in Harare in a critical condition. The torturers had held him over burning coals, forced 
him on to a raging fire and dropped melting plastic over his body” Sayagues, M. "The terror that 
racked Zimbabwe's poll." Mail and Guardian, 30 June 2000b. 
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elections and perfected during the Gukurahundi, the direct repression is important because it 
made clear that Zanu’s government was in the game to win, at all costs committed to fighting off 
all enemies as now conveniently epitomized by the MDC.  In a sense, the violence was one of the 
best underground recruiting tools for the MDC. As Simon Dube who had never heard of MDC, 
quoted above, reports his conversion to the MDC: 
So, when they beat me up for the second time, then I joined this new party. First I went to 
hospital and I was treated and I was helped. Then I went back to settle down at home. 
Then I decided let me join this party. I am now an MDC supporter but it’s my secret 
(Staunton, 2009, p 218). 
The NCA coming off of its win against the constitution would continue and is still in 
existence today promoting an alternative constitutional process for the country, but it has lost the 
energy and creativity that marked its early days. A 2005 evaluation conducted on behalf of the 
Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) by Cephas Lumina cites the uncertainty over 
membership and the over-identification with its board chair, a haunting charge for an organization 
focused on promoting democracy (Lumina, 2009). 
We have seen with ORAP and the ZCTU, that one of the main problems of umbrella 
groups was their difficulty in enumerating and counting members, which points to a chronic 
weakness of civil society organizations to account for their members. This can be explained by 
their equally important need to protect and provide refuge as we have seen that membership 
outside of the party creates suspicion and comes with the danger of violence against person and 
property.  
The new NCA sought in the period leading up to the constitutional referendum to be 
inclusive in its processes and, thus, to be able to produce a draft constitution that would be vetted 
by and discussed with a broad base of Zimbabwean civil society. But it would also suffer from the 
same vagueness around membership that afflicted many organizations including political parties. 
The report bluntly criticizes the lack of membership accounting and the tight identification with 
and control that the chairman exerts over the organization. A picture emerges of an organization 
that has continued the activities of civic education for the constitutional process without the critical 
resonance with civil society that marked its initiation.  
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As many institutions, both commercial and non-profit have disappeared in the wave of 
economic misery that culminated in 2008 with the final abandonment of the national currency, the 
continued existence of the NCA is a testimony to the relevance of its stalled mission. Yet, it is 
also a memorial to the promise of the people power from which it sprang.  It is like an institution in 
stasis that awaits the next opening of civil society. 
Conclusion: Still Waiting for a Constitution 
In 2012, Zimbabwe is still without a constitution although Zanu is pressing for rapid 
agreement on a new constitution or for the MDC to agree on holding elections without it, as a new 
constitution is one of the conditions for elections to end a makeshift unity government with the 
MDC. The enthusiasm around the NCA was fueled by the context of anger and dissatisfaction 
with the political regime, even though its origins began before the December 1997 
demonstrations. The founders saw it as a way to channel frustration in a constructive direction 
that could re-create the political regime from the ground up.  
The interest in the constitution shows the awareness within civil society that the 
agreement between government and its citizens needed to be re-constructed. This is born out by 
the focus on civic education and dialogue that would connect people to a process of constitution 
building. The NCA was emerging as an effort to create a bridge to political ideas, purposely not 
contesting party politics directly while attempting to get at the constitutional causes behind 
political corruption and malfeasance, namely a formal constitution and informal constitutional 
culture that enabled the political class to be sheltered from the demands of its own civil society.  
The NCA was built on lessons learned by a broad coalition organized around labor, 
church, human rights, and economic and political objectives. Each of these groups came to the 
table because they had come to believe that the Zanu government was one of the main 
impediments that stood in the way of realizing progress against their objectives and had begun to 
see the problem as the corruption of the party and its practice of squelching public participation in 
its policies. The balance of strategies between the promotion of civic education and dialogue 
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around the constitution and the work to construct a new constitution demonstrates a commitment 
not just to the introduction of a new and better social contract but to a process to engage as many 
stakeholders as possible and arrive at a better end by incorporating the diverse perspectives of 
the governed. The experience of the NCA shows that the ultimate success of civil society to 
recreate the constitutional order was weakened by: 
1) The contradiction of representation 
Simply put the creation and execution of a new social order required that the two 
legitimate parties come to the table.  While the NCA, certainly counted on a broad base 
of support, it lacked the organizational capacity and the legitimacy to engage all 
stakeholders of a new constitutional order in the process. Despite the idealism of the 
founders, it is not clear that an NCA success in drafting and submitting a constitution 
could have been legitimate enough to be put to the people.  
On the other hand, the government could not have carried out its own 
constitutional process in the manner it did without recourse to the ideas and processes 
pioneered by the NCA. Furthermore, the NCA’s civic education efforts and watchdog role 
over the government-led process provided important pressure for a more democratic 
vision and was informed by members that were engaged in on-going civic education 
efforts.  
2) Divided Civil Society 
The revolutionary struggle against the colonial forces that enslaved Zimbabwean 
society had not been won and was not as anachronistic as many believed. The veterans 
had demonstrated that the main problem with the government was that it had become 
self-serving and counter-productive to the revolutionary goals that should have resulted in 
the retaking of Zimbabwean resources and customs.  In this way, the intensification of 
occupations directly after the constitutional defeat was a vote for an alternative 
constitutional order in which the largely economic remnants of colonial structure would be 
eradicated along with the perceived un-African imports such as homosexuality and 
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universal human rights (that protected settler property). While the veterans and their 
supporters also saw the government as the problem, it was its abysmal track record on 
delivering results in this revolutionary battle that motivated them.  
3) The Dependency Conundrum 
The NCA and the government were interdependent on each other throughout the 
constitutional process. In order to carry out its objectives, the NCA required more than 
the minimal conditions of the rule of law and the enabling institutional framework—
registration, oversight, funding, etc. that are necessary for associative action—it needed 
to be able to access a large constituency and carry out a broad social dialogue, all of 
which were both directly restricted by the government through limiting its access to media 
(concurrently persecuting private media channels and disciplining groups like ORAP that 
could have facilitated its access) and challenged by the creation of a parallel 
constitutional process that was enabled to better accomplish the NCA’s objectives.  
Likewise the government relied on the NCA not only to elucidate the participatory 
conditions that would legitimate its process but also to promote the passage of the 
results, a condition that it ignored to its own detriment in the end.   
Zanu’s adoption of the same approaches, albeit with an apparently predetermined end, 
demonstrates not only the co-option of the NCA constitutional process by making it a redundant, 
non-representative (because not elected) effort but its recognition of the power it thought it would 
regain by harnessing the justice creating values and social objectives of civil society. 
The resounding “no” vote was a shock to Zanu because it did not recognize the limits to 
which it could control and dominate the political dialogue. The referendum was the first time it lost 
in a national election and it demonstrated Zanu did not have an iron hold on Zimbabwean civil 
society. Bruised and battered, it would, thus, return to its hegemonic base and withdraw its 
support for anyone who did not clearly identify with the party base. By exploiting the veterans, it 
shored up its own hegemonic power by widening an inner gulf dividing groups arranged around 
valid social objectives within civil society. Its exertion of hegemonic power through the “passive” 
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employment of violence and terror in the land takeovers and persecution of MDC members threw 
society into an orderly chaos. Combined with the removal of support from all other elements of 
civil society, Zanu succeeded in weakening the capacity of civil society organizations to mobilize 
people’s power against it. But it also interrupted the decade-long process of debate and action 
that had resulted in a consensus for increasing democratic accountability and participation.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN: PEOPLE’S POWER…PSSST, A PROCESS  
In terms of completely dismantling the political regime in Zimbabwe, civil society clearly failed. 
Without the cooperation of the veterans, the people’s power revolution and attempts to recreate 
the social contract that followed left an exploitable loophole for the use of social power to keep 
the political regime alive. Furthermore, the launch of another political party to contend with Zanu 
in the one-party state it had created brought the struggle over the social contract back to the 
environment that Zanu controlled. This story of the struggle between civil society and the state 
points to three civil society strategies to counter political power: 1) constructing political 
alternatives within the existing regime, 2) mass withdrawal of support from the authority of the 
regime and 3) reconstruction of the social contract. Despite the terrible destruction of social and 
economic fabric of the country by the political struggle of the 2000s, the transformative process of 
people’s power offers a glimmer of hope for the future of the country.  
 
In 2010 on a research visit to Zimbabwe, I was worried I might have trouble. I had heard 
rumors about the government turning away researchers and persecuting Zimbabweans who 
make contact with them. My worries turned out to have been unfounded. I soared easily through 
customs and found that I was welcomed with courtesy and warmth.   
Amidst decayed infrastructure and traumatized people, real life continued; I attended a 
wedding with all the trappings--dancing, nice clothes and ceremony. I found time to go to my old 
favorite places, like an art workshop and the craft vendors in front of the Bulawayo City Hall who 
sell the beautiful breadbaskets and woodwork made throughout the region. But the absence of 
government services was visible everywhere I looked. The end to trash removal in the suburbs of 
Bulawayo where I stayed had left dark scars in the spaces where people burn their trash, 
conversations focused on mysterious and sometimes outrageously imaginative bills from the 
public utilities, and getting around was a challenge of navigating dilapidated sidewalks brimming 
with people or negotiating a thumbnail of space on public transit. The white population, which was 
once quite noticeable even if it did seem separate and aloof, was mostly but not entirely gone. A 
friend and I passed a nursing home that had been used by white seniors; “the only ones who are 
still here,” she remarked, “are those who had no family or no way of getting out.” But some white 
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Zimbabweans were certainly still there; I caught glimpses of their faces shielded behind tinted 
windshields or stoically shopping in the supermarkets now brimming with goods from South 
Africa.  
On the bus from Bulawayo to Harare, we passed endless fires burning in the bush, some 
of which was once active farms. I thought, perhaps, the fires got out of hand from local trash 
disposers. “Not so,” said an officer of an environmental NGO with whom I met in Harare, “people 
set the fires purposely to catch animals for food.” With the loss of farm jobs, he told me, many 
rural families have taken to hunting. He also told me that the discovery of diamonds could help 
these people, if all the income did not simply disappear into the black hole of the government. 
Later, I met with a friend who said she was working with small groups of village women who 
wanted to mine these diamonds for the benefits of their communities. In the same conversation, 
we talked about the Zanu’s desire to hold elections as soon as possible, apparently confident that 
the time for the Unity Government (a temporary political marriage between Zanu and the MDC 
meant to calm tensions since 2008) was at an end. “We are tired of politics and elections,” she 
told me, “please let there be no elections.”  
The stark realities of a world of diminished political authority are grim, perhaps not as 
definitive as the nasty, brutish and short alternative that Hobbes suggested but certainly as the 
conditions disintegrate, the breakdown in social and economic infrastructure becomes as much a 
tragedy as the political violence and turmoil. This is politics as a train wreck, nobody chooses it 
and rationally everyone seeks to avoid it.  
The breakdown, as explored in the last chapters, was accompanied by the dissonance 
between the political regime and the social objectives of its citizens who in trying to build 
democracy, human rights and accountable government no longer believed that the regime 
constituted by Zanu and Mugabe and developed from the schema of an inherited constitution 
could serve the people. Zanu’s insistence on maintaining a monopoly on government and 
continuing the pursuit of its revolutionary goals by eradicating internal and external enemies for 
many became the repressive force to be opposed.  
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Zanu’s revolutionary objectives, particularly repatriation of land and black empowerment, 
had power to the extent that people both believed Zanu was actually pursuing them and were 
willing to make sacrifices for this greater good. In 1997 only the veterans, unemployed youth and 
others for whom Independence requires return of the land to the hands of the authentic African 
owners were enthusiastic about this agenda. In the years after the constitutional referendum, their 
willingness to force others to align with Zanu made opposition dangerous. The resulting physical 
and social abuse coupled with the economic hardship of a rapidly retracting economy encouraged 
many to leave the country.   
From the beginning, the conflict was not monolithic; there were diverse ends within civil 
society.  Worker’s rights, development and poverty alleviation were three we explored in the work 
of ORAP, ZCTU and the ZCC. In fact, Zanu was quite outspoken in criticizing the rights-based 
frameworks of these organizations as an importation of a false individualistic universalism from 
the West, serving its purpose in driving home the authenticity of its revolutionary ideas against the 
imposed, imperialistic values that had planted a flag on Zimbabwean consciousness. This phase 
of political hegemony is still going on. To mark his 88th birthday in February 2012, Mugabe 
exhorted Zimbabwean youth to resist Western values, most particularly homosexuality, a stable 
meme in his battle against the West, “You must go to the head of the imperialist and knock out 
his brain…” beware of "any love for money than is greater than your political conscience" 
("Zimbabwe president, marking his 88th birthday, tells the young to shun Western values, gays", 
2012) 
Zanu’s fight against so-called imperialist values has little changed over the last decade 
because it provides a moral basis for party power. For example, The Herald’s blunt allegation of 
the external control of the MDC in 2003 is a raw attempt to tar the MDC with the burden of the 
West’s imperialist intentions,  
On its part, the MDC has spent virtually all of its troubled political life entrenching itself as 
a violent [sic], an anti-Zimbabwe political party created and funded by this country's 
enemies who do not want to see peace, unity and the black majority taking over 
ownership and control of the country's natural resources, notably land. The MDC has not 
wanted peace in Zimbabwe and hence if you look back to 1999 you will find endless 
examples of MDC parliamentarians and officials threatening peace in the hope of 
 180 
politically profiting from the resultant instability. The same is true regarding national unity, 
mention it to the MDC and they run away preaching ethnic divisions because they do not 
want unity ("When will the opposition MDC become Zimbabwean", 2003). 
While the hyperbolic allegations of this article should be taken with a grain of salt, the 
MDC certainly did emerge from a history of threatening peace (if civic protest and strikes are 
seen as breaking the peace) and rejecting the ruling party’s vision of unity (if unity=supporting 
Zanu). The rejection of Zanu’s objectives, or the disbelief that it really intended to accomplish 
anything outside of enriching the political elite through patronage and corruption, fueled the 
people’s power moment. Zanu’s response amounted to a return to the stalled revolution as if to 
say political corruption was meaningless as long as Zimbabwe still suffered from the fake 
imperialist values that keep it in a state of dependency. The moment for withholding political 
authority gave way to the exigencies of survival as everything broke down over the next decade. 
The government manipulated and controlled the country’s resources most importantly overseeing 
the wholesale destruction of the agricultural industry as white farmers were forced out by often-
violent occupations and fled the country.  
Remaking the fundamental constitutional agreements of society is at times a nasty and 
brutish process. We can see, in the case of Zimbabwe, that the pressure for change actually 
accelerated Zanu and the veterans’ use of violence and coercion to resolve their issues over land 
ownership. The emergence of a viable opposition returned the guerrillas to the trenches in a 
social war as a more powerful force than an army of mercenaries. The historical record of the 80s 
and 90s leaves much room to doubt that Zanu had used its fiery revolutionary symbols and 
rhetoric for more than window dressing. But these weapons were stockpiled and used effectively 
in the 2000s to jettison the fake baggage of democracy Zanu had lugged throughout the first two 
decades.  
Gone was Zanu’s support for the institutions of an open society (as newspapers, NGOs 
and the judiciary were all attacked) and gone was the pragmatism, racial tolerance and patience 
that had been central to the Zimbabwean alternative. Balancing its revolutionary objectives with 
tolerance for other objectives—protecting the economic engine of the agrarian economy by 
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leaving capitalist forces in tact, kowtowing to universalist rights, propping up a democracy that 
was really one-party rule and expanding the illusion of independence within a clientelist 
structure—had not worked any way if we measure success against Zanu’s efforts to consolidate 
and monopolize political power.  
Did Zimbabwe have a people’s power revolution? 
For many political analysts, people’s power is significant to the extent that it results in a 
revolution that succeeds in unseating a regime and establishing the power of new political 
contenders. Samuel P. Huntington defines revolution as “rapid, fundamental and violent domestic 
change in the dominant values and myths of a society in its political institutions, social structure, 
leadership and government activity and policies” (Huntington, 1994). If there is such a thing as a 
people’s power revolution some obvious, significant diversions from this conception of revolution, 
such as the commitment to non-violence and the role of values and myths, come to mind. 
The commitment to non-violence in the simple terms of not challenging the government 
with arms is clearly prevalent throughout the three periods of people’s power in Zimbabwe we 
have explored. Non-violence is central to the conception of people’s power pursued by ORAP 
through grassroots empowerment, by ZCTU through mass, peaceful protest and by the NCA 
through citizen dialogue and civic education. These strategies are purposefully non-violent and 
would not seem to fit Huntington’s definition. But if we understand that non-violence in revolutions 
is itself a social objective for a better social order, we can assume Jack Goldstone’s position that 
non-violence may be the only path to democratic improvement, “only where revolutions are 
relatively non-violent, and leave no major counter-revolutionary threats or ethnic conflicts in their 
wake, is their hope for a democratic outcome to the revolutionary struggle” (Goldstone, 1994).  
But what are we to make of revolution as the rapid change of dominant values and 
myths? Zimbabweans did demand a widespread change from the corruption of Zanu’s own 
promises for expanding the general welfare and independence of Zimbabwean society that had 
already become part of the political landscape. Their mass protests expressed the frustration of 
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civil society that government was not living up to the democratic values of participation and 
accountability. Civil society was motivated to address and alter the repressive conditions that limit 
or restrict action (the dependency of communities, the burden of taxes on workers) by attempting 
to restructure the formal political space. It was clear that government did not live up to its 
promises and systematically violated its citizens’ trust. In the expression of people’s power, we 
see a movement for re-establishing the order based on the values of democratic limits on political 
power and increased citizen participation.  Moving into the constitutional review period, NCA 
attempted to channel people’s power into the creation of a new constitution based on these 
values through civic education, consensus building and a dialogue on what government should 
be. In other words, civil society did seek fundamental change in the values and myths of 
government through a revolutionary process aimed at establishing a new constitutional order. 
In Charles Tilly’s framework, the important units of revolutionary action are the regime, 
contenders and the polity (Tilly, 1973). The revolution plays out in terms of who is able to mobilize 
resources for a cause most effectively. There is a certain utility in defining the contenders for 
political power in Zimbabwe as the union leaders and business interests backed up by middle 
class interests, as Bond and Manyana do in Zimbabwe’s plunge.  While this simplifies the 
analysis and makes it fit into a framework of pro and anti-neoliberal contenders, however, it 
obscures the larger-scale resistance to the particular regime by a diversity of actors who are in no 
way differentiated by a commitment to neo-liberal economics or the status quo. Grappling with 
leaderless diversity goes back to the very different conceptions of civil society as a site for 
reinforcing social control or an expanding area of social action. In terms of people’s power, I fail to 
see how it is helpful to collapse this diversity into a class interest or specific set of interests. 
Tilly does propose a resolution in centering analysis around social movements that 
channel claims into sustained campaigns, a variety of political action, and representations of the 
strength of their claims (which he calls WUNC, for worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment). 
From this perspective, the Zimbabwean “movement” was nascent in the grassroots 
empowerment work of NGOs and the protests, perhaps, finally coalescent in the creation of the 
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aptly named Movement for Democratic Change, which was conceptualized as a political party.  It 
is worth considering the quote from the Daily Herald News with which Tilly opens his study of 
Social Movements,  
…various interest sectors of society will be bound together by one common grievance 
which in most cases will be the commonly perceived lack of democracy in a specific 
political setting. This has been particularly the case within the last two decades of 
the South African antiapartheid struggle and more relevantly in the last four years 
in the Zimbabwean situation. The only significant difference between the Zimbabwean 
situation and the antiapartheid social movement in South Africa is that the former tends to 
be less defined and less focused.  In fact, in Zimbabwe people can sometimes be 
forgiven for thinking that the social movement has been split (Tilly, 2004) – emphasis 
added. 
In many ways the social movement is as amorphous a structure as civil society because 
it still lacks a hierarchical order, however, the conceptualization has the heuristic benefit of being 
defined by an overarching aim such as democracy, women, rights or the environment.  It also 
makes sense to speak of leaders within a movement as the organizations and individuals who 
speak on its behalf and contend directly with political power. In this way, various organizations of 
civil society contributed their members, staff and supporters to the pro-democracy movement in 
Zimbabwe and were adept to differing extents at mobilizing or employing people’s power. A 
movement is not the same as people’s power but is a moment when a clear direction emerges 
from it. Exploring the content of the Zimbabwean crisis we have seen such moments in the 
development of grassroots democracy, the strikes and the no-vote on the constitution.  
Clearly, the MDC did emerge out of civil society as a new contender for political power 
only when people had learned that they could not meet their objectives through other methods. 
But Morgan Tsvangirai along with his business, civil society and other backers flounders with the 
message—since the old values and myths were clearly still a powerful moral base and the 
capitalist, neo-liberal framework could hardly be championed (Bond and Manyanya, 2002).  
One way of explaining this is that Zanu was able to manipulate these flaws because the 
consolidation of social objectives behind a homegrown formulation of democracy had not fully 
coalesced. Instead it could mobilize social forces against the same old meme, the continuing 
injustice of land ownership not only because it was the most accessible but because it could 
 184 
demand sufficient loyalty. Revolution continued to be Zanu’s central organizing principle and in 
terms of power tactics it could effectively counter the people’s power of civil society by igniting an 
equal and opposite fervor within civil society itself. Zanu was ineffective in doing this until the post 
constitutional period seemed to confirm that the revolutionary land goals of the veterans and 
others were stymied underplayed by the no vote.   
So was there a people’s power revolution and, if the Zimbabwean struggle against its 
perceived corrupt authoritarian government is an example, in what did it succeed and in what did 
it fail? 
End of neo-patrimonialism? 
Larry Diamond in his 2008 book, The Spirit of Democracy, reviewed the prospects for 
democratic transitions around the world. He comes back to the mainstream view that enduring 
neo-patrimonial realities challenge the development of democracy in Africa, as Michael Bratton 
has put forward.  Such systems are characterized by the charismatic rule of a single individual or 
group who reinforce their rule through a system of clients who benefit in terms of material goods 
and status by providing their support. Clients in Zimbabwe became dependent on the state 
following Independence through political patronage and in terms of drought relief, emergency aid, 
educational and health assistance—a myriad of ways through which Zanu bought loyalty as the 
fount of resources needed for survival and basic necessities. The social contract under such a 
system is, therefore, not made between the government as an abstract entity and civil society but 
between actual people, as epitomized in Robert Mugabe, and those who are in a dependent 
position to the state. The system functions relatively effectively to the extent that the losers—
those who do not receive patronage—have little redress to institutions and are kept in their 
subordinate position through the loyalty of those who would protect their own access and 
benefits.  
Zimbabwean people’s power emerged in direct opposition to neopatrimonial politics (“He 
has exploited us for 17 years. He must go”) because the population understood the transfer of 
resources to a privileged few to be unfair and to this extent the patronage system was a social 
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injustice that stood in the way of achieving a just society through the diverse lens of development, 
human rights, church and community associations. As we saw, in the ORAP case, social 
objectives are adaptable, oriented around what is practical and desirable.  It is possible to build 
pockets of fairness even within a neo-patrimonial regime, as ORAP did for 20 years. Even clients 
who benefit from the largesse of the regime measure their own benefits in terms of the 
accomplishment of their social objectives. In this way, for example, many human rights, 
democracy, university and union activists in Zimbabwe were able to pursue their goals because 
of the benefits they or their families had received from the Zanu-led state.  
But patronage systems were recognized in Zimbabwe as the central problem in terms of 
corruption, self-dealing and the growing understanding that these transfers of resources were not 
free but had to be taken from society as a whole. They came as taxes and levies on the backs of 
the poor and the workers who could see their real capacities diminishing. Thus, the struggle 
against neo-patrimonialism had in Zimbabwe the contours of a tax rebellion.  
Widespread grievance over taxes was a conduit for expressing dissent to the systems of 
political patronage. This bears out in the editorials, the protests and the discussions that focused 
on the unjust way in which the taxes were put forward to benefit the veterans and not the injustice 
of taxes in general.  Thus, the protests were not merely a psychological expression of 
dissatisfaction, but a shared rational objective to make government accountable to all its citizens. 
Civil society does not merely have the capacity to exert people’s power; it reproduces ideas of 
legitimate action through the educational process of pursuing social objectives.  But people’s 
power in Zimbabwe was tactically directed against the injustice of patronage politics, not taking all 
grievances as worthy of a revolution and a re-thinking of the social contract. 
Civil society and political neutrality 
The idea that Zimbabwean civil society was ever apolitical or neutral about politics, I 
think, should be seen as pure rubbish. Even where organizations such as ORAP attempted to 
assume an apolitical position, it was for tactical political reasons and not because they had 
reinterpreted their missions. While the Zimbabwean regime, in the Webberian sense had a 
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monopoly on violence and control over the bureaucratic infrastructure and conditions for social 
organization, it eventually had a responsibility for the greater good in which civil society 
organizations are participants. Civil society’s withdrawal of support from the regime in the course 
of pursuing social objectives was based on a learned moral objection to the political structure in 
which associations found themselves. Zanu was not the engine for the values and myths that 
underpinned its own political institutions despite its attempts to close off and inoculate itself from 
social processes at work in its own civil society and, thus, had no choice—if it was committed to 
its survival as a revolutionary party—except to return to its base with the veterans that shared a 
significant portion of its core values.  
If we accept that the participants in a people’s power revolution share the aspiration for a 
change in the dominant values and myths of society but in a particular limited way that does not 
have the warlike features of violence and contenders for the control of the formal political 
institutions, then it would seem fair to say that the events of the late 1990s were in fact a peoples 
power revolution. But, we have one more issue. Who won? 
Who won the Zimbabwean People’s Power Revolution? 
Everyone suffered from the outcomes of the 1990s protests. Over the 2000 decade, 
Zimbabwe registered a painful deflation of national capacity and a hemorrhaging of economic and 
social health. This pain registered in the decline of support for democracy. By 2004 the 
Afrobarometer survey found that support for democracy as a form of government for the country 
had fallen from two-thirds of the population in 1999 to one half. At the same time trust in Mugabe 
and Zanu had risen since 1999 to just under 50 percent. The survey finds the most important 
factor in this rebound for Zanu was political propaganda. “Since 2000, the government has 
mounted a comprehensive campaign to revive the nationalist fervor of the liberation war” and 
“…of these two strategies of political control persuasion works better than force…. However 
crude, the government’s nationalist appeals have apparently induced numerous Zimbabweans—
especially older, less educated elements in rural areas—to accept the political status quo” 
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(Chikwanha et al., 2004, p 29). While it is important to understand the fear and exhaustion from 
the years of political infighting that followed the launch of the MDC, the ensuing rejection of 
democracy suggests that the people’s power movement of the 1990s not only failed to dislodge 
an authoritarian government but also lost key support for the process of democratization.  
Nevertheless, some feel that Zanu registered a decisive victory in the war of ideas. For 
example, in a recent interview with Lance Guma on South African radio, Blessing Miles Tendai 
defended the assertion in his new book, Making History in Mugabe’s Zimbabwe, ‘Politics, 
Intellectuals and the Media, that the reason for the failure of the MDC to take over in Zimbabwe 
was its inability compared with Zanu to advance ideas (Guma, 2010). Zanu, he argues, exploited 
society’s demand for land and patriotism, while the MDC focused on the strategies of ending 
dictatorship and expanding democracy. The ideas must exist before Zanu and the veterans can 
use violence to impose them, “So the ideas have to be there, these constructions have to be 
there for the violence then to become operationalised so the two go together, they closely rely 
and that’s something that’s been missed” (Guma, 2010).  
Tendai is right; ideas do matter. But the vision of a democratic society in which the 
government is accountable to its people is also a significant idea that showed its mass appeal 
and resonance in the events leading up to the year 2000. The failure is not, thus, only of the 
MDC’s ability to articulate. The failure is that a genuine people’s power movement despite its 
embrace of a diversity of opinions could be channeled into a polarizing, hegemonic war between 
two opposing sides; reminiscent of what Richard Day calls the “hegemony of the idea of 
hegemony.”42 The creation of the MDC as an opposition political party ready to engage on the 
                                                      
42 For Day, civil society is itself a dangerous forms because it is “presumes and reinforces both 
the state and corporate forms through the theory of autonomous spheres of action.” The 
challenge is to break out of the authoritarian mold of set by the idea of the state itself, “Once we 
recognize that actually existing state non-statist societies are organized societies rather than 
reversions to or remnants of, a nasty and brutish ‘state of nature,’ we can begin to see their 
traditions offer alternatives to the hegemony of hegemony.” Day, R. J. F. (2005) Gramsci is dead : 
anarchist currents in the newest social movements, London ; Ann Arbor, MI; Toronto, Pluto 
Press; Between the Lines. 
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very political playing field that was just rejected by civil society reduced the struggle for 
democracy to the faulty political rules and constitution that were central to the problem to begin 
with. People’s power was hemmed into narrow moral space in which democracy was pitted 
against land justice. So people’s power could not bring down the regime because a) civil society 
was divided internally over national objectives and b) the ruling party was capable of exploiting 
this split. 
Thus the people’s power movement in Zimbabwe was countered by an equally authentic 
social power of veterans that were committed to Mugabe/Zanu because they had never ceased to 
share its objectives. Organizations like ORAP, ZCTU and the NCA had come to a practical 
demand for democracy, but they did not or could not articulate a democratic vision that resonated 
with the veterans. The capitalist, largely white, class in Zimbabwe had shown that the status quo 
ownership of the means of production was not going to advance the position of the poor—
especially by 1997 when even those with jobs were struggling. As Bond and Manyanya argue, 
unless the MDC provided a believable blueprint for economic transformation, it could not hope to 
unify society into a struggle against Zanu. The exceptional division of the veterans was, thus, a 
serious flaw in the power of civil society.  
As the government collusion in the land occupations and the violence against the 
remaining white farmers in the country came to a head in the 2000s, the world witnessed a re-
emergence of racist politics. The writing was finally on the wall for the white farmers; they were no 
longer welcome, at least not as owners of productive farmland. Their continuing control of 
agriculture and identity as outsiders gave Zanu an enemy in the white population, one that could 
be linked by inference to the dangerous external enemies who would stanch the revolution and 
exploit the country. In this way, veterans, Zanu members and unemployed youth would feel 
justified in dismantling the remaining economic anachronism of white power, even though it hurt 
the farm workers, the largely agrarian economy and everyone else caught in the turmoil.  
MDC members were targeted and victimized by direct violence because they were 
declared stooges of the internal and external enemy that sought domination over the country. 
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Faced with the organized violence that Zanu knew all too well how to employ, MDC was ill-
prepared to respond and ended up being accused of copying some of the same top-down 
strategies of Zanu (Raftopoulos, 2006, McCandless, 2006).43 Mugabe knew what he was doing 
when he strengthened the party’s link to veterans in 1997.  To reassert authority, he also needed 
to reinvigorate Zanu’s centrality in the social contract. As revolutionary fighters, the veterans 
reproduced and reinforced the liberation struggle for their society. Just as the interests of 
Gramsci’s Italian aristocrats were threatened by the growing power of the capitalists, so were the 
promised social and economic entitlements of the veterans under threat by the new social 
aspirations of civil society.44  
The veterans were not a part of the people’s power movement for democracy; they may 
have constituted an alternative land justice movement although in lieu of people’s power they 
apparently chose a form of more violent persuasion. While the unresolved claims to land were not 
forgotten by organizations such as ORAP and ZCTU and the NCA, they had become secondary 
to rewriting political power. So a broad-based people’s power movement in civil society can be 
countered by powerful competing social objectives. When this force is highly consonant with the 
regime, it comprises the army of troops in the battlefield of values and violence that re-exert 
control over the population, even while they cannot re-create the social contract.   
One can wonder if organizations like ORAP, ZCTU and the NCA had built bridges to the 
veterans, had, as Goma suggests, been as good about ideas as Zanu was, whether the ensuing 
crisis actually needed to happen. The question is hypothetical but it seems fair to say that this 
                                                      
43 For the most part, the MDC and its allies in civil society have been committed to non-violent 
strategies but faced with the overwhelming capacity of Zanu to employ both state and non-state 
methods of violence against them, the direct competition for political power creates an 
exclusionary playing field on which survival has dictated violence as a defense. 
44 Veterans, of course, are not the only Zimbabweans who participated in the struggle or 
contributed to the end of the settler state as Makumbe sums up the hegemonic liberation 
strategy, “The resort to the politics of the liberation struggle is, therefore, a deceptive design 
aimed at hoodwinking the citizenry to think that no other political grouping can run the affairs of 
the nation in a better or more democratic manner” Makumbe, J. M. (2009) Zimbabwe : survival of 
a nation, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Organisation for Social Science Research in Eastern and 
Southern Africa. 
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strategy of broadening the democratic tent had already been tried by political parties and failed. 
The expression of the desire for an open society based on the rule of law had to be put forth as 
an alternative against the more than two decades in which Zanu had honed its message and, 
such a thing, had little to offer those who saw the land ownership structure of society as the major 
issue of injustice.  
But this leads to another hypothetical, what if the anti-Zanu alternative had not been 
narrowly channeled into the creation of the MDC? Perhaps, the non-partisan power of civil society 
was abandoned too early, before it had succeeded in bringing down Zanu. Had Zanu ever shown 
it could share power in the past?  Neither the constitution nor the historical record could give any 
inkling of a hope that Zanu would share political power—so why try again? The creation of an 
alternative party may have been the ultimate gift to Zanu. By so doing, leaders moved opposition 
onto the political field, while the Zanu regime remained in place. The historical parallels are 
remarkable. For example, the liberation war in which Zanu, Zapu and others took to the bush to 
challenge the Rhodesian government was interrupted by the Lancaster House settlement that 
provided for transference of power without achieving the revolutionary outcomes for the return of 
land and resources; now, the MDC would hold Zanu in place by opposing it on the political 
battlefield without winning the battle against corruption or the replacement of a faulty constitution.   
Internally, the land occupiers gave Zanu an arm (just as the 5 Brigade had done during 
the Gukurahundi) that could reach into the rural base and terrorize all opposition. Those with 
MDC cards or suspected of having MDC cards were regularly singled out and terrorized and 
abused. “Whatever one's precise characterisation, there can be little doubt that the invasions 
were associated with intense and widespread intimidation of MDC activists, with the party 
recording the deaths of 31 of its supporters in the run up to the election” (Alexander, 2000). The 
veterans and other land invaders functioned as both a material and ideological disciplining force 
that would keep opposition weak. The MDC, however hard it tried, would be trapped at a 
disadvantage because if it fought against the land justice issue it would show itself an enemy of 
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the veterans and if it fought for the land justice issue its own message of tolerance, rights and rule 
of law would be undermined.  
Before we move forward any further on how civil society failed it is good to explore also 
what it accomplished. Up until the pivotal 2001 “No” vote victory against the draft constitution, 
Zimbabwean civil society was successful in creating spaces that substituted for a government by 
the people as part of a practical process of reproducing the democratic values of traditional 
society in concepts such as Zenzele. We see this first in the creation by ORAP of a practical 
grassroots democratic methodology, organizational structure, mobilizing philosophy and program. 
Its approach, used the structures of government to advance its own goals, and thereby created 
pressure for government to serve its citizens. ORAP is only a microcosm, one development 
movement among many. But we see its embrace of the democratic ideal resonate with the broad 
appeal of the tax protests led by the ZCTU in 1997.  
In 1997 we see a change in strategy. Civil society organizations had learned that Zanu’s 
commitment to democracy—or to seeking the good for all people—was a hollow shell, hardly a 
new idea but one that galvanized into open rebellion against Zanu’s attempt to spread the burden 
for the theft of veteran’s funds across society. In the resulting demonstration of people’s power—
Mugabe abandoned many of the planned taxes—people, including the legislators themselves, 
clearly demanded for the leadership to change. Civil society, thus, succeeded to strengthen and 
build a strong Zimbabwean conception of democracy and even to force the political leadership to 
act increasingly in concordance with democratic values.  The uproar within the Zanu party 
meeting in 1997 was a clear sign that some, if not many, Zanu members themselves shared this 
anger over the democratic deficit. Having withheld their authority, many of the same civil society 
organizations and activists came together in an attempt to re-create the hollow democracy into 
something that better serves the interest of the people. The constitutional movement convened 
under the guidance of ZCC was also a positive outcome in the transformative process. 
Still the movement’s accomplishments in giving meaning to a democratic Zimbabwe were 
insufficient to overcome the centrality of land reform (not democracy) to the next stage of 
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Zimbabwean Independence; as Guma points out this construction of land injustice was an idea 
that already had currency. In this way, we tell two equally valid stories of Zimbabwe side-by-side; 
one the tale of ending colonialism in which the original stripping of a people of its land and 
resources continues to impact on their lives and the other, the story of the quest of civil society to 
remake the political sphere as a more democratic space. In 1997, it looked to many 
Zimbabweans like the latter tale provided the ground for a shared cause against the state. But the 
cause, so to speak, was never shared with the veterans. Since Zimbabweans as a whole were 
called upon to shoulder the burden of the veterans, the 1997 tax revolt cannot be understood 
apart from the veteran’s cause.   
Even as the land has been subsequently taken over in the country, the contours and 
shapes of injustice are shifting again and the possibility of resuming the people’s power revolution 
is taking on new forms. Civil society is immersed in a new struggle for rights, democracy and the 
rule of law that will not go away, such as in the efforts of my acquaintance who has weathered the 
last decade and redirected her energies to mobilizing village women to earn income from mining, 
one of the primary sources the government is currently doing its best to direct into official coffers. 
So, from one perspective, civil society did not fail. It has forced the confrontation of the 
contradictions inherent in the continuing struggle and, whatever emerges on the broken bones of 
the Zimbabwean people’s power revolution, will have to contend with a new civil society that will 
take the events of the last fifteen years as a new social fact.  
Possible Global Implications 
We have explored the contours of the emergence of people’s power in Zimbabwe, hoping 
that it could tell us something about the relationship between political authority and civil society. In 
the course of reviewing the roles and aims of civil society groups, three moments of people’s 
power emerged in the Zimbabwean context: 
1) Promoting alternatives within the political regime 
2) Withdrawing support for political authority 
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3) Attempting to reconstruct the social contract 
At the risk of over-generalizing the Zimbabwean experience, it is worth noting that these 
moments correspond to a changing structural relationship of civil society and the political regime. 
In the first stage, civil society accepted the control of the State and supported its capacity but 
focused largely on creating alternatives for those who are marginalized by the political regime.  
ORAP’s alternative was the creation of an alternative democratic space in which 
marginalized, largely rural communities through social dialogue and local action would hold real 
power over their lives without challenging state power. Human rights organizations, women’s 
organizations, unions and religious organizations in Zimbabwe also pursued alternative political 
strategies interacting in a diversity of ways that did not come up directly against Zanu’s power. By 
not directly opposing government, they were able to carve out a refuge to construct grassroots, 
citizen power as a rational strategy to rectify oppression and serve the needs of marginalized 
communities. As it emerged in Zimbabwe, we can see that the idea of democracy was given 
shape in the safety of this refuge.  
In the next stage of people’s power the contradiction between people’s values and the 
regime expressed itself in outrage over the arbitrary imposition of the will of the minority, as in the 
anti-tax strikes and demonstrations that rocked Zimbabwe. While protests in the street were by 
far the most visible moment in the expression of people’s power, they were merely the tip of the 
iceberg in which people’s real lived experiences had taught them that they share a common 
aspiration for a better political order. The protests were characterized by demands for change, 
impatience and disbelief. A yearning for real change spread like a wildfire across society and 
attention was focused on removing the offending political order. 
Finally, in a third stage, civil society organizations sought to remake the political order to 
better serve the public. But with an established government in place, they face the real problem of 
who represents civil society. Government easily managed to convince even some advocates for 
change that it was the more legitimate site of a participatory constitution making process.  
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None of these elements of people’s power are new. But seeing them emerge as part of a 
process of people acting together as a civil society is worth emphasizing to confirm the 
importance of civil society as a site for the legitimization of political authority. Such a view sees 
the acceptance of the social contract not taking place in some remote, possibly theoretical, and 
abstract moment of history. It finds order emerging from the messy and complicated processes of 
association and interaction. Civil society then imparts authority to its government as a process in 
which people and communities must learn by confronting actual injustice in their own societies. It 
is not any repressive constraints they fight against, it is those experienced in the path to meeting 
their objectives—the imposition of external agendas, unjust taxes, etc.  
Civil society and the political regime are not completely separate. While each is 
organized around different logics they fundamentally rely on each other along the dimensions of 
control, support and the mutual construction of the values and meanings that flow through 
society. In this way, both hold power over the political objectives of society and are able to 
influence each other. People’s power can be countered by the power of the regime in a condition 
of mutual dependency—the supportive conditions, in fact, proposed by most followers of Putnam 
and de Tocqueville including made comparative political theorists and aid agencies. While this is 
a messy relationship based on ongoing processes, it warrants some general observations. 
Under appropriate conditions, the expression of people’s power as a concerted and 
effective force of civil society amounts to a withdrawal of support that can lead to the 
downfall of a regime 
As we see in Zimbabwe, the narrowing of the political space into a one-party state began 
soon after Independence. This was accepted because many Zimbabweans respected Zanu (or 
Mugabe) as a legitimate leader of the revolution and they saw concrete gains from the expansion 
of social services. Not all social objectives could be met in this context; but many could. The 
withdrawal of support from political authority is not the same as the absence of support for the 
government. It is that moment as we saw in 1997 when the reconstitution of the regime becomes 
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the shared goal of civil society, which continues, nevertheless, to respect the authority of 
government in general.  
It is interesting how far some have gone to try to exclude from civil society all the 
unwanted elements that are squeaky and uncomfortable. A somewhat common term “uncivil 
society” refers to the undemocratic forces that would remake society in their own image and do 
not care a whit for the objectives of others who do not share their goals and identities. Uncivil 
society uses violence or it is not pluralistic in its values (Kopecký and Mudde, 2003).45 
This might make sense if the social contract is appropriate and fixed in a widespread 
constitutional culture, re-created in the Habermassean way through the consent of everyone who 
is potentially affected, but if consent is absent or the constitution is faulty there is no shared social 
framework from which to judge who is in and who is out of civil society. Of course, the use of 
violence against others even in the pursuit of perceived justice is still indefensible because those 
affected by the violence find it to be wrong. The exercise of freedom in the associative sphere, 
that is civil society, requires a basic recognition of the other, the other’s rights and a commitment 
to limit one’s own actions based on the rules of society.  
Writing in 1995, I think Robert Fatton gives a terrific description of the need to understand 
the uncivil within civil society:  
…current processes of democratization are due largely to civil society's debordement of 
the state. By debordement I mean the capacity of civil society to defy and ultimately 
overwhelm the predatory state and its projet disciplinaire through illegal mass political 
defiance and protest. Civil society is thus a potentially liberating factor in any political 
calculus; and yet it is not always civil. Civil society can indeed be quite uncivil; it is replete 
with antinomies (Fatton, 2010). 
                                                      
45 Kopecky and Mudde quote Larry Diamond “A third distinguishing mark is that civil society 
encompasses pluralism and diversity. To the extent that an organization—such as a religious 
fundamentalist, ethnic chauvinist, revolutionary, or millenarian movement—seeks to monopolize a 
functional or political space in society, claiming that it represents the only legitimate path, it 
contradicts the pluralist and market-oriented nature of civil society. Related to this is a fourth 
distinction, partialness, signifying that no group in civil society seeks to represent the whole of a 
person’s or a community interests”. Such a highly restrictive contraction of all of civil society 
would cut out virtually everyone who acts on behalf of deeply held moral commitments. It makes 
civil society less messy by denying it the power to change a whole society.    
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A growing understanding that the government was corrupt and its objectives hollow or 
dissonant with most or all groups within civil society raised the stakes and expressed itself as a 
denial of the regime’s political authority, particularly around proposed unfair taxes, through protest 
and refusal to participate. Material deprivation was, of course, intimately linked to this process (as 
the proposed taxes were seen to cause significant hardship to workers and others). But citizens 
did not only suffer from a significant loss of income; they lost hope that they could to improve their 
own conditions through political redress. People’s power was, thus, the expression of moral 
outrage over the political sphere. However, in Zimbabwe, people’s power did not succeed in the 
1990s to bring down the political regime. It is, thus, not an unstoppable force. It can be retarded, 
countered and reduced. 
The political regime controls outcomes through the employment of hegemonic values 
within civil society that can disrupt and divide people’s power 
A people’s power protest comes together around a common agreement on the state-as-
problem by a diversity of associations (as in the case of bringing together unions, human rights 
and church organizations in Zimbabwe). These associations are like travelers on a road who all 
work together to remove a roadblock even though they are strangers and headed in different 
directions. The obstacle is concrete and real to them; they rely on each other to define the scope 
of the problem and arrive at a solution.  
With limited communication between the veterans and their fellow travelers, it is 
unsurprising that the two could not define their common problem. Was it the injustice of 
continuing dependency or the corruption and patronage systems of the government, 
remembering that both these issues had widespread resonance? And both had internally 
legitimated just causes. The massive consensus around the problem of the tax hikes in 1997 
included everyone but the veterans and those who shared their values. And for the veterans the 
problem was not, at that point, Zanu: it was the people’s power demonstrations that stood in their 
way of their special status in the continuing struggle of Zimbabweans from their resources 
through the attempt to take down the veterans levy.  
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All political regimes will seek to reward and benefit their supporters and particularly those 
whose resonance with their political goals is the most attuned.  But it cannot be said that just any 
special interest group can provide the hegemonic support that a government needs to stay in 
power. Just as knives and spears are no longer as relevant as guns, tanks and planes on the 
battlefield, so the objectives of the hegemonic class must resonate out in civil society as well as 
with the government, we see this in Zimbabwe with sufficient numbers of youth and/or land 
hungry people willing to join the invasions.  The struggle for liberation from colonialism has never 
really ended.  Even though civil society gave a wide embrace to the social objectives of 
democratic participation, human rights and protections, the idea that all freedoms must be won 
and the lived experience of the failure of white-settler capitalism to redistribute land and 
resources were shared even among the broad dissenters in civil society. The means of the violent 
occupiers could be denounced but the ends, distilled as the re-establishment of black control of 
the land, were largely shared even by many of the white farmers (whose public complaints were 
not the solving of injustice but the imposition of new injustice). As Moyo remarks, “…both ZANU 
(PF) and the state have followed behind the social movement and tried to co-opt and contain it 
within the framework of the evolving land acquisition programme” (Moyo, 2001).  
As Gramsci suggested, hegemonic civil society is a powerful force. Leadership is exerted 
through the resonance of values—in the case of Zimbabwe—the resolution of land injustice. And 
therein is an explanation of Zanu’s success in reasserting and reconstructing itself; its own 
objectives were not exhausted. As Tendai points out Zanu was very strategic in the war of ideas. 
By using the anger over land, a contradiction that it was careful to keep alive but also contain 
during its first two decades, and one that resonated beyond Zimbabwe’s borders (Raftopoulos, 
2004),46 mobilizing the veterans meant reinvigorating the basis of its authority over the continuing 
                                                      
46 “The Mugabe Government has worked hard to generalize its model of resolving the national 
question, based largely on the model of land reform through violent land occupations, articulated 
through a Pan Africanist and anti-imperialist discourse. Moreover, in this model, the human rights 
question and the democratic demands of civic groups are dismissed as an extension of Western 
intervention, with little relevance to the ‘real issues’ of economic empowerment” Raftopoulos, B. 
(2004) Nation, race and history in Zimbabwean Politics. in B. Raftopoulos and T. Savage (eds) 
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struggle. The landless and the land hungry derived their power from having nothing to lose and 
everything to gain as well as their claim to a moral ground.  
What if civil society had built better bridges within itself to the veterans and those with 
continuing grievances over land distribution? What if ORAP had not ignored the land issue and 
the ZCTU had been better at bringing in the veterans who also had a beef with the government 
over its corruption with the veterans fund? What if the NCA had found a way to involve the 
veterans in the constitutional debate from the beginning? If a people’s power revolution requires 
unity around a shared cause, there is value in acting with a view to the make up of the whole of 
civil society. This is a question of strategy and tactics but it is also a key to the construction of 
shared social values. So it was not inevitable that democratic-seeking civil society had to come 
head-to-head with land justice seeking Zimbabwe and it is not inevitable that either democracy or 
land justice will be realized without the other, it is, probably not even very likely. But the 
generations of tomorrow who will have to rebuild on the ashes of these destructive years will deal 
with new possibilities for democracy and distribution that bring their own need for resolution.  
The construction of social meaning and values within civil society is an ongoing process 
that can be interrupted but not halted by the exertion of hegemony or the removal of 
support. 
If we see it this way, the construction of political authority is a painful struggle—it could be 
the educational process to which Hegel referred when he said “the disfavor showered on 
education is due in part to its being this hard struggle…” (Hegel, 1967). This goes beyond the 
pain of learning what is already known; if we think of education as a constructive process in which 
people face and work through the intransigent and contradictory values of their society, in which 
there are no easy answers but only those that come through the painful process of succeeding 
and failing on what we set out to do, we can see the lifeworld of civil society always pushing at 
                                                      
Zimbabwe: injustice and political reconciliation. Cape Town: Institute for Justice and 
Reconciliation. 
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the repressive margins, falling down but getting back up as a different civil society with new 
capacities ready to fail and succeed again. 
As the saying goes, people can always vote with their feet.  More than three million 
Zimbabweans (out of a total population of 12 million47) fled the country in the decade after the 
people’s power demonstrations.48  There are now Zimbabwean diasporic communities in South 
Africa, England, Australia, Canada, the United States and neighboring countries.  Of course, 
much of the white settler population would leave as well ("30,000 Whites in Zimbabwe", 2005). 
Many in the diaspora continue to be the voice of a democratic movement and they, along with the 
courageous activists that have stayed in the countries at organizations like the NCA, Zimbabwe 
Lawyers for Human Rights, the CCJPZ, Kubatana, the Foundation for the Western Region of 
Zimbabwe and others as well as the MDC that has learned from its political battles and 
persecution. The debate about the future more democratic Zimbabwean regime continues and 
will prove a more powerful force than international sanctions in charting a path through the 
endless crisis. 
Political regimes through civil society’s dependence on supportive resources and 
institutions can further inoculate themselves against people’s power 
Clearly, Zanu did not only have the hegemonic power of the veterans and the 
unemployed youth to deploy against the growing opposition. Because state and civil society are 
interdependent both for material resources such as land, taxes and patronage and the state 
provides the conditions, laws and institutions for associative action, the state can diminish 
people’s power merely removing by removing the support and protections needed by civil society. 
                                                      
47 The CIA Fact Book reports the population of Zimbabwe as 11,342,000 in 2000. The population 
would fall by 4 percent and 7 percent in 2006 and 2008 respectively, reflecting internal crisis. 
Current population is reported as 12 million. The Fact Book also estimates that Zimbabwe 
currently has the world’s greatest rate of migration of nearly 25 migrants per 1000 people—
presumably as Zimbabweans are trying to return home. CIA, (2011) CIA Fact Book - Zimbabwe. 
48 The size of the diaspora is difficult to estimate and many of the returning Zimbabweans may 
have returned after the periodic crises such as the economic collapse and elections of 2008. In 
2007 there were at least three million displaced Zimbabweans in South Africa. Howard-
Hassmann, R. E. (2010) 'Mugabe's Zimbabwe, 2000-2009: Massive Human Rights Violations and 
the Failure to Protect', Human Rights Quarterly, 32(4), 898-920.  
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Zanu methodically dismantled the supportive environment. It eviscerated the judiciary of 
sympathetic judges, proposed draconian new rules for NGO registration, removed legal 
protections for an independent media, persecuted those few newspapers that remained and 
limited food distribution by independent actors. By permitting violent land occupations and the 
persecution of MDC card carriers, it created an environment of fear for independent thinking and 
action and removed the security civil society needed.  
We can come to the issue of dependency in two distinct ways.  First, Zanu controlled the 
aid and assistance for communities affected by drought as well as the national social services 
infrastructure. While it had opened up in the 1990s to allow for private actors in its clientelist 
networks, for example, the budding of independent media and the action of local and international 
NGO in the rural areas, it kept sufficient power to squeeze them if they rebelled. By coming down 
hard on civil society, e.g. the draconian NGO legislation and media ownership laws passed in the 
2000s, it succeeded in disciplining civil society. Unless MDC were to have taken to the bush, its 
own powers to mobilize resources behind its cause were severally limited.   
But it is hard to say that removing the supportive pillars for civil society is a strategy 
worthy of replication by other governments that would stay in power. The resulting loss of 
population and industry, not to mention the eventual international sanctions that Zimbabwe 
suffered, are a very high price to pay and make it clear that civil society and the state are 
significantly dependent on each other.  
While civil society associations are conscious of repressed aspirations in diverse ways, 
they will work with regimes to solve them until the regime becomes the most significant 
obstacle to these aspirations. 
To the extent that ORAP’s approach is generalizable, it says a lot about the immanent 
capacity of civil society to make its own freedoms in a repressive situation. By creating the 
conditions and logic in which autonomy over development makes sense, ORAP was actively 
resisting the government/party centric view of development. It did this through an emancipatory 
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approach to citizen’s democracy that avoided squaring off against its government—which 
ultimately would have weakened its ability to pursue a more democratic localized alternative. 
Once again, seeing education as something that emerges from both daring to set one’s 
own objectives and acting on them, ORAP communities had the opportunity to experience 
freedom in conditions that were far from free. The violence of the Gukurahundi was a concrete 
experience. Coupled with a pulling in, a return to culture and initiative taught people that they did 
not need to wait for the government in order to accomplish the things they desired. The 
participation of local government officials in ORAP programs coupled with its efforts to work 
collaboratively with government can be seen as a constructive engagement to make the 
government into something it needed to be. Attempting to re-purpose the government’s objectives 
to those more resonant with the objectives of local association was, thus, a viable way of resisting 
authoritarianism.   
Such collaboration is, however, very difficult to separate out when the government itself 
becomes the problem. While ORAP participated in the Working Peoples Convention and pursued 
its own program of civic education, it had to bear the burden of needing government approval in 
order to pursue its drought relief and other programs in the rural areas, it failed to put its full 
support behind the people’s power coalitions that emerged from the 1997 demonstrations.   
The creation of a rival political party before support for political authority has been fully 
withdrawn may undermine the force of civil society 
In a society with little viable opposition the creation of the Movement for Democratic 
Change as a broad-based, inclusive political party was easily justified by the necessity to re-insert 
debate in the political process. Perhaps, however, it came too soon. The NCA had succeeded in 
highlighting the need to create a new constitution and the people’s power demonstrations had 
withdrawn significant political support from Zanu but the political regime remained in place. 
Paradoxically, the government-led constitutional consultations did produce something of 
a blueprint around the desire for a more limited government and the ‘No’ vote on the constitution 
was actually a ‘Yes’ vote for this dispensation. The elections that year in which the MDC garnered 
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50 percent of the Parliamentary vote were a further expression that the country was ready for a 
change. 
It was not enough, however, to simply be the party of not-Zanu, as many of the parties in 
the country had already demonstrated. And as long as the rules of politics remained the same, 
the MDC, like the parties that came before it was going to need to fight over their bones. As 
Raftopoulos elegantly shows, it had neither the structure, the vision nor the capacity for this fight 
even though it was the best subscribed opposition party since Zapu and sucked all of the strength 
and power it could from civil society (Raftopoulos, 2006). As Bond and Manyanya argue, MDC’s 
economic vision abandoned the workers and the poor for a version of the prevailing neo-
liberalism, prying it wide-open to the charges of new imperial control (Bond and Manyanya, 2002) 
at the center of the Zanu’s political vision. 
This does not mean civil society should never move its dissent into a political party—it 
does so all the time. But the speed of the events and the lack of preparation can leave no 
alternative except for a new party to play the same hegemony of hegemony game, by the same 
rules and with the same outcomes as the past. The creation of the stopgap Unity government in 
2008 is an eerie reflection of the Unity Accords of 1987 that ended the life of Zapu or the 
negotiated settlement of Lancaster House that changed the faces but not the structure of 
government. The difference is, of course, that Zimbabwe is in a much different place today and 
the debate over what it is and what it should be has directly affected much more of its population. 
Conclusion: When will Zimbabwe be Free? 
I must admit that I have entitled my conclusion “When will Zimbabwe be Free” somewhat 
ironically and feel compelled to start with the disclaimer that I believe the preceding analysis has 
no predictive power to answer this question. What I mean to say by the question is a little less 
dramatic and more limited in its scope.  Something more like can we expect to see a resolution to 
this particular tragedy and what might a resolution look like from the perspective of civil society? 
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In 2008, the economic collapse in Zimbabwe became so complete that the Zimbabwe 
dollar disappeared. Having survived rates of inflation that make it a global legend—dollar 
dominations rose from the thousands, to the millions and billions and even came with expiration 
dates in the form of bearer’s checks—the Zimbabwe dollar was finally supplanted by the US 
dollar (and a cobbled together mess of coins from neighboring countries). My acquaintances all 
have horror stories to tell about 2008, mostly concerning their frantic search for food and the 
basics of survival that consumed virtually everyone in the country. Those close to the borders fled 
to neighboring countries where they endured long lines and discrimination as they struggled to 
bring home enough to keep themselves and their families alive. In a way, the loss of the currency 
is an interesting metaphor for the Zimbabwean identity, which, although it has not ceased to exist 
as the currency has suffers from a highly contested present that seems like it will only progress in 
a future without Mugabe and, perhaps, Zanu. 
After the 2008 election in which Zanu declared victory amid allegations of rigging and 
intimidation, South Africa helped to negotiate the “unity” government between Zanu and the MDC, 
from which Zanu/Mugabe has shown it will do whatever it takes to extricate itself. Industry, media, 
tourism, infrastructure, schools, health care and people’s lives have been ruined or remade. And, 
yet, I think the story of civil society is a reason for optimism; ‘hope,’ a word I have not yet heard 
die on the lips of my Zimbabweans friends. Why? 
While there is no guarantee, civil society is tirelessly working to both define the space of 
free action and enhance the capacity of citizens to act within it. As a historical process, new 
repressions and freedoms are created that will only be stable to the extent that people 
understand themselves to be better off with them, that is, able to rationally anticipate the 
accomplishment of their objectives. Zimbabweans are not playing with democracy; for many the 
future of the country has become literally a matter of survival. The struggle for Independence 
must be won over and over again, at each stage seeking for a chink of freedom as diversity 
overcomes one hegemonic group only to see another rise in its place. On the other hand, the 
struggle for survival is now taking up most the time of many Zimbabweans transforming many 
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social objectives into unaffordable luxuries that must await a new political dispensation. In falling 
half way down a well, the danger of falling the rest of the way is still there. It is interesting that so 
many discussions with my friends in Zimbabwe throughout the years have begun with an 
acknowledgement that “we have already hit the bottom.” The idea that there is nowhere to go and 
that one can only begin to climb from the bottom.    
If we think of the social contract as a process and not a moment, the centrality of the 
dream of a participatory constitution is a beautiful metaphor for the advancing of new conditions 
through learning, struggle and aspirations within evolving social contracts. But for me, it is the 
clarity of the old woman in Filabusi that the aspiration of civil society—of people sharing common 
cause—is the common good of all including those who have not yet contributed and who are not 
yet born. And in this the political, moral and ethical goals of society, civil society provides the 
possibility of the idea of expanding freedom even while the concrete reality remains out of grasp. 
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Appendix 1: Historical Timeline 
 
Year Event 
1961 Zapu Formed 
1962 Southern Rhodesia Council of Social Services founded 
1963 Zanu Formed 
1979 Lancaster House Agreement 
Independence, beginning of national reconciliation 
Voluntary Organisations in Community Enterprise (VOICE) established 





Independence Day Celebration at Rufaro Stadium, 
Salisbury  
State of Emergency renewed (and every 6 months to 1990)  
Battle between ZIPRA and ZINLA guerillas  
Organisation of Rural Associations for Progress (ORAP) begins organizing 
Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) established 
1981 
Feb   
 
Aug 
Outbreak of Violence at Entumbane (300 killed) 
Dumbutshena Report commissioned  
South African forces sabotage Inkomo Army barracks 
($50m in equipment destroyed)  
Growth with Equity development plan 







Discovery of arms caches in Matabeleland  
Indemnity and Compensation bill reinstated (granting 
government officials immunity from prosecution  
5 Brigade passing out parade and ready for deployment  




5 Brigade deployed to Matabeleland  
Chihambakwe Commission of Inquiry set up to investigate 
atrocities in Matabeleland. 
1984 Leadership Code Promulgated 
CIO detentions/disappearances  
1985 
Jul Elections (Zapu retains its 15 Matabeleland seats) 
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Year Event 
1986 First 5-year Development Plan 
Replacement of Westminster form of Government 
1987 Jun 
Dec 
Zapu rallies banned  
Unity Accord – End Gukurahundi Replacement of 




Amnesty for dissidents (122 surrender)  
Amnesty includes all members of the army  
Willowvale Scandal breaks 




Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) party formed by Tekere  
Student demonstrations at University of Zimbabwe lead to 
first closure  
Mugabe dissolves senate, creates House of Assembly 
Economic policy change-ESAP  
Elections – ZUM loses  
Constitution change: ZAPU leader as Head of State/Land Reform  
Zimbabwe accord with Overseas Private Investment Corporation  
Nurses and teachers strike 
1990 
Jul:  State of Emergency is not renewed  
1991 Drought to 1992 
Land Reform and Repayment II published  
1992 Mar 
May 
Lines for drought relief 
Forum for Democratic Reform Trust established 
1994 Jul  Racism protests in Harare 
1995 Apr  Elections IMF Suspends Balance of Payments support 
1996 Second 5-year ESAP set to begin Land negotiations with Britain 





CCJPZ releases Matabeleland Report  
Commercial farm workers Strike 
Nation-wide “people’s power” stayaway and strikes 
Zanu party Conference in Mutare 
Launch of the National Constitutional Assembly 
Continued strikes and stayaways 
1998 
Sep Donor’s conference - International Donors' Conference on 





Nationwide Referendum Rejects Draft Constitution 
Land occupation intensifies 
Constitutional Amendment 16A 
2008 Collapse of Zimbabwe Dollar 
2009 Unity government formed with MDC and Zanu 
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Appendix 2: Acronyms 
Acronym Name 
ANC Africa National Congress 
BLPC Bulawayo Legal Project Centre 
CCJPZ Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe 
CFU Commercial Farmers Union 
CIO Central Intelligence Organisation 
CIVICUS World Alliance for Citizen Participation 
CZI Confederation of Zimbabwean Industries 
ESAP Economic Structural Adjustment Program 
LCFHR Lawyers’ Committee for Human Rights 
LRF Legal Resources Foundation 
MDC Movement for Democratic Change 
MMPZ Media Monitoring Project of Zimbabwe 
NANGO National Association of Non-Governmental Organisations 
NCA National Constitutional Assembly 
NCPDZ National Council of Disabled People of Zimbabwe 
NGO  Non-governmental Organization 
NUST National University of Science and Technology 
ORAP Organisation of Rural Associations for Progress 
UDI Unilateral Declaration of Independence 
UNDEF United Nations Democracy Fund 
UNRISD United Nations Research Institute for Social Development 
UZ University of Zimbabwe 




Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front 
ZANLA Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (armed wing of ZANU-PF) 
ZAPU Zimbabwe African People’s Union 
ZIPRA Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (armed wing of ZAPU) 
ZCBC Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops’ Conference 
ZCC Zimbabwe Council of Churches 
ZCTU Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions 
ZNA Zimbabwe National Army 
ZNLWVA Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association 
ZUM Zimbabwe Unity Movement 
ZRP Zimbabwe Republican Police 
 
